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Abstract 
Several recent studies indicate that revolutions of non-violent civil resistance lead 
to more democratic and peaceful political transitions than either violent revolutions or 
elite-led political transitions.  However, this general trend has not been disaggregated to 
explain the many prominent cases where nonviolent revolutions are followed by 
authoritarianism or civil war.  Understanding these divergent cases is critical, particularly 
in light of the problematic transitions following the "Arab Spring" revolutions of 2011.  
In this paper I explain why nonviolent revolutions sometimes lead to these negative 
outcomes.  I show, through quantitative analysis of a dataset of all successful non-violent 
revolutions from 1900-2006 and comparative case studies of the revolutions in Egypt and 
Yemen, that the mechanism of success whereby the non-violent revolution achieves its 
goals, such as an negotiation, election, or coup d’etat, has a significant impact on the 
likelihood of democracy and civil war.  Most centrally, mechanisms which involve pre-
transition capacity-building, civil resistance campaign initiative, and broad political 
consensus are significantly more likely to lead to democracy and peace.  This research 
has powerful implications for understanding both the options available to non-violent 
activists seeking revolutionary goals and the choices likely to lead to optimal outcomes 
during the post-revolutionary transition. 
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Introduction: When the Revolution Wins 
As, in a quavering voice, the vice-president of Egypt officially announced that 
Hosni Mubarak, authoritarian president of Egypt since 1981, was stepping down 
immediately, the crowds in Tahrir Square erupted.  For 18 days, despite repression and 
concession, despite tear gas and thugs on camel-back, despite the regime repeatedly 
assuring them that their demands had been heard and there was no point in remaining in 
the streets, they had stayed.   They were tired of assurances, tired of fear, tired of a 
country where the most central facts were unemployment, poverty, and a criminal 
government. And now, through their steadfastness, they had nonviolently ousted the 
regime that had ruled longer than many of the protesters could remember.  Around the 
world commentators talked about the hope of Egypt, of a new prosperous society united 
across social and religious divides, led by passionate young liberal technocrats from 
Google.    
 Yet over the following months the military regime which replaced Mubarak, 
headed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), backtracked on their 
support for the revolution.  Thousands of civilians were arrested, sometimes tortured, and 
sentenced in quick, secretive courts.   Promises of democracy were hampered by 
guarantees of military immunity and the continued preferential treatment of old regime 
elites.  And when Egypt’s first free and fair presidential election in history brought the 
2 
Muslim Brotherhood to power, conflict grew.  Clashes between Christians and Muslims 
in Egypt became increasingly common.  
Finally in July 2013, after protests of an almost unprecedented size and scope,
1
 
the military once again stepped in and ousted the elected government in a popularly-
backed coup d’etat.  This second coup has been followed by months of violent clashes 
between brotherhood supporters and the military, with little indication of the possibility 
of a long-term sustainable solution.  As the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution 
passed, Amnesty International bleakly observed that “the revolt’s causes not only remain 
but in some cases have grown more acute…the motto of the uprising, ‘bread, freedom, 
social justice,’ rings hollow” (Amnesty International, 2014, 5).  Three years of revolution 
have left many Egyptians wondering what went wrong and if it any of it was worth the 
sacrifices they endured to make it happen. 
 Many have speculated on what happened to that hopeful moment in 2011.  
Perhaps it was an incompatibility of Islam with democracy, or the continuing influence of 
authoritarian elements, or maybe the destructive history of the totalitarian regime which 
preceded the revolution.   But what much of this analysis misses is that Egypt, and 
several similar cases from the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, are part of a much larger 
historical trend.  Since the beginning of the 20
th
 century there have been over eighty 
successful nonviolent campaigns that have ousted a government, expelled an occupying 
                                                 
1
 Media estimates range from the millions to the tens of millions, numbers which, if 
accurate, would account for almost a third of Egypt’s population and make the June 2013 
protests among the largest in history. 
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power, or seceded from a nation-state.  Of these cases, over a quarter were followed by 
major episodes of political violence, and more than a third failed to transition to 
democracy.
2
  Why is this the case?  Why are successful nonviolent revolutions sometimes 
followed by autocracy and violence?      
 This historical trend is made more puzzling because several studies have shown 
that political transitions initiated by revolutions of nonviolent civil resistance tend to 
result in greater peace and democracy over the long term than other kinds of transitions.  
Theorists of civil resistance contend that the dynamics of nonviolent struggle inherently 
incline societies towards democracy since they diffuse power throughout many different 
societal actors (Sharp 1973).  Transitions initiated by nonviolent campaigns are more 
likely to be democratic and internally peaceful than transitions initiated by violent 
campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011), more likely to be democratic than transitions 
orchestrated by elites (Ackerman and Karatnycky 2005) and more likely than violent 
campaigns to lead to democracy than a new autocracy (Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch 
2013).  If these studies are accurate, what explains the widespread occurrence of 
exceptions to this trend?   
 In this thesis I argue that the answer to this puzzle lies in how the civil resistance 
campaign achieves its goals.  These mechanisms of success play a central role in shaping 
the nature of the political transition process which follows them as the various strategic 
actors in the transition process respond to the initial stimulus of the mechanism of success 
                                                 
2
 See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the data informing these figures. 
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in consistent, path-dependent fashion.  Like a chess game between grandmasters in which 
the opening sequence shapes the rest of the game so mechanisms of success inform and 
confine the strategic decisions throughout the transition process.  These decisions in turn 
dramatically shape the likelihood that the transition will be characterized by violence and 
what political system will be established at its conclusion. 
The first step in my argument is an examination of the previous literature on civil 
resistance.  I find that while the civil resistance literature convincingly argues for the 
positive effects of nonviolent action on society its underlying theory of power, informed 
by the work of Gene Sharp, makes it ill-equipped to consider the future effects of 
successful civil resistance campaigns.  In addition the empirical work on civil resistance 
has been primarily concerned with explaining civil resistance success and has not 
disaggregated the set of successful campaigns in order to understand the variation which 
is clearly observed in their outcomes.  Thus I find the extant literature to be insufficient to 
answer my question. 
Having established the necessity for my project based on these gaps in the 
literature I then explain the nature of the various mechanisms of success and lay out the 
essential characteristics which separate them from one another.  Informed by theories of 
nonviolent action as well as scholarly accounts and primary sources I present a six-tiered 
typology of mechanisms of success which captures all of the variation in the historical 
cases.  I argue that transitions which are characterized by three factors: campaign 
initiative, broad political consensus, and pre-success political capacity-building are likely 
5 
to initiate transition processes which will not lead to violence and which will result in 
more democratic future societies. 
This argument is not intended to be a generalized theory of either democratization 
or political violence, but rather is limited in scope to the particular conditions following 
the success of a civil resistance campaign.  I do not preclude the possibility that 
mechanisms of success may play an important role in other types of transitions.
3
 Studying 
their effects in these different environments would doubtless be a fruitful avenue of 
research.  However, following the insights of Johnstad  (2010) and Ackerman and 
Karatnycky (2005) I consider successful civil resistance campaigns to have a distinct 
transitional path, with its own dynamics dissimilar from the larger set of regime 
transitions.  Hence, because of this uniqueness, I limit the scope of my argument to 
transitions following successful civil resistance campaigns. 
I test my theory using an original dataset of successful civil resistance campaigns, 
their mechanisms of success and future levels of democracy and violence.  I find that, 
while the small size of the dataset makes statistical results somewhat unstable, the data is 
strongly suggestive of my theory.  Mechanisms of success which possess my three 
essential factors, namely negotiations and electoral victories, are significantly associated 
with higher levels of post-campaign democracy and lower levels of violence.  These 
results continue to hold when a series of control variables informed by the literature on 
democratization and civil war are included to test for alternate explanations. 
                                                 
3
 For example see Geddes, Wright and Frantz 2014. 
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I bolster my statistical findings through an examination of two contemporary 
cases: the Arab Spring revolutions in Egypt and Yemen.  Traditional explanatory 
variables for democracy and civil peace would suggest that the transition in Egypt would 
be more peaceful and democratic, while Yemen would be likely to be characterized by 
violence and a return to authoritarianism.  In contrast, while both transitions are 
preliminary at this point, the Yemeni transition has been much smoother and more 
inclusive and the Egyptian transition has resulting in authoritarian retrenchment and 
increasing political violence.  This difference can be explained in large part by the 
difference in the two cases’ mechanisms of success. 
Finally, I conclude by re-stating my argument in light of my findings and laying 
out areas of research which remain to be examined and other crucial questions which can 






Chapter One: Civil Resistance, Democracy, and Civil Peace 
In this chapter I review the major literature on civil resistance and its effects.  I 
follow this general review with a more in-depth analysis of the theoretical work of Gene 
Sharp (1973, 2004) which has informed much of the civil resistance literature, 
emphasizing the four mechanisms of success which Sharp postulates based on his theory 
of power.  I critique Sharp’s exclusive focus on the ability of civil resistance to degrade 
existing structures of power without taking into account the new power structures which 
must replace those degraded, a bipolar focus on struggle between the nonviolent 
campaign and the regime which does not take into account other actors’ agency, as well 
as the lack of empirical parsimony in his discussion of mechanisms of success.  I propose 
instead a more empirically-grounded theory of success mechanisms which connects the 
initial insights of Sharp’s theory to the historical record of successful civil resistance 
campaigns.  
Civil Resistance: From Pacifism to Pragmatism 
Nonviolent resistance has been a facet of many political systems for much of 
human history, even as early as ancient Rome (Sharp, 1973, 75-76).  Civil resistance has 
played an important role in several struggles of national liberation (Bartkowski, 2013), 
including the American Revolution (Conser Jr., McCarthy, Toscano, & Sharp, 1986).  
More recently, civil resistance campaigns were a major factor in the end of the 
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Communist regimes of Eastern Europe (Garton Ash, 1990), the spread of multi-party 
democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa (Bratton & van de Walle, 1997), and the overthrow of 
authoritarian leaders in the post-Communist “color revolutions” (Bunce & Wolchik, 
2011).  Thus, understanding the occurrence and success of civil resistance is of central 
importance for political scientists.  However, the clear theoretical articulation and careful 
scientific study of civil resistance has lagged significantly behind its historical 
importance.    
 Early literature on civil resistance came primarily from ideological pacifists.  
Henry David Thoreau articulated a theory of civil disobedience as “gumming the wheels” 
of an unjust system (Thoreau, 2004).  Adin Ballou, a Unitarian minister and anti-slavery 
activist, wrote extensively on the ethical duty of Christians to reject the use of violence 
based on Jesus’ teaching in the Sermon on the Mount to “not resist one who is evil” 
(Matthew 5:39 English Standard Version) and argued for the potential of achieving 
political goals through nonviolent means (Ballou, 2003).  Ballou’s works were an 
inspiration to the Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy, who drew on them in his writings on 
pacifism; most famously The Kingdom of God is Within You (Tolstoy, 1927).   
 Tolstoy’s works in turn served as a central inspiration in the intellectual 
development of the 20
th
 century’s greatest theorist and practitioner of nonviolent 
resistance: Mohandas “Mahatma” Gandhi.  Gandhi and Tolstoy corresponded extensively 
early in the Indian independence leader’s life (Gandhi, 1983).  This correspondence, 
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along with The Kingdom of God is Within You, formed much of the basis for Gandhi’s 
development of the idea of satyagraha, or “soul force,” whereby a nonviolent contender 
willing to take on suffering for the sake of a goal is able to both undermine and win over 
his opponent.  Gandhi wrote extensively on Satyagraha in the context of the Indian 
struggle for independence (Gandhi, 1958), and his example spawned its own literature, 
with many works both in India and internationally drawing upon his ideas and practices.
4
  
Other well-known practitioners of civil resistance such as Vaclav Havel (2009) and Aung 
San Suu Kyi (1995) have also written influential works which combine both normative 
and pragmatic arguments on the use of civil resistance as a tool to fight political 
oppression.  Yet while these pacifist and practitioner works provide inspiring narrative 
and compelling normative arguments in large part they fail to approach civil resistance 
from an objective or scientific viewpoint and are more interested in advocating for 
nonviolence rather than understanding it.  
 Academic literature on civil resistance largely springs from the work of Gene 
Sharp.  Sharp marries Gandhi’s strategic insights with insights into the nature of political 
power from thinkers such as Machiavelli and Etienne La Boetie.  He argues that power is 
not a constant quality which a leader possesses but one which requires constant 
replenishment through the consent and cooperation of the governed.  Nonviolent action 
overcomes powerful leaders and achieves revolutionary change through organizing 
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 See, for example Bondurant 1958, Dalton 1993, Klitgaard 1971, Sharp 1960, Sharp 
1979, and Shridharani 1939.  
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collective dissent which dissolves the leader’s power (Sharp 1973).  Sharp outlines 198 
methods of protest, non-cooperation, and nonviolent intervention which can all be used to 
achieve this collective dissent.   
 Sharp and later Helvey (2004) particularly emphasize the ability of nonviolent 
action to undermine the power of regimes through co-opting their “pillars of support.”  
These “pillars” are the social and political institutions through which a political regime 
maintains its power and through whom consent and thus political authority are channeled.  
Armed struggle pursues a strategy of either annihilating the opponent’s “pillars” in order 
to coerce them to surrender (traditional warfare) or of eliminating the leadership of the 
regime through violence and assuming control over the pillars which remain (guerilla 
warfare).  These destructive strategies are necessary because violent resistance is likely to 
consolidate regime opposition through a “rally round the flag” effect since most members 
of the “pillars” are physically threatened by the armed struggle.  In contrast, nonviolent 
resistance pursues a bottom-up strategy of weaning the support of the “pillars” away from 
the regime, dissolving its power. 
 Sharp’s theoretical work is very strongly focused on individual agency.  His basic 
argument is that nonviolent action has the potential to both occur and successfully 
achieve change no matter the circumstances.  Thus Sharp discounts the kinds of 
preconditions which have been typically used to explain the occurrence of nonviolent 
political contention such as an “open” political opportunity structure (Eisinger, 1973) or 
 
11 
pre-existing organizational networks (McAdam, 1982).  He also is less concerned with 
the challenge of revolutionary dissent as a collective action “rebel’s dilemma” which 
requires incentive-based strategies in order to succeed (Lichbach, 1995).  From Sharp’s 
perspective, the inherent fluidity of power means that nonviolent action is possible and 
may even succeed under any circumstances, even when objective political opportunities 
may not exist (Kurzman, 1996).  Sharp’s key scope conditions for limiting the possibility 
of nonviolent action thus rest almost entirely on the action’s possible participants.  If they 
are able to prevent fear and adequately strategize for success then they are likely to 
devise methods for organizing dissent and achieving political goals.    
 Sharp’s work was not particularly influential upon its publication but has stood 
the test of time as one of the clearest formulations of how nonviolent methods of struggle 
are able to achieve change, and has inspired several works which draw upon his insights.  
Boserup and Mack (1974) use Clausewitzian strategic analysis to argue for the possibility 
of the use of nonviolent “weapons systems” in national defense.  Ackerman and Kruegler 
(1993) develop a 12-point agenda of strategic factors which they find crucial for success 
in six case studies of nonviolent action.  Schock (2005) connects Sharp’s insights on the 
nature of power with theories on mobilization and social movements from sources such 
as McAdam (1982), Tarrow (1998) and Tilly (1978).  Mattaini builds on Sharp’s insights 
using behavioral systems science (Mattaini, 2013).  Sharp’s work has also been used as a 
source to develop a practical toolkit for civil resistance by practitioners seeking to 
achieve political change (Popovic, Djinovic, Miliojevic, Merriman, & Marovic, 2007).  
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Others have critiqued Sharp’s approach for failing to take into account the structural 
causes of consent (Burrowes, 1996), being overly dismissive of the importance of 
“principled” nonviolence (Weber, 2003) or reinforcing an agenda of global neoliberalism 
(Chabot & Sharifi, 2013). 
Sharp has also been used as a foundation in the empirical literature on civil 
resistance, which most frequently seeks to explain the onset of and factors of success in 
civil resistance campaigns.  The authors in Zunes, Kurtz and Asher (1999) use a wide 
variety of cases to point to the geographical dispersion and frequency of campaigns of 
nonviolent action.  The authors in Bartkowski (2013) examine the role of civil resistance 
in various national liberation struggles.  The authors in Roberts and Garton Ash (2009) 
similarly present a wide variety of cases to show the various forms that civil resistance 
has taken around the globe.  And Shaykhutdinov (2010) uses quantitative analysis to 
show the superior ability of nonviolent resistance to successfully achieve territorial 
autonomy arrangements.  An extensive literature has also developed around particular 




The most central question examined in the literature has been the factors in or 
corollaries of nonviolent action which lead to its success.  The literature’s primary task 
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 See, for example: Ahmed and Stephan 2010, Boudreau 2004, Fukuda 2000, Martin, 
Varney and Vickers 2001, Modzelewski 1982, Parkman 1990, Pearlman 2011, Schock 
1999, Stephan 2009, Zunes 1999.  
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has often been portrayed as overcoming a bias towards violence common in the broader 
literature on political struggle and arguing that nonviolent action may be effective, 
perhaps even more effective than violent action (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).  Various 
authors have pointed to security force defection and elite division (Nepstad, 2011), 
resilience and tactical innovation (Schock, 2005), relationships of direct dependency 
(Summy, 1994)and broad, diverse participation (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011) as critical 
factors in explaining success. 
Most works have relied on simple case narratives or comparative case studies.  In 
contrast, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) use a comprehensive dataset of the global 
population of nonviolent and violent campaigns from 1900-2006 to show that nonviolent 
campaigns are not only frequently successful but are, in fact, more than twice as 
successful on average as violent campaigns.  Critical in explaining this success is the 
nonviolent campaign’s ability to achieve broad participation.  Following Sharp and 
Helvey, Chenoweth and Stephan argue that as higher levels of participation increase the 
likelihood of members of the campaign linking to the opponent regime’s “pillars of 
support” and thus undermining the regime’s power.   
After Civil Resistance: The Puzzle 
The contributions of this burgeoning literature on promoting a better 
understanding of civil resistance cannot be overstated.  However, this focus on strategic 
success as the key dependent variable means that most of the literature has either failed to 
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explain the future effects of successful civil resistance campaigns.  Exceptions to this rule 
are Sharp (1973), Ackerman and Karatnycky (2005), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), and 
Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch (2013).  All four of these argue that not only does civil 
resistance work but its effect over the long run is positive.  Sharp (1973) argues that the 
participation in a civil resistance campaign has a power-diffusing effect across society.  
This effect means that people in a society which has experienced a successful civil 
resistance campaign are unlikely to allow new autocracies to arise.  Ackerman and 
Karatnycky, using data from Freedom House, show that political transitions which follow 
successful civil resistance campaigns are much more likely than elite-led transitions to 
result in democracy.  Chenoweth and Stephan show through their dataset that successful 
nonviolent campaigns tend to lead to much higher levels of democracy and civil peace 
than violent campaigns.  And Rivera Celestino and Gleditsch similarly find that 
successful civil resistance campaigns have a positive effect on future levels of 
democracy. 
These findings contrast with arguments on democratic transitions from the 
seminal work of O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986).  While not directly addressing the 
violence-nonviolence paradigm, O’Donnell and Schmitter’s insight from various 
transitions from authoritarianism to democracy is that a peaceful transition with a 
democratic outcome is most likely to occur through a “pacted” transition process.  
Through this “pact” regime moderates come to an agreement with opposition elites to 
gradually liberalize the political system.  In exchange, regime moderates restrain “hard-
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liners” while opposition elites suppress the rise of civil society and non-institutionalized 
dissent.  Collective mass dissent of the type imagined by Sharp and described by 
Chenoweth and Stephan is seen as a dangerous hindrance to a smooth democratic 
transition rather than a positive driving force towards peace and democracy.   
Support for O’Donnell and Schmitter’s skepticism towards mass action can be 
found in the multiple cases of successful civil resistance campaigns which have resulted 
in significant levels of violence and reverted to autocracy.  While the most prominent 
case is the 1979 revolution in Iran, others that could be pointed to include the nonviolent 
uprising against President Jaafar Nimeiry of Sudan or the student uprising against 
President Syngman Rhee of South Korea.   These and many other cases of successful 
campaigns of civil resistance failed to follow the general trend of successful civil 
resistance leading to democracy and peace.  This extreme variance calls for 
disaggregation of the subset of successful civil resistance campaigns to explain it.  What 
caveats are necessary in the civil resistance literature to explain why nonviolent activists 
sometimes “win well” and sometimes fail to do so?  
One potential explanatory variable comes from Bunce and Wolchik’s (2011) work 
on the various “color revolutions” in the post-Communist world.  As part of their 
examination of this set of cases Bunce and Wolchik seek to explain the variation in future 
levels of democracy.  Among other factors, they find that the mechanism of success used 
to overthrow the authoritarian regime had strong effects on future levels of democracy.   
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Their cases followed two types of transition mechanisms.  First, elections, in 
which the opposition ousted the authoritarian leader through a free and fair presidential 
election (often obtained and ensured through the use of protests and other forms of civil 
resistance).  Second, elite coups, which Bunce and Wolchik describe as “extra-legal 
seizures of power that did not use democratic methods to achieve democratic outcomes” 
(Bunce & Wolchik, 2011, 324)  The first led to more democratic outcomes, Bunce and 
Wolchik argue, because preparation for the election required civil society mobilization 
and opposition capacity building which were later critical in maintaining a successful 
democracy.  In contrast, elite coups led to a transition characterized by a weak civil 
society and fractured opposition which was unable to consolidate its initial democratic 
breakthrough. 
 If mechanisms of success are important, and may provide insight into solving the 
puzzle of why successful nonviolent revolutions are followed by civil war and 
authoritarianism, how can the civil resistance literature use this insight to solve this 
puzzle? What tools currently exist within the literature to tackle this approach? 
Sharp’s Mechanisms and the Need for New Mechanisms of Success 
In the literature on civil resistance the question of transition mechanisms has been 
most comprehensively addressed in the work of Gene Sharp, mentioned above.  Sharp 
addresses the question of transition mechanisms with a four-fold typology of 
“mechanisms of success” whereby nonviolent movements can achieve their goals.  His 
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typology flows directly from his consent-based theory of power and is best understood in 
terms of that theory.   
 Sharp’s first mechanism of success is “conversion” (Sharp 1973, 2005), and is a 
close corollary to Gandhi’s idea of Satyagraha as a tool not just to overcome an opponent 
but to reconcile with them.  In “conversion” the example of the nonviolent campaign 
converts the opponent to their point of view.  The opponent thus willingly grants the 
campaign’s demands.   Conversion can be achieved through a simple process of rational 
argument but is more typically associated with the practice of self-suffering.  The 
members of the nonviolent movement take suffering upon themselves to show their 
opponents the violence inherent in the system they support.  This causes the opponent to 
see the injustice of the system and leads them to willingly accede to the movement’s 
demands.  
 Sharp’s second mechanism is “accommodation.”  While the opponent remains 
“unconverted,” the actions of the nonviolent campaign change the power dynamics such 
that the opponent agrees to grant the campaign’s essential demands rather than “risk a 
more unsatisfactory result” (Sharp 1973).  This may take place for a number of reasons.  
Violent repression may be seen to be impractical or inappropriate, the opponent may wish 
to minimize political or economic losses, or they may seek to control potential defection 
or dissension within their own ranks.    
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 The third and fourth mechanisms, “nonviolent coercion” and “disintegration” are 
closely related, distinguished largely by degree.  In both, the actions of the campaign 
have so degraded the capacity of the opponent that they lack the essential capacity to 
accept defeat.  Rather, defeat occurs without their consent as their structures of power no 
longer sustain them.  The distinction between the two comes in the effects of the 
nonviolent action on the opponent group’s cohesion.  In nonviolent coercion change 
occurs while keeping the opponent’s essential political structures intact.  In 
disintegration, the opponent “simply falls apart.”  Political structures have been so 
fragmented and dismantled through the withdrawal of cooperation that they simply cease 
to exist. 
 Sharp’s typology is helpful in understanding the various ways in which 
nonviolent action may lead to political change.  However, his typology has several 
prominent shortcomings which limit its utility in using mechanisms of success as an 
explanatory variable.  
 First, since Sharp is primarily concerned with explaining the potential effects of 
nonviolent action rather than mechanisms of regime change, his model lacks 
operationalizability.  In the “people power” revolution of 1986, for example, which 
mechanism of success led to the ouster of the dictator Ferdinand Marcos?  The 
unwillingness of soldiers to shoot at unarmed protesters may be seen as “conversion.” 
Coup leaders’ negotiations with presidential candidate Corazon Aquino might be seen as 
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“accommodation.” As Marcos’ forces rapidly began ceasing to obey orders, his regime 
doubtless seemed to be undergoing “nonviolent coercion” or “disintegration.”  Simply 
establishing which mechanisms took place would be a doubtful empirical challenge.  
Making a further argument as to which mechanism was the critical causal factor in 
achieving success would be an even greater challenge, perhaps impossible. 
 Second, Sharp’s mechanisms assume a binary perspective on how political 
change occurs.  In all four mechanisms the essential question is the power relationship 
between the civil resistance campaign and its opponent.
6
 This binary perspective provides 
helpful theoretical parsimony.  However, as a way of understanding mechanisms of 
success so as to empirically test their effects it is so divorced from reality that it fails to 
be useful.  In every political struggle multiple actors pursue their interests, engage in 
strategic interaction, and seek to capture political power and authority.  Even simple 
theoretical models such as in Tilly (1978) incorporate the interactions of governments, 
other members of the polity, challengers, and international actors.  A comprehensive 
view of mechanisms of success must go beyond the binary campaign-opponent 
perspective. 
 Finally, Sharp is focused solely on the power-negative effects of nonviolent 
action.  He makes a detailed argument as to how civil resistance can degrade existing 
power structures but has little to say on how new power structures fill the void left by that 
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 Typically the government, though Sharp does not explicitly state this. 
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degradation.  As with his theory’s campaign-opponent dichotomy this emphasis on 
degradation may be justified for the sake of theoretical parsimony.  Sharp is not 
attempting to empirically describe reality but rather to build a clear theoretical model of 
the political power of nonviolent action.  The theory is useful insomuch as it is used for 
that purpose.  But to understand mechanisms of success and apply them empirically to 
understand future outcomes Sharp’s theoretical contribution is insufficient. 
 In order to use mechanisms of success to examine the puzzle of violence and 
authoritarianism after civil resistance a new toolkit is necessary.  While Sharp’s 
theoretical contribution can still be fruitfully applied to understanding situational 
dynamics, full-fledged political transitions require a typology of transition which is 
empirically grounded, takes into account the possibility of significant action by third 
parties, and shows not just how a mechanism degrades the power of the existing regime 
but also sets in place new political structures.  While other works, such as Bunce and 
Wolchik (2011) mentioned above, have made strides at creating such a typology, no 
comprehensive categorization which can apply to the global population of successful 
civil resistance campaigns currently exists.  In the following chapter I will lay out my 
new typology of transition mechanisms and show how to apply them in answering this 





Chapter Two: Mechanisms of Success 
 In this chapter I outline my typology for categorizing civil resistance mechanisms 
of success as well as my argument for why particular mechanisms can be expected to 
lead to varying outcomes related to democracy and civil peace.  This typology is the 
result of a careful study of the population of successful maximalist civil resistance 
campaigns in the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 centuries, and captures all of the variation observed 
in these campaigns’ mechanisms of success. 
I divide mechanisms of success into six ideal types which and point out three 
critical features of the various mechanisms: degree of consensus-building, campaign 
initiative, and political capacity-building.  I then lay out an argument informed by the 
democratization and civil war literatures as to why the essential characteristics of these 
different mechanisms of success would be expected to precipitate different outcomes. 
Defining Terms 
I will first briefly offer my working definitions of several central concepts.  First, 
I define “civil resistance” most broadly as the use of nonviolent and yet transgressive 
methods of political struggle to achieve a political goal.   This definition draws upon 
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several definitions offered in the literature,
7
 as well as closely aligning with definitions of 
“revolutionary protest” from sources such as Kim (1996) and Tilly (1978), and 
parsimoniously captures civil resistance in its most essential aspect: its place in the 
political space not accounted for either by traditional politics or by violent political 
contention.   It also helpfully serves to illustrate several things which civil resistance is 
not, such as personal feelings or beliefs about nonviolence, “weapons of the weak,” or 
passive acquiescence to political injustices.  It is fundamentally a method of political 
struggle.
8
    
In this formulation civil resistance may be broadly used by any number of 
different political actors for any number of political ends.  Thus for the purposes of this 
study I narrow the broad range of possible manifestations of civil resistance in two major 
areas.  First, since I am concerned with civil resistance campaigns which initiate a 
political transition, following the lead of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), I examine only 
civil resistance campaigns with “maximalist” goals of regime change, expulsion of a 
                                                 
7
 See for instance: Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 12, Roberts 2009, 2, Schock 2005, xvi, 
Sharp 1973, 64-66.  
 
8
 I also use the term “civil resistance” rather than “nonviolence” or “nonviolent action” to 
express an instrumental, political frame of reference rather than a normative frame of 
reference.  As Bond (1988)  points out, even the ostensibly solely descriptive use of the 
word “nonviolence” can imply a certain moral prescriptiveness, with the “nonviolent” 
being judged “good” and “violent” judged “bad.”  I explicitly avoid this normative 
discussion because it obscures the political focus of my research.   Thus for the purposes 
of this study I use the term “civil resistance” and attempt to maintain a strictly empirical 
definition.  Normative questions are certainly relevant to the study of violence and 
nonviolence but are not the focus of my thesis. 
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foreign occupation, or secession.  Second, I limit my study to campaigns, where 
individual acts of civil resistance are coordinated and sequenced in a purposive manner to 
achieve the stated goal. 
The second major concept to define is success.  Following Nepstad (2011) I 
define success as the negative removal or defeat of the opponent through the civil 
resistance campaign’s actions.  It is the moment when the dictator steps down, the 
occupier leaves, or the state gives up its right to the secessionist territory.
9
  Observers 
may point out that in many senses this moment of “success” is only the beginning of a 
possibly much longer process of political struggle.   Thus using the term success is 
misleading.  This insight, that the moment of victory over the original opponent is not the 
end of a political struggle, is in fact one of the central inspirations for this work.   Yet I 
maintain that defining success in this way is analytically useful.  It captures the 
perspective of the campaigns themselves, whose goals and identities are typically defined 
around this concept of success,
10
 and it allows us to clearly delineate between distinct 
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 Another close corollary of this concept is “autocratic breakdown” in Geddes, Wright 
and Frantz (2014). 
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 Note, for instance, that the iconic motto of the Arab Spring was: “ash-sha’ab yirid isqat 




phases of political activity: the initial political struggle and the political transition.
 11
  
Campaign success is the moment dividing these two phases. 
The language of mechanisms of success or mechanisms of change originates with 
Gene Sharp (1973, 2004).  He uses this language to describe the four theoretical ways in 
which nonviolent action can alter power dynamics and achieve victory.  However, as laid 
out in the previous chapter Sharp’s typology, while analytically helpful, becomes deeply 
problematic when applied to real empirical cases.  Thus, while I find the language helpful 
I shift the definition to make it more applicable to my question.  I define a mechanism of 
success as the immediate causal antecedent of success.
12
  It is the final strategic action, by 
the campaign or another strategic actor, which precedes success – the last strategic action 
in the initial political struggle and the first in the period of transition.  The mechanism of 
success thus occupies a bridging position between the two phases.   
Having defined civil resistance, success, and mechanisms of success, I now move 
on to the six mechanisms of success observed in successful civil resistance campaigns. 
 
The Six Mechanisms 
The first mechanism of success is the coup d’état.  I define a coup d’état as an 
independent seizure of power by a group of regime elites, military or civilian.  While 
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 Similar to Rustow’s (1970) “preparatory phase” and “decision phase.” 
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 As defined in the preceding paragraph. 
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coups may be precipitated by certain indicators they are fundamentally unexpected events 
from the side of the regime and often from the side of the civil resistance campaign as 
well. A coup may follow the classic form of a military coup, with soldiers in the streets 
assuming control over key government assets, or may take place in the corridors of 
power, with coup leaders orchestrating the ouster behind closed doors. While coups are 
typically initiated without the knowledge of the civil resistance campaign they act as a 
mechanism of success by bringing about the self-defined goal of the campaign.  The 
regime which the campaign opposed is ousted and new leadership is brought to the fore.   
 Coups may engage with the civil resistance campaign in a number of ways. Coup 
leaders may proclaim their action to be in solidarity with the civil resistance campaign, as 
in Egypt in 2011.  Coups may even be initiated after the campaign explicitly encourages 
regime figures to seize control of the state, as in Guatemala in 1944.  But their unifying 
characteristics are an independent, unexpected seizure of power by regime elites. 
 The second mechanism is negotiations.  In negotiated transitions the civil 
resistance campaign engages in a bargaining process with the regime (often mediated by 
domestic or international third parties) to establish the terms of the regime’s departure.  
Negotiations may take place in pre-arranged institutional settings such as the roundtable 
discussions between Solidarity and the Communist Party in 1989 or they may be more 




 I only consider negotiations to be a mechanism of success if the negotiation 
results in the achievement of the campaign’s central goal.  Negotiations may happen 
often throughout the course of a civil resistance campaign, both before and after success, 
and may be either a source of strategic progress or reversal.  Negotiations may be a 
stalling tactic used by the regime to blunt the campaign’s momentum or to satisfy critical 
international observers.  They may also be used by the campaign to meet intermediate 
strategic goals or gain concessions.  None of these negotiations are true mechanisms of 
success since they do not directly lead to the achievement of the campaign’s goals.  For 
negotiations to be considered a mechanism of success they must result in the ouster of the 
regime, the withdrawal of the occupier, or successful secession.   
 The third mechanism is elections and referenda.  In this mechanism the campaign 
achieves its goal through an institutionalized electoral process.  In the case of regime 
change this typically occurs through an election in which the incumbent regime is 
defeated.  This victory is often ensured through the threat, or sometimes actual use, of 
civil disobedience if the regime fails to honor the terms of the election. Some of the best 
examples of this transition mechanism are the various “color revolutions” of the early 
2000s, though the defeat of Indira Gandhi by the Janata party in the 1977 election in 
India is an early example which has been understudied. 
 As with negotiations, it is critical to distinguish elections which function as 
mechanisms of success from elections which occur in the course of the civil resistance 
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campaign or simply occur with relative regularity and predetermined results in “electoral 
authoritarian” regimes around the world.  An election or referendum only functions as a 
mechanism of success if it is the direct cause of the achievement of the campaign’s goal. 
 The fourth mechanism is international interventions.  Interventions may be 
diplomatic (as in the Ruhrkampf in 1923) or military (as in East Timor in 1999).  The key 
distinguishing factor of an intervention as a mechanism of success is that the intervention 
precipitates the achievement of the campaign’s goal and is a necessary component of the 
success.  Thus some international involvement may be involved in other campaign 
situations as part of a negotiated transition process or international observers may enforce 
the terms of a negotiated transition but are not decisive in the success of the process 
itself. 
 While these definitional criteria contain some level of subjectivity, I maintain that 
they are the most clear and parsimonious reasonably possible.  International action either 
by states or non-state transnational actors often plays a role in civil resistance 
movements, but this role is rarely decisive in success (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).  
Thus I maintain an extremely conservative position in defining an international 
intervention as a mechanism of success.
13
   
                                                 
13
 Summaries of all my coding decisions which show this conservative process in practice 
are included in the attached codebook (Appendix A). 
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 The fifth mechanism is resignations.  In a resignation the regime relinquishes 
power independent of an election, negotiation, or other previously institutionalized or 
negotiated process.  The leaders of the regime, perhaps fearing the consequences of 
remaining in power, simply choose to leave.  For example, this was the mechanism of 
success in the East German revolution, as a string of resignations by members of the 
socialist party led to the overthrow of the regime (Nepstad 2011).   
 Resignations are closest theoretically to “elite coups,” in which the civilian elites 
in the regime force the top leadership out in an independent attempt to seize power.  The 
distinction between the two is in the mechanism’s initiative.  Coups involve a 
fundamental break in the upper echelons of the regime followed by a decisive seizure of 
power by a particular regime faction.  Resignations, though they may be preceded by a 
certain degree of pressure from other members of the regime, are undertaken through the 
initiative of the regime leadership.   
 Finally, the most dramatic transition mechanism is overwhelming.  An 
overwhelming represents the closest empirical approximation to what Gene Sharp 
described as “disintegration” (Sharp 2005).  Participation in the campaign reaches such a 
high level and defection from the regime becomes so widespread that the organs of 
government simply cease to function and the regime collapses.  For instance in the 2005 
Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan police ceased repressing the increasingly massive 
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protests, protesters occupied the major government buildings in Bishkek, and 
authoritarian president Askar Akaev simply fled the country.   
Mechanism of Success Characteristics 
The genesis of my transition mechanism typology is empirical, the result of a 
study of the population of successful civil resistance campaigns since 1900.  Having 
confronted the problems of looking at mechanisms of success through the theoretical lens 
offered by Sharp, I sought to strongly foundationalize my theory in the actual empirical 
record, creating intuitively discrete categories.  However, through this examination I have 
generated a rudimentary theory of nonviolent transitions rooted in Gene Sharp, Robert 
Helvey, Peter Ackerman, and others.  These theoretical distinctions are rough, but do 
provide essential guiding points for understanding the effects of the different mechanisms 
on future outcomes. 
 As mentioned in the introduction, this theory of mechanisms of success is not 
intended to be a comprehensive theory explaining democratization or the onset of 
political violence.  These larger questions are intimately related to my question and I 
have sought to inform my theory with insights from these broader literatures.  Yet at this 
stage I intentionally limit the scope of my explanations to transitions following successful 
civil resistance campaigns.  Mechanisms of success may or may not be useful as an 
explanatory variable in other cases of regime transition, and future expansions of this 
work might fruitfully examine their effects in these other cases.  However, I maintain that 
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limiting the scope of the current study to transitions following successful civil resistance 
campaigns is justified by the unique effects of civil resistance on regime transitions, as 
shown in the studies described in the previous chapter.   
The six mechanisms described above vary along three key metrics.  First, they 
vary in regards to initiative.  The mechanism of success as a strategic action may be 
initiated by any of several different potential actors.  In overwhelmings, for instance, the 
initiator is the civil resistance campaign.  In resignations, the initiator is the leadership of 
the regime.  And in coups and international interventions the initiator is a third party, 
domestic or international.  Because mechanisms of success are at such a critical strategic 
juncture this question of initiative may be crucial for determining the characteristics of 
the transition process which follows them. 
Second, the mechanisms vary in regards to consensus.
14
  The transition 
mechanism may be a strategic action undertaken with mutual consensus by the various 
strategic actors, as in a negotiation or an election,
15
 or may be independently imposed 
(violently or nonviolently), as in coups or overwhelmings.  This distinction is crucial in 
understanding the framing narratives and political incentives which confront the various 
strategic actors during the transition.  A mechanism of success involving broad consensus 
                                                 
14
 Thanks to Nils Petter Gleditsch for pointing this distinction out. 
 
15




from the major strategic actors is likely to facilitate framing narratives for all the actors 
involved which legitimize the later transition process and discourage the use of political 
violence. 
Third, the mechanisms vary in the degree to which they require political capacity-
building by the civil resistance campaign prior to the moment of success.  As Bunce and 
Wolchik (2011) focus on in their cases, certain mechanisms of success by definition 
require a degree of political institutionalization and capacity-building in order to succeed, 
while others, primarily through a reliance on outside actors, do not require the same 
degree of capacity-building prior to success. 
The six mechanisms may be categorized along these three lines as shown in Table 
2.1.   
Table 2.1 Transition Mechanism Characteristics 
 Mechanism Consensus Capacity Initiative 
Coups No No Regime Insiders 
Elections Yes Yes Campaign/Regime 
Negotiations Yes Yes Campaign/Regime 
International  No No International Actors 
Resignations No No Regime Leadership 
Overwhelmings No No Campaign 
 
This categorization represents ideal types.  Mechanisms of success may be 
characterized by lesser or greater degrees of these three characteristics.  For example, 
negotiated transitions may enjoy the participation of all or nearly all segments of the civil 
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resistance campaign, as in the round table negotiations in Poland, or may be led by only 
certain factions of the campaign, as in the GCC-led negotiation process in Yemen.  I thus 
expect the following arguments on the mechanisms’ effects on democracy and civil peace 
to hold most closely when the mechanism most closely follows the ideal types on 
consensus, capacity, and initiative shown above.  I now consider how these essential 
characteristics lead to the mechanisms’ varying effects on democracy and civil peace. 
 
Democracy 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, many studies on civil resistance have 
focused on its advantages in promoting democracy.  The association between the two has 
been powerfully reinforced by major waves of successful civil resistance movements 
such as the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe, the “Color Revolutions” of the early 
2000s, and the “Arab Spring” of 2011, all of which were characterized by millions calling 
for democratic rights.  Yet as the literature on democratization shows,
16
 the process of 
actual democratization is typically far less inspiring, much more complex, and often 
deeply problematic.  As Carothers (2002) points out, “transitions to democracy” are often 
complete misnomers as countries rarely go on straight tracks from authoritarianism to 
full-fledged democracy and instead often end up in “feckless pluralism” or “dominant-
party democracy.”   
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 See, for example: Geddes 1999, Geddes 2009, Linz and Stepan 1996, Whitehead 2002. 
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In considering civil resistance campaigns, part of the problem is that campaigns 
often articulate broad goals of “freedom” or “democracy” with little substantive 
ideational content.  Democracy may be the slogan presented for the media, but the 
democratic master narrative presented by elites may have little connection to the actual 
political attitudes of campaign participants (Beissinger, 2013).  In other cases the 
overthrow of the regime, even through civil resistance, may be pursued by actors 
attempting to replace prior clientelist networks with their own (Bratton & van de Walle, 
1997).Thus explaining democratization simply through the overthrow of an autocrat by 
ostensibly “democratic” forces is insufficient. 
Structural factors such as development, levels of education, and proportion of 
democratic neighbors have all been pointed to as explanatory variables to account for 
successful democratization.  Yet despite the vast size of the literature, the effect of these 
claims is disputed and uncertain (Geddes 2009).  And the existence of numerous 
exceptions to these general indicators suggests that the impact of any one of them, while 
substantial, is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining a democratic outcome. 
In contrast, I explain democratization following successful civil resistance 
through a dynamic model of strategic interaction between various players initiated by the 
success of the campaign.   This approach is similar to several seminal works on 
democratization (Rustow, 1970; O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Linz & Stepan, 1996).  
Where I depart from these works is in my emphasis on the central role of bottom-up civil 
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resistance movements as a key actor which engages in strategic interaction with the 
government, other members of the polity, and extra-polity challengers (Tilly, 1978).   The 
mechanism of success informs how this strategic interaction takes place and thus 
critically shapes the outcome.  This influence is not deterministic, nor does it always 
trump the general impact of the broader structural factors mentioned above.  However, in 
the majority of cases the mechanism of success will be a critical factor in leading to a 
democratic outcome. 
First, the aspect of consensus raised above is likely to be critical.  A mechanism 
of success such as negotiations and elections, which involve a degree of consensus and 
shared understanding between the various actors: regime, campaign, and domestic third 
parties, is more likely to initiate a democratic transition because it incentivizes actors to 
work together and thus broadens the “winning coalition” which governs (Bueno de 
Mesquita et al., 2003).  With more power players involved before the transition begins it 
is likely to be more difficult to exclude them once the transition is underway.  While this 
may not lead to a perfect democracy, at the very least it may lead to “consociational” 
arrangements which move the country further along the democratic continuum. 
Mechanisms of success which lack broad consensus, such as coups and 
occupations, are likely to tilt the transition towards non-democratic outcomes.  For the 
coup, this inclination is more obvious.  Coup leaders typically assume power not to 
simply abandon it but to gain personal, political, or economic goals.  Thus the coup 
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leaders are more likely to attempt to maintain or even consolidate authoritarianism rather 
than democratize.  Even in coups which at least appear to be genuinely motivated by 
concern and support for the civil resistance campaign such as the “October 
Revolutionaries” in El Salvador the action of the coup itself has the effect of centralizing 
power, at least temporarily, in the hands of a small cadre of plotters.  This makes the 
transition process vulnerable to capture by potential autocrats within the coup group.   
Successful coups also inform the strategic calculations of other actors.  
Participants in the civil resistance campaign may take the lesson that, while nonviolent 
tactics may be useful in applying pressure for political action, the actions of a small group 
of armed actors are really the only way to achieve power.  Thus strategies for setting the 
rules of the game during the transition period may involve centralization of power in an 
armed wing which attempts to seize power through future coups and counter-coups.  
Overwhelmings may appear to incline more towards democracy.  Indeed, Sharp’s 
theory would lead us to expect them to.  One cornerstone of Sharp’s theory of civil 
resistance is that successful civil resistance diffuses power throughout a society (Sharp 
1973).  Individuals, newly awakened to their capacity to overthrow existing power 
structures, no longer fear new would-be autocrats and instead, aware of their new power, 
continue to use tactics of civil resistance to achieve more open and democratic political 
institutions.  An overwhelming represents the purest form of this power diffusion since 
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the transition is not mediated by a third party or campaign elite but comes directly from 
the people. 
While I do not deny the potential for a power-diffusion effect following a 
successful civil resistance campaign this effect is insufficient to lead to democratization.  
Stable democracy requires more than simply an awareness of power, it requires the 
implementation of rules of the political game which check various actors against one 
another and protect citizens from abuse by the state.  The diffusion of power in an 
overwhelming, rather than informing the transition process with a strong aspect of 
“protected consultation” (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001), instead informs social actors 
that victory is best achieved through a maximization of efforts and ratcheting up of tactics 
to the extreme. 
Because an overwhelming does not empower or even strictly require an 
organizational leadership it is also likely to not develop leadership structures which 
remain in place after the transition occurs.  Thus it fails to promote the political capacity-
building by the civil resistance campaign which can then maintain a pro-democratic 
opposition after success occurs. With no “civil” leadership structure, or at least structures 
which are weak, ethnic, religious, and other narrower entrepreneurs may more easily rise 
to power.   
The lack of consensus in the overwhelming also signals elite actors, both in the 
regime and outside of it, that civil resistance is a dangerous tool that will not operate 
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according to the rules of the political game.  It thus may have the effect of creating an 
authoritarian consensus among actors who otherwise might be inclined to democratize.   
Thus, the overwhelming is likely to initiate a transition process characterized by former 
regime elites struggling to maintain power by any means necessary, possibly supported at 
least tacitly by more moderate extra-regime elites who fear the social consequences of a 
resurgence of popular discontent.  
Initiative is also likely to be critical in determining the direction of the democratic 
transition process.  In political transitions, the player who plays first is likely to have an 
outsized impact on the transition process.   This is the case because of the fundamental 
uncertainties involved in political transitions.  As O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) point 
out, in transition processes structural factors fade into the background.  The rules of 
political life are up for grabs and intelligent strategic thinking and personal virtu is likely 
to play a much more critical role.   
Decisions prior to the transition moment are also likely to play an important part 
in shaping the transition.  From the point of view of Sharp’s work on civil resistance 
every gain for the campaign represents degradation in the existing power structure and 
thus an increased opening of the political space.  Nonviolent resistance and the 
withdrawal of consent involved in it thus slowly changes the political rules such that pre-
existing norms and institutions become less important and strategic decisions come to the 
fore.  However, the moment of transition still represents a critical jumping off point 
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where the power position fundamentally shifts.  The pre-existing power structure is no 
longer simply degraded, but turned on its head.  Thus the initiator of this particular 
decision, this particular move, has special power. 
The importance of initiative may be helpfully illustrated by examining coups.  A 
successful coup, such as the 2011 coup in Egypt (to which I will return in much more 
detail in the case studies), places rule-making authority in the hands of a new actor: the 
coup leaders.  Coup leaders typical first action is to lay out their vision of the new rules 
of the political game: what kind of political dissent will be allowed, what will be done 
with the top leadership of the ancien regime, what place there will be for the leaders of 
the civil resistance campaign, etc…  This agenda represents the first frame of the political 
transition, the point from which other actors must frame their own political agendas and 
in the context of which other actors will have to formulate new political rules.   
Resignations also provide a powerful illustration of the importance of initiative.  
Resignations typically occur in large part through Sharp’s mechanism of 
“accommodation” (Sharp, 1973).  The leadership of the regime: the military junta, the 
party politburo, or the tinpot autocrat, “sees the writing on the wall.”  Perhaps there have 
been rumblings about defection from the military or security services.  Perhaps cabinet 
ministers are resigning en masse and throwing their support behind the opposition.  
Perhaps, as with Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, their superpower patron will no 
longer return their calls except with advice to “cut and cut cleanly.”  For whatever reason, 
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the regime’s top leadership no longer believes it has the capability to maintain power and 
thus decides to try to shape the future political order as best as possible through 
resignation.  As with the coup, the resignation is often accompanied by an agenda of how 
the following transition will take place: who will assume interim power, how future 
leaders will be chosen (the terms and timing of a new election), which frames the 
transition period.  
The two examples above illustrate negatively what I believe to be the transition 
mechanism characteristic for promoting democracy: initiative, at least in part, by the civil 
resistance campaign.  To achieve success a civil resistance campaign is likely to have a 
wide, diverse base of support.  Thus in order to satisfy the campaign participants who 
have been integral in the campaign’s success the campaign is more likely to incorporate 
the more open, democratic power structures.  
Finally, as mentioned above, the degree to which the mechanism of success 
involves building the civil resistance campaign’s capacity prior to the breakthrough is 
critical.  This is partially the case because, as Beissinger (2013) shows, civil resistance 
campaigns are often based upon a “negative coalition” which is only able to overcome 
collective action problems through its shared opposition to a particularly hated regime 
institution or figure.  If the campaign has not been able to build political capacity and put 
in place organizational mechanisms for continuing to coordinate pro-democracy actions 
prior to the ouster of the target of its “negative coalition” then it may fall apart once 
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success occurs.  In contrast, if the transition mechanism itself, such as an election or 
negotiation, requires some degree of institutionalization, coordination, and campaign 
capacity-building then the civil resistance campaign will be well-placed to continue to 




Political violence is likely to occur during transition periods for two basic reasons: 
either the main actors struggling to shape the new political regime use violence to achieve 
political goals or other social or political actors use the state’s weakened monopoly on the 
use of force to violently pursue their own agendas.  These two challenges may be referred 
to in short-hand as “politics by other means” and “opportunistic violence.”  Both are 
likely to be correlated with transitions following civil resistance campaign success.  Thus 
solutions to the problem of transitional violence must meet these two distinctive 
challenges. 
The challenge of “politics by other means” is essentially the problem of 
reconciling disparate goals through nonviolent avenues.  The downfall of a regime 
through civil resistance creates a unique set of winners and losers who are likely to enter 
the transition with widely varying objectives.  The winners, i.e. the members of the civil 
resistance campaign, typically desire radical changes in the fundamental political 
structures of the state which will empower new groups.  Furthermore, campaigns 
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typically desire that members of the old regime, in particular those involved in repressing 
the campaign’s earlier contention, be punished.  There are calls for corruption 
investigations, purging of the ranks of the bureaucracy, and sometimes peremptory trials 
and executions.  The losers, such as members of the former regime, traditional elites, or 
businessmen with connections to the state, desire the exact opposite.  The ouster of the 
upper echelons of the regime may have left many of their positions intact, but often with 
reduced access to upper authority structures.   And erstwhile regime supporters fear the 
prospect of a setting straight of the wrongs of the former regime.   
The influence of civil resistance on the initiation of this conflictual dynamic may 
be significant; particularly if principled nonviolence has been a characteristic of the 
campaign.  The influence of figures such as Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu in South 
Africa comes to mind.  But more often than not either this ethic is absent or insufficient 
to prevent the onset of violence.   
This dilemma may be simply stated as follows: the winners must be incentivized 
against using the fruits of their victory (power) to transgress against the defeated 
opponent and the losers must be incentivized against violently counterattacking.
17
   The 
two are, of course, related.  A violation by one side is likely to trigger a response by the 
opponent, with the potential for violence to continue until a new political regime arises 
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which can ensure political order.  However, if no initial action is taken the two sides may 
very well hold back the dogs of war until a stable political order is established.     
 The importance of initial actions in sparking violence brings us back to the factor 
of initiative.  As with democratization, I argue that campaign initiative in the transition 
mechanism, rather than initiative by the regime or a third party, is likely to reduce 
incidences of politics by other means.  This is the case because the campaign, by 
definition, is an unarmed actor which does not use violence to achieve its ends.  If the 
transition mechanism follows campaign initiative it will thus begin the transition with a 
nonviolent step, a step which may be iteratively followed to create a nonviolent transition 
process.   
In contrast, if an actor who relies on the use of violent force initiates the transition 
process, violence or the threat of violence will be present in the transitional period from 
the beginning.  Other actors will thus be incentivized to respond with their own violence, 
creating an escalation cycle. 
 Consensus in the transition mechanism is also likely to decrease the incidence of 
“politics by other means.”  If all or most of the major parties in the political system, from 
the regime to the campaign, have been involved in the mechanism of success, or are 
invested in the institutional framework which underlies it (as in elections) then it is likely 
that they will perceive their interests as best pursued through the transition framework, 
rather than through violence.  Since the major strategic players already have experience 
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that consensual regime change can occur, an appeal to consensus-building, nonviolent 
methods of contention is more likely to be the first avenue pursued during the transition 
process. 
In contrast, non-consensual transition mechanisms are likely to be perceived as 
illegitimate by the political actors not party to their shaping.  While it is certainly possible 
that groups who perceive the transition as illegitimate will attempt to shape the political 
order through nonviolent methods, they may lack the popular support to make nonviolent 
action effective (particularly if they come from groups privileged in the ancien regime) 
and thus turn to violent contention as a preferable option. 
The strategic lesson taught by a non-consensual transition mechanism is that one 
can achieve maximalist political goals without taking into account the preferences of all 
the major political actors.  This counters the logic of civil resistance, which focuses on 
achieving goals through broad, diverse participation, and instead inclines the political 
conversation towards violent methods of political struggle, which do not require broad 
participation but instead a small, highly-invested minority. 
 While addressing the possibility of “politics by other means” is central to solving 
the problem of post-campaign violence, many incidences of violence which follow 
successful civil resistance campaigns do not fall into this category.  Instead, they can be 
described as “opportunistic violence.”     After the downfall of a regime, the expulsion of 
an occupation, or the successful secession of a particular region it may be difficult for the 
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state to perform its function as the holder of a monopoly on the use of force.  A lack of 
state capacity – real or perceived – may create opportunities for various groups to pursue 
social or political agendas through the use of violence.   
 The literature on failed or fragile states cites numerous examples of how this 
general dynamic may come into play.
18
  Ethnic or religious entrepreneurs may use the 
weakness of the state to assert demands for greater autonomy, settle ethnic scores, or 
even attempt to capture the state in order to pursue their own narrow agenda.  In a sudden 
breakdown of state authority ethnic groups may also find themselves in a “security 
dilemma” which leads to conflict (Posen, 1993), or rebel or criminal groups may seek to 
take advantage of lootable natural resources.  Breakdown in state coercive power may 
also give space for insurgents or transnational terrorist groups.  Preventing opportunistic 
violence thus requires both the maintenance of at least some degree of state capacity and 
also the incorporation of the general demands of aggrieved groups into the political 
transition process so that these groups are not incentivized to use violence.   
 The “consensus” transition mechanisms of negotiations and elections are likely to 
lead to the lowest incidences of opportunistic violence.  This is first because by their 
nature consensus mechanisms involve a degree of maintenance of state capacity.  In both 
cases the ancien regime participates in the transition as a strategic actor whose 
fundamental structures have not been completely eliminated by the actions of the civil 
                                                 
18
 See for example: Fearon and Laitin 2004, Rotberg 2004, Krasner 2004. 
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resistance campaign.  Even if security force defections during the civil resistance 
campaign have in fact degraded the ability of the state to respond to armed challenges 
there is at least likely to be a perception, since the state continues to operate as a party in 
the mechanism of success, that some degree of political continuity can be expected.  Thus 
the perceived opportunities for violence are lower.  Consensus-based transition 
mechanisms may also initiate systems of political practice which incorporate previously-
excluded actors, significantly reducing the incentives for political violence. 
 Maximalist civil resistance campaigns over the 20
th
 and early 21
st
 century have 
succeeded through the use of six empirically discrete mechanisms of success: coups, 
negotiations, elections, international interventions, resignations, and overwhelmings.  Out 
of these six, two mechanisms – elections and negotiations – are characterized by broad 
political consensus, campaign initiative, and pre-success political capacity-building.  
These three characteristics make these two mechanisms of success much more likely to 
lead to democratization and not be followed by political violence.  Having laid out my 





Chapter Three: Testing the Effects of Transition Mechanisms 
My research on the effects of mechanisms of success followed a two-stage 
process, both quantitative and qualitative; in order to both establish the general 
correlative trends associated with mechanisms of success and also to process-trace the 
causal dynamics behind this correlation.  The latter step, two comparative case studies, 
will be addressed in the following chapter.  In this chapter I explain my broader research 
into the global population of successful civil resistance campaigns and present the results 
of my quantitative analysis of that population. 
Methodology 
The first step in my research was a brief examination of each case of successful 
maximalist civil resistance since the beginning of the 20
th
 century.  My set of civil 
resistance campaigns was drawn primarily from the NAVCO 1.1 dataset created by Erica 
Chenoweth (2011),
 19
 which contains consensus data on violent and nonviolent 
campaigns from 1900-2006 including campaign duration, participation, and outcome.
20
  
                                                 
19
 Campaigns are a series of sequenced tactics, distinguishing them from random riots or 
isolated events.  In order to be included in the dataset, campaigns had to have at least 
1,000 members, maximalist goals (regime change, secession, or anti-occupation), and 
persist for at least a week (Chenoweth & Stephan, 2011).  
  
20
 Chenoweth codes campaigns as either “success,” “limited success,” or “failure.”  
Campaigns are coded as successful if the campaign achieved its stated goals within a year 
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This dataset was compiled using several comprehensive bibliographies of nonviolent 
action as well as extensive consultation with leading experts.  I augmented this list with 
additional cases from later iterations of the NAVCO dataset (Chenoweth & Lewis, 
2013),
21
 cases from the ongoing Major Episodes of Contention data project,
22
 and 
additional cases from my own independent research.  Aggregating these sources led to a 
final dataset of 83 campaigns from 1900-2006.
23
 
For each of these 83 cases I independently researched the cases’ mechanisms of 
success.  I relied primarily on scholarly accounts and narrative data found in sources such 
                                                                                                                                                 
of its year of peak activity.  Campaigns are coded as “limited success” if they failed to 
achieve their stated goals but were able to achieve significant concessions from an 
opponent.  For example, a secessionist campaign that fails to achieve full independence 
but is able to gain significant levels of political autonomy.  Campaigns are coded as 




 This data is available for download at www.navcodata.com. 
 
22
 This project is ongoing and the data has not been publicly released  as of the time of 
writing.  See 
http://www.du.edu/korbel/sie/research/chenow_mec_major_episodes_contention.html for 
more information.  
 
23
 Several additional cases, including the 2011 “Arab Spring,” have taken place since 
2006 but were not included because of data limitations and the desire to measure 
outcomes at least five years after the end of the campaign. 
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as the Global Nonviolent Action Database (Swarthmore College, 2014), with occasional 
augmentation from primary sources such as historical newspapers when necessary.
24
 
I used the information gathered from this research to generate values for a 
nominal variable describing the mechanisms of success based on the six-tiered typology 
outlined in the previous chapter.  These categories satisfactorily covered all 83 campaigns 
in the study with conceptual precision and empirical discretion.  In most cases the coding 
was relatively straightforward, as the various sources consulted were in agreement on the 
mechanics of success.  However, in some cases sources were in disagreement on the 
mechanism of success, or choosing the particular breakthrough moment to consider the 
moment of success was unclear.  For these more difficult cases I followed a three-step 
process to ensure reliability.  First, I consulted as many sources as could be feasibly 
obtained in order to get as clear a picture of the transition as possible.  Second, I 
explained the rationale for my coding decisions in “methodological notes,”
25
 and third, I 
included a dummy reliability variable in my dataset in order to run statistical tests both 
including and excluding these more difficult cases.  Out of my population of 83 cases, I 
identified nine cases as “weak:” cases in which the impact of civil resistance in the 
transition was unclear or the maximalist nature of the campaign was questionable.  I also 
                                                 
24
 For brief narratives of each transition and a complete list of references on individual 
coding decisions see Appendix A: Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success codebook. 
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 Available in Appendix A. 
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identified eleven cases as “uncertain:” cases whose inclusion in the dataset I was 
confident in but which had some ambiguity in the coding of one or more variables. 
I used pre-existing data from the Center on Systemic Peace (CSP) to generate 
values for my dependent variables of democracy and civil peace.   The Polity IV dataset 
is a commonly-used tool to represent levels of democracy.  It collects time series data on 
a variety of political characteristics in a country in a particular year.  This data is then 
used to generate a score from    -10 (completely autocratic) to 10 (completely democratic) 
(Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2011).  I collected the polity scores of each country five and 
ten years after the end of the civil resistance campaign to create two sets of three 
variables: POSTPOLITY (the score itself), POLITYCHANGE (the change in polity score 
from the year of the end of the campaign to five and ten years afterwards), and 
POSTDEMOC, a dummy variable which captures whether or not the country was a 
democracy five years after the end of the campaign (i.e. had a polity score of 6 or higher).   
To represent the future outbreak of civil conflict I used data from CSP’s Major 
Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV) dataset (Marshall 2010).  MEPV collects time-
series data on various forms of political violence including international war, civil war, 
and ethnic violence.
26
  I created two sets of dummy variables (POSTWAR) to capture 
whether civil conflict occurred in the five years and ten years after the end of the civil 
                                                 
26
 The MEPV dataset records data from 1946-2010.  For the four cases in the NAVCO 
dataset which ended prior to 1946 I used data from Gleditsch 2004.  For country-years 
from 2011-present I used data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (2014). 
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resistance campaign.  This variable was coded as a one if any of the five or ten country-
years had a value above 0 for any of MEPV’s civil conflict variables. 
I also included several control variables to account for some of the most widely-
accepted structural causes of democracy and civil war.  There is a widely-acknowledged 
relationship between development and both democracy and civil war – positive for the 
former (Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994, Lipset 1960, Geddes 2009) and negative for the 
latter (Kalyvas, 2009; Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).
27
  As a proxy for development, I 
include a measure of GDP per capita from the World Bank databank, a tool used in 
several seminal quantitative studies (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006).  Other studies have 
indicated that a country’s location in a “democratic neighborhood” increases the 
likelihood of democratization (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Kopstein & Reilly, 2000).  I thus 
include the proportion of neighboring countries which were democratic in the country-
years in question 5 years and 10 years after the end of the campaign.
28
  Population has 
also been recognized as having a strong and consistent effect on the likelihood of civil 
                                                 
27
 There remains significant scholarly disagreement on the precise effects of development 
on democracy.  Some, most prominently Przeworkski et al (2000), argue that 
development has no effect on transitions to democracy but instead has strong effects on 
the survival of democratic regimes, thus explaining the statistical correlation between 
high levels of development and democracy.  For my purposes whether development 
initiates a transition or instead makes democratic stability more likely is largely 
irrelevant.  Either causal mechanism will lead to a higher likelihood that the country will 
be a democracy five years and ten years after the transition mechanism and thus must be 
controlled for.  
 
28




war (Hegre & Sambanis, 2006), in my regressions on political violence I thus include 




The rich literatures on democratization and civil war have both offered a number 
of additional potential explanatory variables for their respective outcomes.  Yet the 
“canonical” status of many of these variables remains contested, or their causal 
mechanisms are poorly articulated, thus I exclude them.  For instance, several studies 
have found a significant negative relationship between democracy and large Muslim 
populations (Barro 1999, Fish 2002).  However, the causal mechanisms linking Islam and 
authoritarianism are unclear (Teorell & Hadenius, 2007); particularly in the light of 
relatively high support for “democracy” among Muslims (Tessler, 2002) and whether the 
“Muslim effect” is simply an “Arab effect” remains contested (Stepan & Robertson, 
2003).
30
  Others have argued that a heritage of British colonization is likely to lead to 
more democracy (Weiner, 1987; Payne, 1993) but other studies find little empirical 
support for this contention (Fish, 2002), and some find that Spanish colonies perform 
better when colonialism is conceptualized holistically (Bernard, Reenock, & Nordstrom, 
2004).    Thus I do not include additional control variables for democracy or civil peace. 
                                                 
29
 The data on country-years post-2007 is from The World Bank 2014. 
 
30
 In addition, these studies do not take into account the still-unfolding effects of the 
“Arab Spring” in 2011. 
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In addition, considering the small size of the dataset, the multiplication of 
explanatory variables would lead the regressions into severe degrees of freedom 
problems.  Thus, while including additional control variables might provide helpful 
differentiation, the shape of the data precludes inclusion of a “grab bag” of explanatory 
variables.  This exclusion may make the statistical findings on their own problematic.  
However, I address this issue through the use of the case studies in the following chapter. 
Finally, I include dummy control variables to indicate whether the country was a 
democracy or experienced a major episode of political violence in the five years prior to 
the transition.  Values of these variables were informed by the same datasets as the 
POSTWAR and POSTDEMOC variables. 
This dataset allowed me to perform a series of statistical tests framed around two 
central hypotheses, explicated in detail in the previous chapter and stated formally as 
follows: 
H1: There is a positive, significant relationship between elections and negotiations 
as mechanisms of civil resistance campaign success and future democracy.
31
 
                                                 
31
 Throughout this chapter I will use “consensus-based” and “non-consensus-based” as 
shorthand for the two categories of transition mechanisms that follow the scheme of my 
hypotheses (“consensus-based” referring to elections and negotiations and “non-
consensus-based” referring to the four other mechanisms of success).  This is purely for 
the sake of stylistic convenience and is not meant to imply that the characteristic of 
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H2: There is a negative, significant relationship between elections and 
negotiations as mechanisms of civil resistance campaign success and future 
political violence. 
My primary means of testing these hypotheses was multivariate logistic 
regression, using the binary measures of post-campaign democracy and civil conflict as 
my dependent variables and using dummy variables to represent each category of the 
transition mechanisms.  I also used OLS regression for measures of the post-campaign 
polity scores and levels of change in the polity score from before the campaign to five 
and ten years afterwards.  In each regression I excluded a single transition mechanism 
category from the model.  The resulting regression coefficients represent the effect of the 
transition mechanism on the probability of democracy or violence relative to the excluded 
transition mechanism.  Because GDP per capita data was only available from 1960 
onwards, excluding several cases from my dataset, I also ran models which did not 
incorporate the GDP per capita control variable. Finally, I ran regressions of all the 
dependent variables using a combined dummy variable representing both negotiations 
and elections (i.e., a value of one if the transition mechanism was either of these 
consensus-based mechanisms).  I also ran each regression both including and excluding 
                                                                                                                                                 
consensus is more important than the characteristics of campaign initiative or pre-success 
capacity building.  
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the nine “weak” cases.  All of these various categories of regressions added up to a total 
of 176 regression models.
32
 
Results: The Shape of the Data 
 The final dataset of 83 cases represented a truly global sample of country-years, 
with almost even distribution of cases across all the major geographic regions.
33
  The 
only region significantly under-represented is the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 
with only 3 cases of successful civil resistance.  There are three reasons for this under-
representation.  First, the region is the smallest out of the five, with a much smaller 
number of countries and thus an expected lower absolute numbers of cases. Second, 
while several different forms of civil resistance have played a political role in the Middle 
East (Stephan, 2009), the region’s authoritarian regimes have shown themselves to be 
particularly resilient to popular challenges, an empirical fact for which a number of 
explanations have been put forth in the literature.
34
  This resilience, whatever the 
particular causes, means cases of successful regime change through any means are rare.  
And finally, as mentioned above, the temporal scope of my dataset excludes the wave of 
“Arab Spring” cases from 2011. 
                                                 
32
 Tests were conducted using the SAS 9.3 statistical software, with confirmation of 
selected tests using both SPSS and Stata.  SAS Program with code for all tests available 
from author upon request. 
 
33
 The dataset includes 18 cases from Africa, 20 from the Americas, 19 from Asia, and 23 
from Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
 
34
 See, for example: Ayoob 2005, Fish 2002, Kamrava 1998. 
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 Since my theory aspires to be a global explanation, I address the under-
representation of Middle Eastern cases in my selection of case studies in the following 
chapter.  However, this geographical limitation should be taken into account in the 
following quantitative analysis. 
 In contrast to this relatively even geographic distribution, there is a strong 
temporal trend towards recent cases, as shown in figure 3.1.  While my data sources 
begin their sampling of civil resistance campaigns in 1900 no successful cases take place 
until 1923 and the numbers rise sharply over time.  The peak decade is the 1990s, 
although my data only goes until 2006, thus the total number of cases from 2000-2010 is 
likely higher.  This trend follows Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) finding that the rate of 
success in civil resistance campaigns has risen over time.  Thus a dramatic increase in the 
absolute number of successful cases is to be expected.  Better global media coverage and 
scholarly attention to popular uprisings are also likely a factor.








1920s 1930s 1940s 1950s 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s
Figure 3.1: Temporal Distribution of Successful 
Civil Resistance Campaigns (Absolute Numbers) 
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 Out of the six transition mechanisms outlined in the previous chapter, four are 
well-represented in the data (See Figure 3.2).  Elections are the most common, with 27 
cases.  Resignations, coups, and negotiations are also well-represented, with between 15 
and 20 cases of each.  International interventions and overwhelmings are much rarer, 
with only four cases of each.   
  
 Dividing the cases by transition mechanism and correlating with the data on 
democracy and political violence five years after success yields initial support for my 
hypotheses.  As seen in figure 3.3 the rate of democracy in cases of both negotiations and 
elections is over 70 percent, while resignations, the next highest, have only around a 50 
percent success rate and coups are even lower.  The relationship becomes even stronger 
when weak cases are excluded, with elections in particular nearing a democracy rate of 
80%.  Aggregating the mechanisms into the “consensus-based” and “non-consensus-
based” categories yield a similar strong division (see figure 3.4. 


















The data on political violence shows the expected inverse relationship.  Rates of 
post-campaign political violence are significantly lower in cases of negotiations or 
elections, though, as with the democracy numbers, resignations perform unexpectedly 
well – coming somewhat close to negotiations in their percentage of post-campaign 
transitional violence (See Figure 3.5).  The aggregated mechanisms show the distinction 






















 This relationship holds, and in fact becomes more prominent, when the successful 



























In cases with at least one major episode of political violence prior to campaign success, 
consensus-based mechanisms had only a 25% rate of recurrence of violence. By contrast, 
non-consensus-based mechanisms of success had an over 70% rate of recurrence (See 
Figure 3.7).  In cases with no prior political violence rates were low for both categories 
(though marginally lower for the consensus-based mechanisms).  This suggests that, 
while the differential effects of the mechanism of success in sparking new episodes of 
violence may be minimal, consensus-based mechanisms of success can have powerful 
preventive effects in situations where violence has already taken place. 
 
 
Democracy and Political Violence Regressions 
Regression analysis of the democracy hypothesis yielded mixed results.  While 
the logistic regressions of all cases using dummy variables for the individual mechanisms 













Figure 3.7: Political Violence Percentage 





showing positive coefficients relative to the other transition mechanisms, no coefficients 
reached levels of statistical significance.   This lack of significance is due in part to the 
small size of the dataset, but does put the democracy hypothesis in question.   
The relationship, however, does become significant when the cases identified as 
“weak” are excluded from the dataset. The combined negotiations/elections variable was 
significant in regressions which both included and excluded the GDP per capita variable, 
with a 0.1 level of significance in the first and a 0.05 level of significance in the second.  
In addition, in the model of all transition mechanisms excluding weak cases and the GDP 
per capita variable the election coefficient had a positive, significant effect relative to the 
coup d’etat coefficient.   
As with the logistic regressions, OLS regressions of the polity score itself failed to 
yield significant relationships, though the signs were consistently in line with their 
expected direction.  Interestingly, though, regression of the change in polity score showed 
several significant relationships, with the combined election/negotiation variable having a 
consistently positive effect. A selection of the relevant regression models is in table 3.1.
35
 
 The logistic regressions of the post-campaign political violence variable closely 
followed the prediction of my hypothesis.  Most strikingly, elections had a significant and 
negative effect relative to both coups and overwhelmings.  The combined 
                                                 
35




election/negotiation variable had a significant negative effect across all variations of the 
model at both the 5 and 10 year stage.  The one exception was negotiations in the 5-year, 
all cases model, with a small positive (though not significant) effect relative to 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Interpretation of these results must be prefaced by a methodological caution: with 
an n of only 83 the accuracy of statistical tests may be imperfect.  As mentioned above, 
some mechanisms have an extremely low n, with only 4 cases of international 
interventions and overwhelmings.  Both of these particular mechanisms of success may 
have interesting effects but the small number of cases makes regression an unsuitable 
tool, as these variables tend to exhibit either quasi or complete separation of data points, 
making their regression coefficients effectively meaningless.  See, for example, the 
coefficients for the overwhelming variable in table 3.1. 
 I have attempted to compensate for the small number of particular cases in part by 
also performing regressions of the aggregate elections/negotiations variable, but this 
aggregation, while offering utility in supporting my argument on consensus, campaign 
initiative, and capacity-building, limits the ability of my analysis to directly compare the 
particular effects of certain mechanisms of success which may be interesting.  
Overwhelmings, in particular, are a unique political phenomenon deserving of more 
study.  The small number of cases, though, makes the quantitative approach less valuable.  
Future work should rely more on qualitative analysis. 
 Having brought up these cautions one encouraging note also bears mentioning.  
The combined datasets used to generate cases are at least a close approximation of the 
complete global population of successful civil resistance campaigns during the period of 
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examination (1900-2006).  Since these 83 campaigns are the population (not a sample) 
even results which do not reach standards of statistical significance may be instructive, 
though of course to be accepted with caution.  The summary statistics presented above do 
show powerful trends, even if statistical tests using the data fail to reach robust standards 
of statistical significance. 
On democracy, an honest evaluation of the results provides only tentative support 
for my hypothesis.  The results are strongly suggestive of the positive effects of elections 
and negotiations.  However, while some relationships of statistical significance do 
emerge, particularly when “weak” cases are excluded from the analysis, the results are 
unstable.  The small size of the dataset, as well as a lack of differentiation among the 
covariates is the likely cause behind this instability.  Yet a lack of strong, statistically 
significant relationships calls for further analysis before firmly arguing for the 
democratizing effects of elections and negotiations.  Due to this uncertainty, the 
democracy question will be the primary concern in the following chapter’s case studies.   
In the future, this issue might also be dealt with by expanding the population of 
cases to different types of regime transitions.  This would require a theoretical re-casting 
of the model, since as it is its logic is limited to successful civil resistance campaigns, but 
would provide a way to expand the dataset so as to make statistical tests more stable.             
 The much more striking and consistent finding is on the effects of mechanisms of 
success on political violence.  Here the data consistently point to extremely divergent 
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effects from the various mechanisms.  Overwhelmings have the highest rate of political 
violence (75%) while negotiated transitions and electoral victories have by far the lowest 
rates (less than 15% combined).  This finding is consistent with Chenoweth and 
Stephan’s arguments on why nonviolent campaigns tend to lead to better civil peace 
outcomes than violent campaigns.  Nonviolent campaigns have these better effects 
because they tend to have lower participation barriers and thus a larger, broad base of 
support which is able to more easily incorporate former opponents into a post-success 
political order.  Consensus-based transition mechanisms are the logical extension of this 
pattern.  
 The question of perceived political legitimacy may also be a potential explanation 
for these trends in the data.  There seems to be an inverse relationship between the degree 
of perceived political legitimacy and future civil conflict.  Overwhelmings, in which the 
mass of the population simply occupies the organs of government, could be argued to be 
the mechanism most alienating to former regime supporters and least politically 
legitimate.  Coups d’état, the category with the next highest mean rate of political 
violence, are illegitimate in that they are extra-institutional, but they represent a decision 
by at least a portion of the former regime elite to side with the civil resistance campaign 
and thus may grant somewhat more legitimacy than overwhelmings.  Resignations and 
electoral victories follow institutional mechanisms and thus while they may 
disenfranchise segments of former regimes they carry with them a high degree of 
legitimacy.  And finally, negotiated transitions are likely to be perceived as most 
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legitimate because by definition they involve all the actors granting them a certain degree 
of legitimacy ex ante.   
 The unexpectedly positive performance of resignations on both democracy and 
civil peace indicate a potentially important theoretical clarification not captured in my 
typology.  I have argued that resignations are likely to perform poorly because the 
mechanism’s initiative rests with the ancien regime.  However, it is not only conceivable 
but indeed highly likely that there is significant variation on both consensus and initiative 
within the sample of resignations.  A resignation may be a canny move on the part of an 
autocrat seeking to control the terms of his departure but may also be a desperate last-
ditch action by a regime that is falling apart – one carefully anticipated and planned for 
by the civil resistance campaign.  The particular intra-regime dynamics which lead to a 
resignation may also be opaque or at least difficult to determine, making a full analysis of 
these dynamics highly time-consuming. More extensive research into resignations may 
reveal meaningful disaggregations which further clarify this question. 
 
Addressing Endogeneity Concerns 
One central concern in my analysis was the possibility that transition mechanisms 
themselves are endogenous to larger historical processes or particular structural factors 
present in the cases prior to transition.  It is dubious to consider transition mechanisms to 
be comparable strategic choices if structural conditions preclude the exercise of particular 
mechanisms of success.  I considered three endogeneity arguments: that transition 
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mechanisms can be explained by geographic region, the country’s level of pre-existing 
democratic openness, or previous regime type. 
 The first argument is closely tied to the “democratic neighborhood” argument 
mentioned previously which I controlled for in my democracy regressions by including 
the proportion of neighboring democracies.  Certain regions may be associated with more 
peaceful, democratic norms due to historical circumstances.  Europe and the Americas, 
for example, with a relatively long history of stable democratic nation-states, might be 
expected to have a higher proportion of consensus-based transition mechanisms than the 
less stable regions of Africa or Asia. 
 As shown in Figure 3.8, the distribution of the transition mechanism categories is 
far from equal across geographic regions.  However the distribution does not follow the 
expected breakdown outlined above.  Perhaps most strikingly, Africa has more than three 
times as many consensus-based as non-consensus-based mechanisms of success, and the 
Americas have 50 percent more non-consensus-based mechanisms.  Asia and Europe 
follow the expected pattern more closely, but still not exclusively.  In particular, out of 23 
cases from Europe, 9 follow non-consensus-based mechanisms.  The geographic 





The second argument is intuitively straightforward: the less authoritarian and 
more democratic the country, the more likely it is that massive political changes can be 
achieved through consensus-based mechanisms such as elections and negotiations.  
Norms of institutionalized political contention and discourse are likely to be ingrained 
deeper in more democratic countries.  In contrast, authoritarian countries with hegemonic 
regimes do not possess such norms and institutions.  Civil resistance campaigns may not 
see them as viable mechanisms of success and the regime’s “pillars of support” may not 
respond to their legitimacy in achieving political change.  Thus highly authoritarian 
regimes are likely to only be ousted through heavily coercive transition mechanisms such 
as coups or overwhelmings.    
 While this argument has an intuitive appeal it is not borne out in the data.  As 
shown in Figure 3.9, the average polity score in the year prior to transition is almost 










Figure 3.8: Geographic Distribution of Mechanism 





interventions and overwhelmings diverge from this trend, but as mentioned above both 
have an n of only four cases each, and thus play only a marginal role in my analysis.
36
  A 
scatterplot of the prior year polity scores (Figure 3.10)
37
 shows a similarly random 
distribution across the four most common transition mechanisms. 
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 Note too that both are included in my “non-consensus-based” aggregation and have 
opposite average prior polity scores, thus counter-balancing one another. 
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 In Figure 3.10, the transition mechanisms are signified by numerical indicators.  Coup 
= 1, Negotiation = 2, Election = 3, International Intervention = 4, Resignation = 5, 

















 The third argument comes primarily from the work of Barbara Geddes (1999) on 
the effects of the type of authoritarian regime on the process of democratization.  Geddes 
divides authoritarian regimes into three major types: personalistic, military, and party-
based.
38
  Geddes argues that out of the three, military regimes are most likely to negotiate 
their way through a peaceful democratization process because of military values of force 
integrity and a desire to peacefully return to the barracks.  Party-based regimes are more 
likely to hold onto power than military regimes but when external or domestic pressure 
increases they are also likely to have a smooth, peaceful transition to democracy.   
In contrast, personalistic regimes are unlikely to voluntarily give up power, 
instead opting to fight to maintain political control as long as possible.  This is due 
primarily to the regime’s close connection to the state, with the state often being seen as 
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 Geddes’ later work incorporates other types of authoritarianism such as monarchies 
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the dictator’s personal property, and the consequent zero-sum nature of political 
transition.  Whereas militaries can negotiate a political exit to return to their barracks and 
party-based regimes may be able to liberalize but remain a part of the political process, 
personalistic regimes are unlikely to be able to integrate into a new political order and 
may face reprisals, even death, once out of political power.  Applying Geddes’ logic to 
my mechanisms of success typology, one would expect that consensus-based transition 
mechanisms would be endogenous to military or party-based regimes while highly 
unlikely in personalistic regimes.   
 To test this question I collected data on regime type from Geddes, Wright, and 
Frantz (2014).  Their data covered the majority of my cases with three major exceptions: 
cases prior to 1946, cases of transition from colonialism, and transition from democratic 
regimes.  In the first case, I performed the prior regime coding myself.  As mentioned 
above, this is very small number of cases, and all involved straightforward coding with 
little or no ambiguity as to the prior regime type.  In the second and third cases I simply 
added new categories to capture these cases.  Extending Geddes’ argument one would 
expect in both colonialism and democracy that a higher proportion of cases would follow 
consensus-based transition mechanisms.  In democracies these types of transitions have 
already been institutionalized while in colonial cases the post-WWII environment of 
European decolonization would seem likely to incentivize consensus-based mechanisms. 
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 A breakdown of transition mechanisms by prior regime type is in Figure 3.11.
39
  
The data provides a mixed answer to Geddes’ argument.  Personalistic regimes have a 
significantly higher number of non-consensus mechanisms, with more than three times 
more non-consensus transition mechanisms as consensus transition mechanisms.  Party-
based regimes show an inverse relationship, with significant numbers of consensus-based 
transition mechanisms relative to non-consensus based transitions.    
However, Geddes’ argument holds less powerfully in relation to military regimes, 
which have nearly equal numbers of both consensus-based and non-consensus transition 
mechanisms.  Most surprising are the cases of transitions in democracies, which have 
twice as many non-consensus transitions as consensus mechanisms.    
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 Geddes, Wright, and Frantz also code several regimes as hybrids of their major 














While these issues with military regimes and democracy do put Geddes’ argument 
in question, the strong relationship shown in the party-based and personalistic regime 
numbers do make the endogeneity question still salient and puts the effects of 
mechanisms of success into question.  Can the occurrence and effects of different 
mechanisms be reduced to the influence of the prior regime type?  In order to address this 
question, it will be necessary to more deeply examine the causal dynamics which both 
lead to and follow differing mechanisms of success.  In particular the dynamics of 
consensus-based transition mechanisms in personalistic regimes and of non-consensus 
based transition mechanisms in party-based regimes will be critical to examine. 
 
Conclusion 
From 1900-2006, there were 83 cases of successful maximalist civil resistance 
campaigns.  These campaigns utilized six mechanisms of success in achieving their goals.  
Out of these six mechanisms elections and negotiations (“consensus-based” mechanisms 
of success) resulted in significantly higher rates of post-campaign democracy and 
significantly lower rates of post-campaign political violence, supporting my argument on 
the effects of mechanisms of success from the previous chapter.  These relationships are 
statistically significant, though in the case of post-campaign democracy the significance 
is unstable.  While my hypotheses were generally supported, the large-n analysis left 
several significant questions.  First, what are the actual causal mechanisms which link 
mechanisms of success to democracy and civil peace?  Second, is the mixed statistical 
significance on democracy due to the small number of cases or to a weakness in the 
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argument?  And third, are the various mechanisms of success viable strategic alternatives 
to one another or is their occurrence endogenous to the country’s prior regime type?  In 





Chapter Four: Transition Mechanisms and the Arab Spring; The Cases of Egypt 
and Yemen 
I have two broad objectives in this chapter: to further support my hypothesis that 
mechanisms characterized by consensus, campaign initiative and political capacity-
building, lead to more democracy and less transitional violence, and to delve more deeply 
into the causal mechanisms at work which lead to the occurrence of this general trend.   
I will also seek to address the endogeneity concern of regime type raised at the 
conclusion of the preceding chapter.  Are mechanisms of success relevant to 
understanding democratization and civil peace after civil resistance campaigns or are 
their effects reducible to the political opportunity structure inherent in the previous 
regime?  Note, however, that in many respects Geddes’ argument is in line with my own.  
The positive effects which she points to from military and party-based regimes are based 
on their greater likelihood of following less coercive, less violent transition mechanisms.  
The causal mechanism whereby Geddes’ argument generates its effects is, in essence, a 
close corollary of my own.   
The endogeneity concern, however, becomes relevant if regime type can be 
shown to reasonably preclude the possibility of differing types of mechanisms of success.  
If certain regime types practically exclude the operation of particular mechanisms of 
success then it is not meaningful to consider the independent effects of mechanisms or 
 
77 
examine them as strategic equivalents.  This is the argument I will seek to address in my 
case studies through testing the following hypothesis: 
H3: Regime type, while influencing, does not predetermine the reasonable 
possibility of civil resistance campaigns pursuing varying mechanisms of 
success. 
Finally, I will address the geographic and temporal underrepresentation of recent 
Middle Eastern cases in my quantitative analysis in order to show the global impact of 
my argument.  Thus, the cases I will examine are the recent “Arab Spring” revolutions in 
Egypt and Yemen, cases which I fit into my mechanism of success typology as a coup 
d’état and negotiation respectively.
40
   These two cases are optimal for my purposes for 
the following reasons:  their close geographic, cultural, and temporal proximity as well as 
the similarity of their pre-revolutionary regimes eliminate the need to control for many 
larger environmental factors, their recent occurrence means that they fall outside of my 
dataset and thus are better-suited to test its findings, and the large degree of media 
                                                 
40
 I consider Yemen’s transition mechanism to be a civil resistance campaign-regime 
negotiation rather than a purely elite-based “pacted” transition because of the role of the 
Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) which actually signed the agreement as a key part of the civil 
resistance campaign up to the signing of the agreement.  While certainly not every faction 
of Yemen’s revolution took part in the negotiation process, those who did negotiate can 
be rightfully categorized as a major faction of the civil resistance campaign rather than an 
elite third party.  This categorization was also how the JMP was perceived in Yemen both 
by the government (Yemen News Agency 11/28/11) and the factions of the campaign 
which did not participate in the negotiations (Yemen Times 11/17/11). 
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attention given to both cases means that significant popular and scholarly resources exist 
with which to examine them. 
I excluded the two additional cases of successful Arab Spring regime change – 
Libya and Tunisia – because the nature of their transitions makes them less optimal tests 
for my hypotheses.
41
  In the case of Libya, while the revolution began with nonviolent 
protests it quickly shifted to an armed struggle, so quickly in fact that it is doubtful if the 
protests in Libya can even be meaningfully described as a civil resistance campaign.  The 
effects of this shift on Libya’s transitional path are doubtless an interesting avenue of 
inquiry but lie outside of the scope conditions of my theory.   
The Tunisian case, while clearly lying within the scope of my theory, offers less 
clear distinction on my independent variable.  The Tunisian revolution would fit into my 
typology as a resignation.  As mentioned in the previous chapter, one of the findings of 
my quantitative analysis was that resignations seem to occupy a more ambiguous middle 
ground between consensus-based elections and negotiations and the other non-consensus-
based mechanisms of success.  Tunisia’s revolution exemplifies this ambiguity.  While 
military defection played a key role the military did not seize power, thus events in 
Tunisia were not a coup.  Instead, when President Ben Ali resigned and fled the country 
parliamentary speaker Fouad Mebazaa created a unity government with the opposition.  
Thus the mechanism of success involved a certain degree of consensus and campaign 
                                                 
41
 H1 and H2 formally stated in the previous chapter, page 52. 
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capacity-building, unlike Egypt, where the events of February 11
th
, 2011 were clearly a 
coup d'état, but is not a straightforward consensus-based mechanism of success, as is the 
case in Yemen.   
While there are many similarities between the pre-revolutionary regimes in Egypt 
and Yemen, they also vary across Geddes’ authoritarian regime typology, with Yemen 
under President Ali Abdullah Saleh coded as a personalistic regime and Egypt under 
Mubarak a three-way hybrid of party-based, military, and personalistic.  While a purely 
party-based authoritarian regime would be a more optimal comparison, these differences 
in regime type do make the comparison meaningful for addressing the endogeneity 
question.  Geddes’ approach might be uncertain on the likely trajectory of the Egyptian 
transition because of the hybrid nature of the Egyptian regime.  However, Yemen’s clear 
personalistic regime structures would make a consensus-based transition mechanism 
highly unlikely.   
 Furthermore, the other ways in which the two cases differ make the cases a “hard” 
test for my central hypothesis.  Several traditional explanations for democracy and 
political violence would lead one to expect strongly better outcomes in Egypt than in 
Yemen.  In 2010 Egypt’s level of development was significantly higher than Yemen’s.  
GDP per capita in Egypt was more than twice that of Yemen (The World Bank, 2014).  
The Yemeni government relied heavily on oil revenues for its income (Revenue Watch 
Institute, 2013), a factor often argued to increase the likelihood and stability of 
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authoritarianism (Luciani, 2005).  Egypt’s reliance on fossil fuel revenue was much more 
marginal (See Figure 4.1). 
  
Perhaps most importantly while the Egyptian government faced no serious armed 
opposition, the government of Yemen was deeply engaged in a struggle with multiple 
armed insurgent groups.  While the general trend in the Middle East against democracy 
would perhaps not make democratization “likely” in either case, these factors and others 
would indicate that political violence in Yemen would be extremely high, while the 
likelihood of democracy would be extremely low.    
 Democratic transitions can be lengthy processes and both Egypt and Yemen are 
too early in their transitions for their democratic progress to be fully evaluated.  I conduct 
my analysis under the assumption that significant transitional periods remain in the future 
for both countries.  This analysis is by no means the last word on the democratic 











Figure 4.1: Fossil Fuel Revenue as 









two years respectively since the success of civil resistance campaigns in these two 
countries provide a rich and fruitful ground for analysis of the effects of mechanisms of 
success, and also give insight into how the continued democratic transition in both 
countries may be expected to play out over the coming years. 
Laying the Groundwork 
Prior to 2011, the political environments in Egypt and Yemen were in many ways 
similar.  Long-time authoritarian presidents, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and Ali Abdullah 
Saleh in Yemen, had been in power for similar periods of time,
42
 held periodic 
“elections” which served to legitimize their rule, and were both considered to be 
grooming their sons to succeed them.  While both regimes allowed limited forms of 
political opposition this took the form of “liberalized autocracy” (Brumberg, 2005) 
arrangements which allowed minimal public criticism but prevented opposition political 
parties or other groups from achieving real political power.  Saleh’s Yemen was a 
personalistic regime revolving around the Saleh family and sustained through a network 
of tribal patronage.  In Egypt the Mubarak regime sustained itself through the all-
pervasive ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), an extensive mukhabarat internal 
security apparatus, and a politically and economically powerful military. 
                                                 
42
 Saleh became President of North Yemen in 1978 and continued as President when 
North Yemen unified with South Yemen in 1990.  Mubarak became President in 1981 
after the assassination of President Anwar Sadat. 
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 In Egypt, an armed insurgency against the Mubarak regime by Islamists in Upper 
Egypt had been successfully crushed in the late 1990s.  While sporadic minor attacks 
took place in the Sinai region, these were minimal and did not present a serious challenge 
to the Egyptian government. 
A political opening in the mid-2000s under pressure from the United States led to 
Egypt’s first multi-party presidential election.  However, extensive legal restrictions on 
the eligibility of presidential candidates and the formation of political parties severely 
tilted the playing field in favor of the ruling NDP.  The election itself was characterized 
by widespread electoral manipulation by the regime, the imprisonment of President 
Mubarak’s most serious contender, only 22 percent voter turnout and an 88.7 percent 
victory by Mubarak (International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 2005).   Nonviolent 
civil society groups until the mantle of the “Kefaya”
43
 movement led protests against 
Mubarak’s rule around the time of the election but these largely faded after the election 
was over.
44
   
Government privatization and other neo-liberal policies spearheaded by President 
Mubarak’s son Gamal had sparked widespread protests and strikes by workers, most 
prominently in the city of Mahalla, but this labor activism remained largely contained to 
non-maximalist goals and did not directly threaten the political monopoly of the regime 
                                                 
43
 Kefaya means “enough” in Arabic. 
 
44
 For a summary of the Kefaya movement see Bisgaard-Church 2011. 
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(Cook, 2012, pp. 178-79).  The government also faced sporadic opposition from activist 
bloggers, who advocated a diverse set of causes but primarily acted to publicize 
incidences of police brutality.  However, in general the political environment in Egypt 
was characterized by a cognitive dissonance as the informal rules of political discourse 
limited criticism of the regime to private discussions (Cook, 2012).  Thus by the time of 
the Tunisian “Jasmine Revolution” in late 2010, with these few exceptions there was little 
visible opposition to the Mubarak regime.  Political discussions in Egypt were 
overwhelmingly focused on the question of Presidential succession, with two regime 
insiders: the President’s son Gamal and intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, considered the 
two most likely contenders.   
 In contrast, the regime of Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh entered the Arab 
Spring confronting a wide variety of violent and nonviolent political opposition.  Three 
major challengers, two violent and one largely nonviolent, are particularly deserving of 
attention. 
 First, the Yemeni government faced an ongoing insurrection in the northern 
province of Saada from Zaidi rebels known as “Houthis.”  The Houthi rebellion was 
initiated in 2004 when the Yemeni government attempted to arrest radical preacher and 
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political leader Hussein Al-Houthi.  Al-Houthi, as leader of the Zaidi
45
 group al-Shabab 
al-Moumeen (the “believing youth”) had led virulent anti-US demonstrations which the 
government interpreted as covert anti-government activity.  Al-Houthi was also accused 
of attempting to revive the Zaidi imamate, the theocratic government which had ruled 
Yemen until 1962.  Al-Houthi’s followers protected their leader violently, resulting in 
three months of armed clashes.  Hussein al-Houthi was killed and the rebellion briefly 
died down in September of 2004, but was re-initiated in 2005 by his father, Badr-eddin, 
and his brother, Abdelmalik.  The following years saw several cycles of violent clashes 
and temporary cease fire arrangements, peaking in August of 2009, when the government 
launched “Operation Scorched Earth” to eliminate the Houthis.  Battles continued 
through early 2010, when the two sides signed yet another cease fire agreement.  
However, clashes continued between the Houthis and pro-government tribal militias 
throughout the rest of the year. 
 Throughout the conflict, while the government accused the Houthis of seeking 
regime change, the Houthis themselves painted their insurgency as much more defensive 
in nature – focused on  protecting the Zaidi regions of Yemen from Sunni persecution 
(particularly from the increasing influence of Salafist groups) and gaining greater 
autonomy for their home region.       
                                                 
45
 Zaidis are a sect of Shi’ite Islam found most commonly in Yemen.  They are a majority 
in Saada Province, the heart of the Houthi rebellion, but a minority in the total population 
of Yemen.   
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 Second, a largely nonviolent protest movement, the Hiraak al-Jenoobi,
46
 known 
across Yemen simply as “Hiraak,” led protests and demonstrations across the formerly 
independent state of South Yemen.
47
  The demonstrations were initiated in 2007 
primarily around the issue of benefits for South Yemeni soldiers forced into retirement 
after the South’s abortive civil war in 1994, but grew more radical in both their demands 
and tactics as the government responded to Hiraak activity with widespread violence.  By 
late 2010 most Hiraak leaders were calling for full independence.   
 The Hiraak movement was (and is) deeply fragmented, incorporating elements of 
the former ruling party of South Yemen, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), as well as 
independent youth activists, moderate Islamists, and others.  While the majority of the 
movement pursued its goals through nonviolence, several armed factions regularly 
clashed with police and targeted both police and government forces in hit-and-run 
attacks. 
Finally, the local branch of Al-Qaeda, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula 
(AQAP), was involved in an insurgency against the government.  Islamist militants had a 
long-standing presence in Yemen, dating to the Yemeni government’s support for the 
anti-Soviet insurgency in Afghanistan in the 1980s.  Most famously, al-Qaeda associated 
                                                 
46
Meaning “Southern Movement” in Arabic. 
 
47
 For a history of South Yemen and background on the grievances and historical 
conditions framing the Hiraak, see Brehony 2011. 
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militants launched an attack on the USS Cole in the port of Aden in early 2000, killing 17 
US sailors.  The Cole attack’s impact was initially limited in Yemen, as militant groups 
lacked popular support and were even connected to high elements in the government 
(Day, 2012).  However, after President Saleh’s eager adoption of the Bush 
Administration’s “war on terror” and in the wake of widespread outrage over the US 
invasion of Iraq in 2003, Al-Qaeda activity steadily increased. 
 
Yemen: Compromising the Revolution? 
48
 
When fruit seller Mohammed Bouazizi self-immolated and initiated the “Arab 
Spring” the political situation in Yemen was already precarious.  Under the terms of the 
Yemeni constitution President Ali Abdullah Saleh was required to step down from power 
at the end of his term in 2013.  However, in late 2010 MPs from Saleh’s General People’s 
Congress (GPC), the overwhelmingly dominant party in the Yemeni parliament, 
announced a series of proposed constitutional amendments which would remove 
presidential term limits and allow Saleh to remain president for life.  The move enraged 
both the formal opposition, led by the Islamist Islah party, and several of Yemen’s 
powerful tribal sheikhs.   
                                                 
48
 The following case studies are informed by a wide reading of primary and secondary 
sources, all of which are listed in the bibliography.  Since much of the narrative relies on 
common-knowledge, open-source information and comes from multiple overlapping 
sources I have not cited each source individually at each usage in the text.  However, in a 
few cases, particularly for pieces of information which are disputed or not based on 
easily-available or uncontested information, I have included a specific in-text citation to 
support my narrative. 
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Thus, when news of President Ben Ali’s resignation and flight from Tunisia 
reached Yemen the news fell on fertile ground.  Students at Sana’a University held small 
protests where they praised the Tunisian revolution and called for a similar uprising in 
Yemen.  Civil society activists and some low-level members of Islah, including future 
Nobel laureate Tawakkul Karman, participated in these first protests and were briefly 
detained by the authorities.   
Protests escalated after the fall of President Mubarak in Egypt on February 11.  
Al-Jazeera coverage played a key role as people across Yemen watched the dramatic 
events unfold.  When Mubarak stepped down tens of thousands came into the streets, 
mobilized almost spontaneously via social media and text messages.  The youth 
protesters in the streets echoed the slogans and tactics of the uprisings in Tunisia and 
Egypt, occupying a square near Sana’a University which they named “change square” 
and refusing to leave until President Saleh stepped down. 
Opposition parties attempted to capitalize on the enthusiasm of the youth and 
organized their own rallies but initially remained much more moderate in their demands.  
While the youth explicitly demanded that Saleh leave office immediately the opposition 
instead called for political reforms and greater political inclusion.
49
  However, the major 
                                                 
49
 The Islah party even attempted to shift the slogan of the revolution from “the people 
want the downfall of the regime” to “the people want the reform of the regime.”  This 
new slogan had an intentional double-meaning in Arabic, as the word for “reform” 
happens to be Islah, the party’s name. 
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opposition parties, under the mantle of the “Joint Meeting Party” (JMP) alliance played a 
key supportive role in maintaining protest momentum, supplying student activists with 
supplies and sending their supporters into the streets and squares (Yemen Times 1/12/12). 
From the beginning the street protests were violently attacked by security forces 
and government supporters in plainclothes.  This repression peaked on the “Friday of 
Dignity,” March 18
th
, when pro-government gunmen attacked a protest, killing at least 45 
people.  This massacre was followed by waves of defections from the Saleh government.  
Perhaps most importantly, three days after the massacre Major General Ali Mohsen Al-
Ahmar, the commander of Yemen’s First Armored Division and widely considered the 
second-most powerful man in Yemen, announced support for the revolution and said that 
his troops would protect nonviolent protesters from attacks (BBC News, 2011).    
The military and political defections, as well as the continuing size of the protests, 
led Saleh to begin negotiating with the opposition.  He offered significant economic 
concessions, including an increase in public sector salaries and guaranteed jobs for 
unemployed students (one of the largest demographics in the protests).  Saleh also 
promised to resign before the end of the year and that his son would not succeed him.  
However, neither the formal opposition nor the street protesters considered Saleh’s offers 
credible and protests continued.  A process of negotiation between the opposition and 
Saleh under the auspices of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) stop-started for several 
months until late May, when President Saleh definitively refused to step down. 
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Saleh’s refusal sparked violent clashes in the so-called “Battle of Sana’a” as 
Sheikh Sadiq al-Ahmar, chief of the powerful Hashid tribal federation, declared support 
for the protesters and led his supporters in attacking government forces and occupying 
several government buildings.  However, the clashes only lasted a few days and the 
tribesmen quickly withdrew from their positions.  More critically, on June 3
rd
 a rocket 
attack on a mosque where Saleh was praying critically injured him.  He was forced to flee 
the country for treatment in Saudi Arabia, leaving executive authority in the hands of his 
vice president, Abdurabh Mansur Hadi.   
Over the following months as protests continued to maintain their size and were 
protected by armed tribal groups and Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar’s first division, Hadi revived 
the scrapped GCC initiative which proposed a political transition in which Saleh would 
step down and hand over power to Hadi in exchange for immunity from prosecution.  The 
UN was also heavily involved, with special envoy Jamal Benomar facilitating dialogue 
and the UN Security Council passing Resolution 2014 which called for all parties to sign 
the GCC agreement.  In November, ten months after the beginning of protests, President 
Ali Abdullah Saleh signed the GCC agreement, officially giving up his executive power 
and beginning the next stage of Yemen’s political transition.
50
   
                                                 
50
 In more detail, the GCC agreement’s terms were as follows: In exchange for immunity 
from prosecution for him and his family, upon signature, President Saleh would 
immediately cede all executive authority to Vice-President Hadi.  Vice-President Hadi 
was required to call early presidential elections within 90 days of the signing of the 
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 This breakthrough moment was a revolutionary anticlimax.  The Joint Meeting 
Parties (JMP) and ruling GPC, the primary beneficiaries of the agreement, lauded it.  
However, on the streets youth activists decried concessions to the regime such as the 
GPC retaining half of all government ministries.  In particular, the youth were outraged 
that, as a condition for signing the agreement, President Saleh and his family had 
received immunity from prosecution.   
 This sense of disillusionment led to continued mobilization in the “Change 
Squares” both in Sana’a and across Yemen.  Tens of thousands of activists, including 
Tawakkul Karman and youth wings of many of the country’s major political groups, 
                                                                                                                                                 
agreement.  Saleh would retain the title of “Honorary President” until the elections, in 
which both the GPC and JMP agreed to mutually endorse Hadi as the sole candidate.  
Immediately upon signing the agreement the JMP would name a Prime Minister, whom 
Hadi would task with forming a government of national unity, with 50% representation 
by the JMP and GPC.  The government of national unity was required to make decisions 
by consensus, with Hadi as a final arbiter if consensus could not be reached.  Among the 
primary tasks for Hadi and the national unity government articulated in the agreement 
was establishing a committee to reform and professionalize the military and a conference 
for national dialogue.  The conference for national dialogue, which explicitly required the 
participation of youth, the Houthis, the Hiraak, other political parties, and women, was 
tasked with making recommendations for a new constitution, as well as discussing an 
array of political problems in Yemen (Southern separatism, the grievances of the Houthis, 
etc…).  When the national dialogue concluded, a constitutional commission would be 
tasked with implementing their recommended constitutional changes, which would then 
be voted on in a referendum.  Once the new constitution was in force, parliamentary and 
presidential elections would be held under its auspices.  Other important provisions of the 
agreement included an explicit statement that the agreement superseded any provisions of 
the Yemen constitution, that women were required to be included at all stages of the 
transition, and that mechanisms were established for working out difference of 
interpretation over the agreement.  The complete text of the agreement is available in 
English at http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/yemen/yemen_transition_agreement.htm. 
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remained in the squares to push for more democratic opening and ensure that President 
Saleh did not use the GCC agreement as a means for returning to power.  While 
participation in protests fluctuated the youth remained mobilized as a potent check on all 
the political parties in power (Yemen Times 6/7/12).  Youth organizations also shifted 
tactics, building political organizations to monitor human rights and advocate for 
democratic causes (Yemen Times 12/12/11). 
 The new unity government, while suffering from severe internal coordination 
problems, moved quickly to implement the terms of the transitional agreement.  
Critically, the agreement itself assumed a role in public discourse as the primary 
instrument of political legitimacy.  Both opposition figures and former President Saleh 
himself used the rhetoric of supporting the transitional agreement as their primary tool to 
defend themselves and attack political opponents.  Contention was at times extremely 
fierce, with both sides accusing the other of undermining the transition process for the 
sake of individual political advantage.  Critically, however, the “field of contention” had 
moved from the all-or-nothing political struggle of 2011 to a limited range of 
institutionalized political tactics, all of which, to be considered legitimate, required 
adherence to the principles of an agreement which clearly laid out a path towards 
democratic good governance.  As President Saleh said in late 2011: “The initiative is 
clear and you must not deviate from…its mechanisms, you can but seek its provisions” 
(Yemen News Agency 11/28/11).  The Al-Ahmar family, the heads of the Hashid tribal 
federation, also said that, while they wanted all members of the Saleh family immediately 
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removed from power, implementing the terms of the agreement was more important than 
settling their individual grievances (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 12). The 
agreement did not eliminate political contention but framed it in a nonviolent, 
institutionalized context that set the stage for greater political inclusion.   
 The terms of the agreement had also laid out a specific program that called for the 
inclusion not just of the parties which had signed it but of all the major political forces in 
Yemen; including the youth in the squares, the Houthis, and the southern separatists.  
Groups which had previously been subject to intense government repression (the youth 
and the southerners) or waves of outright civil war (the Houthis) were now targets of 
intensive negotiation and dialogue to incentivize their participation in the transition 
process.  In particular, appeals were made for all parties to join the inclusive national 
dialogue, conceived as the key means for working out the constitutional changes which 
would determine the post-transition political order. 
 These political outreaches had mixed results.  The Houthis, initially deeply 
skeptical of the GCC agreement, agreed to participate in the national dialogue because 
“dialogue is part of our culture” (Yemen Times 6/4/12).  Youth as well participated in 
record numbers, both as representatives of political parties and as representatives of 
independent revolutionary organizations.  Many factions of the Hiraak refused to 
participate in national dialogue because they believed the southern issue should be 
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resolved first before considering any other issues.  However, several more moderate 
factions did choose to participate. 
 At the same time, President Hadi, elected in his own right in February 2012, 
began working on resolving several critical security issues.  During the instability of 2011 
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and its supporting organization Ansar ash-Sharia had 
taken control of much of the southern province of Abyan, including the provincial capital 
Zinjibar.  President Hadi launched a sustained military operation that, with the 
cooperation of local tribal militias, successfully ousted AQAP from its areas of territorial 
control in Abyan.  US military support also assisted in the successful prosecution of the 
conflict, as US intelligence experts helped coordinate the operation and US unmanned 
drones supported the operation from the air. 
 The fight against AQAP was successfully prosecuted despite continuing splits in 
the Yemeni military and the presence of hostile armed camps in cities across Yemen.  
The defection of the First Armored Division in March 2011 had split the Yemeni military 
first into two and then into three separate armed camps: a segment loyal to ex-President 
Saleh (centered on the Republican Guard, which was commanded by Saleh’s son 
Ahmed), a segment loyal to Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, and later a segment loyal to President 
Hadi.  Attempts to reform this fragmented structure (a key part of the GCC agreement) 
met with strong resistance, even open mutiny.  However, the strong support for the 
transitional process across all aspects of the political spectrum, even the former ruling 
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party, de-legitimized attempts to undermine President Hadi’s military reforms (Alley, 
2013).  While the reform process was slow, major figures were eventually removed from 
command and the military structure centralized in a non-partisan arrangement. 
 Minor violent clashes between other actors did occur throughout the transition 
process.  By the end of 2011, Sana’a in particular had been divided into four hostile 
armed camps which only slowly withdrew from their positions.  Minor clashes occurred 
over territorial disputes, old grievances, and attempts to jockey control over the transition 
process.  However, the clashes which did occur were also quickly contained, and 
decreased as the various armed factions moved out of their occupying positions in 
Yemen’s major cities.   Clashes also occurred between the Houthis and Salafist tribesmen 
in Northern Yemen.  However, this violence was widely seen as counterproductive, and 
the Houthis in particular suffered politically because of it (Al-Muslimi, 2014).  While 
Yemen’s longstanding culture of an armed populace willing to use violence retained a 
powerful influence
51
 the investment of all the major armed parties in the transition led to 
a dramatic de-escalation of political violence.     
 The national dialogue was initiated in March 2013, with participation from all 
major political parties, the youth, Houthis, and moderate factions of the Hiraak.  A 
required quota of 30% also ensured women’s participation at all levels of the dialogue.  
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 For example, it was only in June of 2012 that MPs agreed to stop carrying guns in 
parliament (Yemen Times 6/14/12). 
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Policy decisions from the conference required consensus by at least 90% of participants, 
ensuring both a high-degree of buy-in for the conference’s prescriptions and extreme 
difficulty in accomplishing anything.  The negotiations suffered deep challenges, 
particularly relating to the issue of South Yemen’s independence, a point on which most 
factions of the Hiraak refused to negotiate.  The issue of southern separatism was made 
more problematic by rising demands for greater autonomy from the Hadramawt region of 
eastern Yemen and the region surrounding the city of Aden. In the end, the national 
dialogue was forced to conclude without a definitive answer to the Southern issue.  Only 
after the conclusion of the dialogue did President Hadi announce that a subsequent 
committee had decided that the best solution was the division of Yemen into six federated 
regions, two in the south and four in the north. 
 Perhaps the most critical aspect of the national dialogue was the chance for all 
parties to be involved in a real, substantial discussion of the nature of the Yemeni state.  
One of the primary problems for democratization across the Middle East has been the 
artificial nature of state boundaries and a lack of coherent national identities.  Yemen, 
with its bifurcated history and multitude of tribal and religious identity groups, is no 
exception.  What it means to be Yemeni, the relationship of the people to the state, and 
the acceptable modes of political discourse have all been unresolved questions.  In the 
national dialogue, for the first time all of Yemen’s various groups were able to come 
together and work out many of these questions.   
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 When the national dialogue conference concluded in January 2014, it was clear to 
all parties that the country was not prepared for the next stage of the GCC-planned 
transition process: a referendum on constitutional changes worked out by the national 
dialogue conference to be immediately followed by legislative and presidential elections.  
The conference thus extended President Hadi’s mandate for a year to continue the 
transition process, implement the NDC’s recommendations, and move towards 
constitutional changes and new elections.  As of the date of this writing the transition 
process remains underway, with a committee of legal experts working to draft the 
recommendations of the national dialogue conference into a new constitution.  A 
referendum on the constitution they produce and new presidential elections must be held 
prior to January 2015.   
Yemen’s prospects for both democratization and civil peace are most accurately 
characterized as “uncertain” at this point.  However, the GCC agreement staved off a 
major political crisis, proved critical in opening the political space to new actors, and 
averted an almost-certain civil war. 
 
Egypt: The Army and the People – One Hand? 
In Egypt, the immediate antecedent to the events of 2011 was the 2010 legislative 
elections.  A sense of hope for political change sparked by the return to the country of 
former IAEA chief and potential presidential candidate Mohamed el-Baradei was crushed 
as some of the most blatant government fraud in recent memory brought a legislature to 
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power completely dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), with NDP 
members winning over 80 percent of the seats.   
 As news of the successful revolution in Tunisia came to Egypt increased attention 
was placed on a protest already planned for January 25
th
, 2011 – Egypt’s “police day” – 
by opposition groups, including the Facebook group “We are all Khaled Said”
52
 
organized by Egyptian Google executive Wael Ghonim.  The Egyptian interior ministry 
attempted to suppress the protests through a massive security force deployment, but was 
thwarted by innovative “flash mob” protest tactics employed by the activists.
53
  The 
surprising turnout and new protest approach allowed the activists to reach and briefly 
occupy Cairo’s symbolic Tahrir (“liberation”) square. 
 Over the next 18 days, protests rapidly grew as opposition political parties, 
including the banned Muslim Brotherhood, joined youth protesters in Tahrir square.  
While the largest protests were in Cairo additional protests took place in several cities 
across Egypt, particularly in the Suez city of Port Said.
54
  After initial clashes in the first 
few days of protests the police largely disappeared from the streets of Cairo; to such an 
extent that many attributed the withdrawal to a deliberate tactic on the part of the 
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 Khaled Said was a young Egyptian from the city of Alexandria who was brutally 
tortured and murdered by Egyptian police after publicizing incidents of police brutality. 
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 For an excellent description of the planning and execution of this initial protest, see 
Levinson and Coker 2011. 
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 Where some of the most violent confrontations of the revolution took place. 
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government to foment a breakdown in law and order and incentivize the protesters to 
return home.  The Egyptian army deployed to the streets of Cairo on January 28 but 
declared its intention not to interfere with the protests and instead often operated as a 
buffer between protesters and regime supporters. 
 While protests escalated, the Mubarak government attempted several conciliatory 
tactics. Mubarak re-shuffled his cabinet and appointed intelligence chief Omar Suleiman 
his first-ever vice-president.  Immediately after taking office Suleiman was tasked with 
negotiating with the various political factions in Tahrir Square.  Several political parties 
engaged in negotiation, but the majority of people in the square, predominately the many 
diffuse groups of “revolutionary youth,” refused to negotiate with the regime while 
Mubarak remained in power (Abaza, 2011).  Prominent Egyptian “wise men” also 
attempted to mediate between the two sides, pushing for a transitional plan in which 
Mubarak would retain the title of “honorary president” but cede all of his authority to 
Vice-President Suleiman.  Suleiman would then be tasked with forming a unity 
government and overseeing constitutional changes leading up to free and fair elections 
(Daily News Egypt 2/4/11). 
 While such concessions would have been unthinkable before the beginning of 
protests on January 25
th
, the combination of repression, condescension towards 
protesters, and lack of initiative on the part of the regime both angered protesters and 
convinced them that continued action could eventually achieve their most cherished goal 
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of forcing Mubarak out.  Protest leaders, including Mohamed el-Baradei, also called on 
the military to force a solution to the conflict (Daily News Egypt 2/10/11). 
 As negotiations broke down on February 9 Vice-President Suleiman warned of 
the likely occurrence of a coup if protests continued.  Protesters largely derided this as a 
bluff or intimidation tactic and expressed their intention to continue to escalate tactics 
until Mubarak left office (Daily News Egypt 2/9/11).  Meanwhile, a wave of solidarity 
strikes by workers across Egypt pushing for both political change and labor concessions 
added strength to the protest movement and continued to inflict devastating damage on 
the Egyptian economy. 
 On February 10, widespread reports surfaced that President Mubarak was on the 
verge of resigning.  However, after hundreds of thousands of Egyptians gathered to hear 
news of the announcement Mubarak announced that he would not step down and 
reiterated his firm intention to maintain his office until the end of his term in September.  
Furious protests took place across the country and opposition leaders called for 
immediate military intervention.  Later reports indicated that Mubarak had been prepared 
to resign and had communicated such to prominent regime insiders but had changed his 
mind at the last minute after his son and former presumed heir Gamal had talked him out 
of it (Daily News Egypt 2/15/11). 
 As protesters planned increased demonstrations and other tactical escalations the 
military chose to take control of the situation.  Field Marshall Muhammad Hussein 
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Tantawi, chief of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), held a four-hour 
overnight meeting with President Mubarak.  While the contents of their discussion were 
not revealed, the meeting was the end of the Mubarak presidency.  The following day, 
February 11, as President Mubarak fled to the resort town of Sharm al-Sheikh Vice-
President Omar Suleiman gave a brief statement that Mubarak had stepped down and 
handed over political authority to Tantawi and SCAF.   
 The downfall of Mubarak was hailed both in Egypt and around the world as one 
of the greatest moments in Middle Eastern history.  A sense of euphoria pervaded the 
country as activists hailed the victory of “people power” and eagerly anticipated a quick 
transition to democracy as promised by Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi and SCAF.  
SCAF actively encouraged this narrative, promising activists that all of their goals would 
be met, meeting with youth leaders such as Wael Ghonim, and quickly forming a 
committee to revise the Egyptian constitution.  A number of businessmen associated with 
the corruption of the Mubarak regime were also ousted from power and prosecuted.   
However, military assets remained inviolable, reform of the military was never an 
option on the table, and opposition figures, while consulted, were not given real political 
power.  Cabinet reshuffles undertaken to assuage protester concerns were largely 
cosmetic and orchestrated to keep the old guard in power (Daily News Egypt 2/25/11).  
In contrast to transitional plans which had been considered during the revolution, such as 
a power-sharing arrangement between the NDP and opposition to oversee constitutional 
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changes before the scheduled elections in September (Daily News Egypt 2/9/11b), the 
army suspended the constitution, maintained the longstanding state of emergency, and 
kept all the levers of real political power in its own hands.   
Critically, this approach by the army successfully de-mobilized much of the 
massive coalition which had come together to oust Mubarak.  Certain more radical youth 
“revolutionaries” attempted to remain in Tahrir Square advocating for greater openness 
and democracy and condemning SCAF’s authoritarian tactics, and selected mass protests 
continued throughout SCAF’s time in power.  However, the mass of the people either 
accepted the rhetoric that the army’s ouster of Mubarak represented the victory of the 
revolution or simply no longer felt motivated to engage in political action.  Organized 
political groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood split from the young revolutionaries to 
carve out their own political arrangement with the military.   
Meanwhile SCAF continued to arrest, detain, and try in secret courts over 7,000 
activists (Martini & Taylor, 2011).  SCAF’s concern with maintaining public support and 
its own air of apolitical legitimacy inclined the generals to move away from direct rule, 
but they were determined to ensure that any future ruler would be unable to interfere with 
their continued political independence and domination of the country’s economy.  Thus, 
while SCAF maintained a public face in favor of democracy, its manipulation of the 
transition process, unchecked by any serious partner in power, pushed towards keeping a 
non-democratic autonomous military with little or no civilian oversight. 
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 SCAF’s direct rule was gradually withdrawn, first with parliamentary elections in 
November 2011-January 2012 and then presidential elections in June 2012.  Both 
elections were dominated by Islamists, with the Muslim Brotherhood taking the largest 
proportion of seats in the new parliament (followed by the Salafist al-Nour party), and 
Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Morsi elected as Egypt’s first democratically-
elected President.   
 Morsi’s election was a moment of democratic hope.  International observers 
hailed the historic nature of the election (Egypt’s first real democratic leader in its 
history).  TIME magazine put Morsi on its cover with the caption: “The Most Important 
Man in the Middle East.”  Perhaps most stunningly, Morsi quickly forced the resignations 
of SCAF Chief Muhammad Hussein Tantawi and Army Chief of Staff Sami Hafez Anan, 
a move hailed by liberal activists and seen as a clear repudiation of military rule.  
However, some observers cautioned that the move had been taken in consultation with 
military leaders and seemed to be acceptable to the military leadership (Fahim, 2012). 
 Optimism about Morsi’s rule dissipated as Egypt’s economic problems continued 
to worsen, public services broke down regularly, and Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist 
leaders pushed moralistic policies alienating to many Egyptians.  However, the key 
moment mobilizing opposition to Morsi came in November 2012, when Morsi issued a 
constitutional declaration granting himself sweeping executive powers.  The declaration 
was ostensibly made to protect the upper house of parliament and constituent assembly 
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from judicial interference but its effect was to grant Morsi greater power than the 
president had held at any time under Mubarak (International Crisis Group, 2013).  After 
widespread protests Morsi quickly scrapped the declaration, but its effect was to drive 
away what limited opposition participation there was in the constitution-making process, 
leading to the completion of an Islamist-tinged constitution passed in a controversial low-
turnout referendum. 
 In early 2013, a challenge to Morsi’s rule emerged in the activist group Tamarud 
(“rebellion” or “mutiny” in Arabic).  Tamarud launched a petition drive, aiming to collect 
at least 15 million signatures on a petition calling for Morsi’s resignation.  The 
campaign’s message fell on fertile soil.  While Morsi still enjoyed broad support amongst 
the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters, the rest of Egyptian society had become deeply 
disillusioned with him, with 95 percent or higher of those outside his support base 
expressing a lack of confidence in his rule, and two-thirds saying his election was a 
setback for Egypt (Zogby 2013a).  While the opposition was divided on the best course of 
action to take against Morsi, many favored extreme responses, with over 80 percent 
calling for scrapping the constitution and 60 percent advocating for at least a brief return 
to military rule (Zogby 2013a). 
 On June 30, 2013, the first anniversary of Morsi’s inauguration as President, 
Tamarud’s long mobilizing process and simple message “Irhal!” (“get out”) paid off.  
Millions, perhaps even tens of millions, joined protests across Egypt demanding Morsi’s 
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immediate ouster.   On July 1, the military gave both the President and the opposition 48 
hours to resolve their differences or they would intervene.  Morsi angrily responded in a 
statement reiterating his position as Egypt’s democratically elected and legitimate 
president and condemning any interference in politics by the military.  His statement 
failed to sway the military leadership and on July 3
rd
 Defense Minister Abdel-Fatah al-
Sisi deployed troops across Cairo and placed Morsi and much of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s top leadership under arrest.  An interim government under the leadership 
of chief constitutional court judge Adly Mansour was put in power. 
 Morsi’s supporters reacted to this military coup with huge demonstrations, 
centered on sit-ins in Cairo’s Nahda and Raba’a al-Adawiya squares.  After receiving a 
“mandate” from protesters to “fight terrorism,” al-Sisi led a massive military crackdown 
on the sit-ins on August 14, 2013, with at least 600 and possibly many more people killed 
on that day alone.  The scale of the massacres made the events of August 14 the worst 
incident of mass killing in Egypt’s modern history.  While the military claimed that the 
protesters had been widely armed and had engaged in firefights with soldiers, evidence 
from eyewitnesses suggests that, while some protesters may have carried weapons the 
vast majority were unarmed or armed only with stones and other improvised weapons 
(Human Rights Watch, 2013). 
 In the months since the military coup repression of the Muslim Brotherhood has 
escalated, with the organization first banned and then declared a “terrorist organization.”  
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The military-backed government has arrested thousands of Muslim Brothers and their 
supporters.  The crackdown, however, has not been limited to Islamists, with the military 
arresting prominent youth activists and other well-known liberal opposition figures.  In 
one of the most prominent abuses of civil liberties, three Al-Jazeera journalists were 
arrested on charges of having links to terrorism, a stiff charge whose sole source appears 
to be reporting on government repression of the Muslim Brotherhood (Fahim, 2014).  
The new Egyptian constitution, passed in a referendum characterized by military 
intimidation and an opposition boycott, expands the definition of terrorism to create a de 
facto military state, and widely expands the President’s ability to call a state of 
emergency (Revkin, 2014). 
 This escalating crackdown on any form of popular dissent has been tied with a fall 
in levels of confidence in the military.  While 93% percent of Egyptians expressed 
confidence in the army immediately following Morsi’s ouster, only 70% continued to 
express confidence in September 2013 (Zogby 2013b).  However, the military remains 
the institution most trusted by Egyptians.  A cult of personality has also been built up 
around General al-Sisi, with widespread petition campaigns launched to push Sisi to run 
for president and comparisons made between Sisi and Egypt’s still-popular second 
military president, Gamal Abdel-Nasser (Carlstrom, 2014).
55
  The military gave Sisi its 
official blessing to run for the presidency on January 27, saying that his election was a 
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 Abdelhakim Abdel-Nasser, son of President Nasser, went so far as to say that his 
father’s spirit had been found in Sisi. 
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“mandate.”  Considering the low levels of confidence in all other potential political 
leaders
56
 and the continued blanket repression of all political opponents, it is extremely 
likely that Sisi will handily win the upcoming presidential election. 
 A disturbing rise in violence has accompanied the months since Morsi’s ouster.  
While the military itself has been by far the largest propagator of violence (casualty 
estimates from the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood are upwards of 1,400 deaths), 
there has also been a rise in terror attacks by the Islamist group Ansar Beit al-Maqdis 
(Partisans of Jerusalem).  These attacks have been denounced by the Muslim 
Brotherhood but are attributed by the military to its supporters.  In the immediate 
aftermath of Morsi’s ouster there were also widespread attacks on churches by 
Brotherhood supporters, who blamed Christians for their support for Morsi’s ouster.  
Recent protests have also seen violent clashes between Sisi supporters and the “Anti-
Coup Alliance,” a group led by the Muslim Brotherhood which has led protests against 
the military.  On the third anniversary of the beginning of the Egyptian revolution more 
than 50 people were killed in street clashes. 
In short, the situation in Egypt is much like it was before Mubarak’s ouster, with 
the main difference being an increased level of violence.  Some hope remains – Egyptian 
activists say the level of political engagement and awareness alone created by the 
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revolution and subsequent transition will prevent Egyptians from ever submitting 
passively to authoritarianism again (Noujaim, 2013).  However, the likelihood of a 
transition to democracy remains slim at best. 
 
The Effects of Mechanisms of Success 
The disparate mechanisms of success in the Egyptian and Yemeni revolutions 
have had clear and powerful impacts on their transitional processes.  In the Yemeni case, 
the negotiated transition by multiple major actors, characterized by consensus, initiative 
on the part of the opposition, and political capacity-building led to a transitional 
arrangement in which no single actor was able to impose its agenda upon the transition.  
Instead all of the major political groups were forced to work together in order to achieve 
their goals, creating a system of both formal and informal checks and balances which has 
moved the country towards a more democratic, open political system.   
Perhaps critical as well was the very anticlimax associated with the transitional 
agreement.  In Yemen, the pervasive sense that the revolution was incomplete led 
activists and politicians alike towards continued mobilization for change, some going so 
far as to say that the most difficult stage of the revolution had not even begun until 
Saleh’s ouster (Yemen Times 12/12/11).  Thus not only did the mechanism of success 
itself demand political organization and capacity-building, but its effect even on those 




 Furthermore, the negotiated GCC agreement normalized and institutionalized an 
environment of negotiated problem-solving and consensus-based governance.  Actors 
which had previously interacted on purely conflictual terms were integrated into a 
process of dialogue which gave them political legitimacy based on their adherence to 
norms of cooperation and democratization.  In its initial stages this process only included 
the major elite actors, but the nature of the transition is gradually expanding the political 
space to include outside actors such as the Houthis. Perhaps even Yemen’s violent history 
became an asset as, despite a full-fledged counterinsurgency against AQAP, concerns of 
security were not considered legitimate excuses for centralization of authority (in contrast 
to Egypt) and instead seen as impetus towards reforming the government and military 
and completing the democratization process. 
 A rise in political violence did follow the breakdown in state capacity during the 
revolution in 2011, in particular due to the rise of AQAP in Abyan Province.  However, 
the negotiated mechanism of success allowed the Yemeni state after Hadi’s election as 
President to focus on re-asserting its control over the regions lost during the 2011 
revolution.  Had a different mechanism been followed, for instance a coup by the al-
Ahmar family or General Ali Mohsen, the country’s armed forces would likely have been 
fully engaged fighting amongst themselves at the center, and AQAP might well have 
remained in control of much of southern Yemen until today.  Instead, the consensus on a 
transitional path which maintained state capacity and involved de-escalation by the armed 
actors at the center allowed the state to refocus its strength in regaining control over the 
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periphery.  While AQAP remains a threat its position has been critically weakened since 
the beginning of 2012 and its support is rapidly waning amongst Yemen’s tribes.
57
 
 In Egypt, the coup d’état of 2011 also followed its expected outcome.  Because 
the transition mechanism was not based on consensus but rather on a simple assertion of 
power by regime insiders (SCAF), these authoritarian insiders were able to manipulate 
the transition process for their own ends.  They were also able to do so because the lack 
of campaign initiative and capacity built prior to the transition mechanism left only a 
fragmented, weakened opposition.  The military was also able to subvert the revolution’s 
message through selective prosecution of its rivals in the old regime and its narrative of 
being the defender of the revolution.  The military was less interested in directly ruling 
Egypt than it was in maintaining its privileged reputation and economic advantages.  
Hence, rather than attempting to prolong military rule it pushed for rapid changes which 
prevented meaningful mobilization or discussion against it.   
 The combative, winner-take-all politics initiated by SCAF’s coup was evident in 
the year-long administration of Mohammed Morsi as well.  Morsi and the Muslim 
Brotherhood attempted a full-fledged capture of the state and showed a deep 
unwillingness to negotiate or compromise with their opponents.  In contrast to Yemen, 
where consensus is becoming the model, in Egypt whatever political actor is in power has 
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 Tribal defections were a key factor in AQAP’s defeat, as “Popular Resistance 
Committees” left AQAP and fought alongside the Yemeni military. 
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attempted to rapidly consolidate that power through any means possible.  This is a lesson 
which was taught powerfully by the coup in 2011 and has now been repeated through the 
coup of 2013 (Pahwa, 2013).  Whether it was SCAF, President Morsi, or General Sisi, a 
zero-sum political game has become normalized.  Since the vast majority of the political 
cards remain in the hands of the military, this zero-sum game has led to military 
dominance and authoritarian repression. 
 Furthermore, while political violence was minimal in Egypt prior to the 
revolution, since the revolution it has dramatically escalated.  The military has used 
massive political violence first to suppress dissent from the liberal activists who critiqued 
its direct rule in 2011-12 and now to essentially attempt to wipe out the Muslim 
Brotherhood and any voice of domestic dissent.  While such one-way violence does not 
necessarily imply that other actors will also take up arms, the growing number of attacks 
by Ansar Beit al-Maqdis and violent clashes between Muslim Brotherhood supporters 
and supporters of the military suggest that at least a low-level insurgency is growing. 
 This argument is by no means deterministic or fully definitive.  In Yemen, 
democratization clearly remains a fragile outcome, to be hoped for but by no means 
assumed.  Former President Saleh remains a potent transitional “spoiler,” attempting to 
sabotage the transition and retain power for himself and his family.  Significant elements 
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of the Yemeni military remain loyal to Saleh.
58
 The federal solution to Yemen’s southern 
problem has been condemned by most factions of the Hiraak and continued significant 
political upheaval on the north-south question is highly likely.  Yemen also faces multiple 
economic and environmental crises: a shattered economy, declining water table, and 
highly armed populace still fragmented into hostile tribal and religious units.  Any one of 
these would prove a serious challenge to emerging democracy or the maintenance of civil 
peace. 
However, what hope there is for democratization definitively comes from the 
manner of Yemen’s transition (Juneau, 2013).  In late 2011, Yemen stood on the brink of 
devastating, multi-front civil war.  The example of Syria demonstrates the likely counter-
factual scenario.  Yemen remains fraught with violence and has an uncertain future, but 
its salvation from Syria’s fate can be attributed to the norms and political incentives 
created by its civil resistance campaign’s negotiated mechanism of success. 
In Egypt, too, the return to authoritarianism is by no means predetermined.  Many 
activists in Egypt are re-thinking their trust in the military and the transitional structures 
which were put in place by the coup d’état of 2011 (Raouf, 2014).  Activists are calling 
for political mobilization directed towards more consensus-based, realistic change rather 
than the “negative coalition” demands which have ousted two presidents but failed to 
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achieve democracy (Kaldas, 2014).  And while General al-Sisi enjoys broad support this 
support is not monolithic.  There is, on other hand, continued broad support for an 
inclusive national dialogue, with nearly 80% of Egyptians expressing support for a 
process of national reconciliation (Zogby 2013b).  This increased political awareness on 
the part of activists tied with the desire for national reconciliation has the potential for 
moving Egypt away from the winner-take-all politics initiated by the coup and towards a 
more democratic future.  However, the effects of the coup of 2011 remain powerful. 
The case studies also shed significant light on the endogeneity question raised at 
the end of the previous chapter.  In Yemen’s case, the possibility of various mechanisms 
of success is straightforward.  A coup by General Ali Mohsen might have easily taken 
place, or an overwhelming as the regime’s sources of support continued to disintegrate.  
If anything, the GCC agreement was the least likely option.  Saleh led a personalistic 
regime, which should theoretically make negotiation less likely.  Sporadic and growing 
armed conflict incentivized him to not deal with the opposition.  However, despite these 
factors the JMP faction of Yemen’s civil resistance campaign was able to reach a 
negotiated transitional agreement.   
The endogeneity question is also addressed by the Egyptian case.  
Counterfactually, it was certainly not inevitable that Egypt’s transition process would 
follow the path that it has.  Egypt’s 2011 coup now has a feeling of historical inevitability 
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which was certainly not there at the time.  Significant factions of the protesters in Tahrir 
Square were in favor of negotiations with the government.     
Several alternative transition paths were proposed, including the proposition of 
the “Wise Men” mentioned above, which closely resembled the arrangement reached in 
November 2011 in Yemen.  In exchange for immunity from prosecution for him and his 
family Mubarak would remain in office as “honorary president” while transferring his 
executive powers to Vice-President Suleiman.  A unity government of half opposition 
figures and half government figures would be instated and tasked with constitutional 
revisions to pave the way free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections in 
September 2011.  Such an arrangement, particularly the immunity clause, would have 
been unpopular among many, but might have been reasonably expected to lead to 
significantly better outcomes than the ouster of Mubarak by coup d’état. 
 It is even possible that, had Mubarak resigned voluntarily on February 10
th 
 rather 
than being pushed out by the military on February 11
th
 the shape of the transition may 
have been radically altered.  A Suleiman administration, deeply unpopular, would have 
had significant difficult co-opting the revolutionary narrative, and would likely have been 
heavily incentivized to seek allies in the opposition through a negotiated agreement.  A 
number of groups unwilling to negotiate before Mubarak’s ouster, including the April 6 
Youth Movement, had said they would be willing to negotiate once Mubarak left.  
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Thus, these mechanisms of success were not meaningfully predetermined the 
political opportunity structure of the prior regime.  This supports hypothesis H3 stated at 
the beginning of this chapter and addresses the endogeneity concern from Geddes. 
Alternative mechanisms were realistic strategic options which the various strategic actors 
carefully considered and which can be reasonably assumed to have had radically 
divergent consequences.  
Perspectives on the Arab Spring around the world have largely moved from 
euphoria to caution to cynicism.  The way in Syria and continued violence and 
uncertainty across the region have convinced many that the uprising was a blip, with few 
or no lasting effects on the prospects for democracy and peace for the peoples of the 
Middle East.  Perhaps “people power” is destined to lead to such violence and instability. 
This emotional perspective, while understandable, does not match the realities on 
the ground.  As I have shown in this chapter, these broad strokes miss the critical 
difference in mechanisms of success which have radically shaped and continue to shape 
the prospects for democracy and peace across the region.  The effects of these different 
mechanisms of success follow the theoretical argument I made in chapter 2, formally 
stated in H1 and H2, and support the large-n quantitative evidence presented in chapter 3.  
Yemen’s negotiated transition has set the country on a path of decreasing, though by no 
means absent, political violence and increasing political inclusion and democratic 
openness.  Egypt’s 2011 coup d’état has enshrined the power of the military, normalized 
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a conflict-based, winner-take-all politics and will likely result in a return to authoritarian 
rule as violence by security forces and Islamists opposed to this new regime continues to 
escalate.  In the long-term, new factors may arise which will radically change the 
prediction.  As Egypt and Yemen move away from their mechanisms of success the 
iterative effects of the mechanisms may gradually decrease.  Only time will tell.
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Conclusion: How Does Civil Resistance Win Well? 
The central question of this research project is “how can civil resistance win 
well?”  In an era where people around the world are increasingly rising up against the 
political powers that be and seeking to bring about new orders through the power of 
nonviolent action, this question is critically important. 
 I have shown here that the answer to this question lies in the nature of their 
victory.  If civil resistance campaigns succeed through mechanisms which rely on broad 
political consensus, utilize own initiative, and build their political capacity to push for 
positive goals once their negative goals have been achieved, then their efforts are likely 
to result in a stable, internally-peaceful democracy.   
My work offers indications of how victory in civil resistance campaigns should be 
won if the victors seek to preserve their hard-fought gains.  In particular the data caution 
against perhaps the most dramatic and triumphant of nonviolent victories: overwhelmings 
which completely seize the reins of power.  If a campaign has reached a level of power 
and influence where such a victory is possible it will be deeply tempting to use such 
power.  But my research indicates that a wise campaign leader will hold back, not giving 
in even to nonviolent hubris, and develop a method of transition which will engage and 
include former regime elites to protect the future peace.  In this regard the example of the 
“self-limiting revolution” of Solidarity in Poland is particularly fitting.  Even though the 
movement had the capacity for an overwhelming victory they chose first to engage the 
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opponent in roundtable talks and then to achieve victory only through the lawful, 
institutional means granted through those talks.  Poland’s high level of democracy and 
enduring civil peace speak to the effectiveness of the “self-limiting” path these activists 
chose. 
For academics, this research is one step in beginning to develop a deep 
understanding of the effects of civil resistance.  Many questions remain unanswered.  
Some of these, such as disaggregating the nature of resignations to understand their 
unexpectedly positive performance, I have mentioned previously.  Other case studies may 
also shed light into the particular dynamics of the mechanisms of success not covered by 
my two cases.  The importance of strategic interaction which I have argued for here also 
has powerful implications for understanding the broader population of transitions to 
democracy.  Do these types of incentives work similarly in cases of violent revolution or 
elite-led liberalization?  If so, in what ways are the dynamics similar and different?  How 
do structural factors affect the operation of these dynamics?  All of these are fruitful 
avenues of inquiry which the initial insights of this research leave unanswered.    
 For policymakers my research provides a more nuanced understanding of what to 
expect following civil resistance campaigns and thus what interventions are appropriate.  
Chenoweth and Stephan’s work has given us broad strokes both for understanding the 
widespread existence and frequent success of civil resistance.  My work builds on theirs 
to help understand what we can expect from these campaigns when they succeed.  This 
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has implications both for which movements governments should seek to assist prior to 
success, the shape of that assistance, and how we should relate to them after they come 
into power.
59
 International actors, particularly the UN, played a key positive role in 
helping Yemen’s negotiated mechanism of success come about through well-timed 
resolutions and skillful mediation.  Efforts by states and international organizations along 
these lines are to be encouraged and multiplied.   
There are many cautionary tales of civil resistance failure: Burma in 1988, 
Tiananmen Square in 1989.  But there are also cautionary tales of civil resistance success 
such as Iran in 1979.  But what these tales of both failure and success often fail to capture 
is the deep complexity and multifaceted nature of civil resistance.  Civil resistance 
campaigns do not fail simply arbitrarily, they fail because they are poorly organized, or 
because they lack a broad base of support, or for any number of other reasons.  Similarly, 
here I have argued and begun to show that when they succeed, civil resistance campaigns 
do not simply arbitrarily produce good or bad outcomes.  Just as there are complex 
reasons for failure, so there are complex reasons for failure after success.  If civil 
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 Events unfolding in Ukraine as of this writing provide a particularly potent example of 
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Appendix A: The Civil Resistance Mechanisms of Success Codebook 
Introduction 
 This project represents the first systematic attempt to empirically categorize the 
transition mechanisms of nonviolent civil resistance campaigns, building on the work of 
Bunce and Wolchik (2011), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), Sharp (2005) and Helvey 
(2005), among others.  It is also the first attempt to correlate these transition mechanisms 
with future outcomes of democracy and civil peace in order to answer questions about 
which transition mechanisms lead to better outcomes.  Data available from the author 
upon request. 
Section 1: List of Variables 
1. New, MEC, NAVCO 2.1, NAVCO 2.0, NAVCO 1: Dummy variable indicating 
the original source of the campaign. New = author research. 
2. campaign: Name of the campaign. 
3. location: Country of the campaign. 
4. lccode: COW country code for the country.  Source: 
www.correlatesofwar.org/COW_state_list.xls 
5. target: Name of the target regime. 
6. byear: beginning year of the campaign 
7. eyear: end-year of the campaign (year of the transition mechanism) 
8. Decade: Decade in which the transition mechanism took place (coded by first 
year, i.e. 1990 for all campaigns ending in the 1990s). 
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9. Africa, Americas, FSU, MENA, Asia, Europe: dummy variables indicating the 
region of the campaign. 
10. tranmech: 6-level nominal variable indicating transition mechanism.  Values are 
as follows:  1 = Coup d’etat, 2 = Negotiation, 3 = Election, 4 = International 
Intervention, 5 = Resignation, 6 = Overwhelming.  (author’s coding, see sections 
2 and 4 below for more details on this variable and sources for all coding 
decisions). 
11. trangood: Dummy variable indicating if the transition mechanism was a 
negotiation or election. 
12. traninst: dummy variable indicating whether transition mechanism was 
institutional (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and 
sources on coding decisions). 
13. trancoerce: dummy variable indicating whether transition mechanism was 
directly coercive (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 for more information and 
sources on coding decisions) 
14. transharp: 4-level nominal variable indicating which mechanism of success from 
Sharp (2005) matches the case most closely (author’s coding, see sections 2 and 4 
for more information and sources on coding decisions). 
15. tpop5, tpop10: country’s population (in thousands) 5 years and 10 years after the 
transition mechanism (Source: All country-years prior to 2008 Correlates of War 
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National Material Capabilities Dataset v.4.0, www.correlatesofwar.org.  2008-
2013 World Bank Databank, www.data.worldbank.org) 
16. lpop5, lpop10: natural logarithm of tpop5 and tpop10 respectively. 
17. GDPpercap0, GDPpercap5, GDPpercap10: GDP per capita in the year of, 5 
years after, and 10 years after the transition mechanism (Source: World Bank 
Databank, www.data.worldbank.org) 
18. logGDPpercap0, logGDPpercap5, logGDPpercap10: natural logarithm of 
GDPpercap0, GDPpercap5, and GDPpercap10 respectively. 
19. propdem5, propdem10: proportion of neighboring countries which are 
democracies 5 and 10 years after the end of the campaign (Source: Rivera 
Celestino and Gleditsch 2013). 
20. prewar: dummy variable indicating whether a major episode of political violence 
took place in the five years prior to the end of the campaign (Source: Center for 
Systemic Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm) 
21. predemoc: dummy variable indicating whether the country was a democracy 
(Polity IV score ≥ 6) prior to the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, 
Polity IV dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm) 
22. postwar5, postwar10: dummy variables indicating whether a major episode of 
political violence took place in the five years and ten years after the end of the 
campaign respectively (Main Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Major Episodes 
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of Political Violence dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm. See 
Source Note below for special sources). 
23. postwar5tot, postwar10tot: sum of major episodes of political violence in the 
five and ten years after the end of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic 
Peace, Major Episodes of Political Violence dataset, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm). 
24. logpostwar5tot, logpostwar10tot: natural logarithm of postwar5tot and 
postwar10tot respectively. 
25. postpolity5, postpolity10: Country’s Polity IV score 5 and 10 years after the end 
of the campaign (Source: Center for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm) 
26. politychange5, politychange10: Change in the country’s Polity IV score from the 
end of the campaign to 5 years and ten years after the campaign (Source: Center 
for Systemic Peace, Polity IV dataset, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm) 
27. postdemoc5, postdemoc10: Dummy variable indicating whether the country was 
a democracy (Polity IV score ≥ 6) 5 years and 10 years after the end of the 
campaign (Source: Author’s calculation based on Polity IV dataset). 
28. tranmech1, tranmech2, tranmech3, tranmech4, tranmech5, tranmech6: 
Dummy variables indicating the country’s tranmech category. 
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29. uncertainty: Dummy variable indicating whether the author is uncertain about 
the coding of tranmech, traninst, or trancoerce. 
30. Exclusion: Dummy variable indicating whether the case is considered a “weak” 
case, i.e. whether the transition in question can truly be considered regime change 
or the influence of civil resistance on the transition is unclear.  
Section 2: Description of Unique Variables   
TRANMECH 
Nominal variable describing the empirical transition mechanism by which the 
civil resistance campaign achieved success.  These six empirically discrete categories do 
capture all of the 83 transitions in my dataset with relative accuracy.  Critically, the 
coding of this variable indicates the mechanism whereby the civil resistance campaign 
succeeded, not merely the empirical occurrence of one of these events.  Sometimes the 
coding decisions are not immediately clear and require careful study of the events 
themselves.  In all my coding I attempt to be as strictly empirical as possible.  For 
explanations of all coding decisions see the transition narratives in Section 4.  
Possible values for TRANMECH 
1. Coup d’etat. 
The civil resistance campaign achieves success when the military or other 
former regime elites independently seize power and, when in power, grant 
the demands of the campaign. 
2. Negotiated Transition. 
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The campaign achieves success through a process of negotiation whereby 
the campaign and its opponent come to a mutual agreement.   
3. Electoral Victory. 
The campaign achieves success through an election or referendum which 
removes its opponent from power.  Electoral victory may be ensured 
through popular civil disobedience but the election itself must be critical 
to the campaign’s success for this variable to be coded as a 3. 
4. International intervention. 
The campaign achieves success through the intervention, military or 
political, of an international third party (a foreign state or international 
organization). 
5. Resignation. 
The campaign achieves success when its opponent resigns or otherwise 
steps down from power.  This category is distinct from category 3 in that 
category 5 transitions do not involve an election or other popular vote.  
The opponent simply leaves office.    
6. Overwhelming. 
The campaign achieves success through a complete overwhelming and 
disintegration of the organs of government.  The opponent regime simply 







Nominal variable which assigns the mechanism of nonviolent success the campaign 
followed.  Since Sharp’s definitions are more theoretical with unclear empirical 
components, coding decisions demanded some speculation and are somewhat arbitrary.   
Possible values for TRANSHARP. 
1. Conversion. 
“The opponent, as a result of the actions of the nonviolent struggle group 
or person, comes around to a new point of view which embraces the ends 
of the nonviolent actor.” (Sharp 2005, 415-16) 
2. Accommodation. 
“The opponents decide to yield on an issue rather than risk a still more 
unsatisfactory result.” (Sharp 2005, 417) 
3. Nonviolent Coercion. 
“Shifts of social forces and power relationships produce the changes 
sought by the resisters against the will of the opponents.” (Sharp 2005, 
418) 
4. Disintegration. 
“The opponents’ regime or group falls completely apart…opponents’ 
power is dissolved.” (Sharp 2005, 419). 
TRANCOERCE 
Dummy variable which captures whether a transition mechanism was categorized by a 
high degree of direct coercion.  While all mechanisms by their nature involve some 
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degree of coercion, this variable captured whether the coercion was direct, explicit, and 
central to campaign success. 
0. Non-coercive mechanism. 
1. Coercive mechanism. 
TRANINST 
Dummy variable that measures whether the method of transition followed pre-existing 
legal institutions.  For example: leaders voted out according to constitutional mechanisms 
or elections or resigning and being succeeded by constitutionally-mandated successor.  
0. Non-institutional mechanism 
1. Institutional mechanism 
Section 3: Special Coding Decisions 
Notes on Data Sources 
All data on conflict in country-years from 1946-2008 comes from the MEPV 
dataset from the Center for Systemic Peace.  Data on conflict in country-years prior to 
1946 comes from Gledistch 2004 war list.  Data on conflict from 2008-2012 comes from 
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program 
Upon individual case examination, several end-years from the NAVCO database 
did not capture the true year in which the mechanism of success occurred.  Any 
discrepancies between my end-year coding and Chenoweth and Lewis (2013) thus arise 




Specific Coding Special Decisions 
PREDEMOC for Cedar Revolution in Lebanon.  Polity score not given.  PREDEMOC 
coded as 0 based on “not free” rating of 5.5 from Freedom House for 2004-2005.  See 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2005/lebanon 
PREDEMOC for Ghana, Malawi, Zambia all coded as 0 due to all nations being British 
colonies prior to transition. 
PREDEMOC and POLITYCHANGE for Anti-Balaguer.  1962, year of Balaguer’s 
overthrow, Polity codes Dominican Republic as an 8.  However, Balaguer’s regime was 
still in transition at the time, and was in essence a continuation of the Trujillo regime 
which came before it and was consistently coded a -9.  Thus, for PREDEMOC and 
POLITYCHANGE I use the -9 number for Trujillo’s regime. 
POSTPOLITY5, POSTPOLITY10, POLITYCHANGE for Anti-Huong.  Polity IV codes 
the years 1965-1972 in South Vietnam as “Interruption,” i.e. a period where an occupying 
power terminates the existing polity and re-establishes a new one when it leaves and thus 
has no polity score.  This coding seems strange considering the South Vietnamese 
government continued to function during the entire period of US occupation in the 
country and engaged in political struggle, political activity, etc…  South Vietnam’s Polity 
IV score for every other year of its existence is a -3, thus I have extrapolated a -3 score 
for the years of “interruption” in order to generate values for these variables.      
PROPDEM5 for Anti-Alkatiri.  Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include 
East Timor in their dataset.  In 2011, the country-year for PROPDEM5, Indonesia, the 
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only country bordering East Timor, had a score of 8 from Polity IV, making East Timor’s 
neighbors 100% democratic; hence PROPDEM5 was coded “1.”  
PROPDEM10 for Anti-Diouf: Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch (2013) do not include 
Senegal after 2007.  PROMDEM10 (0.5) is author’s calculation based on Polity IV 
scores of six neighboring countries in 2010 in which 3 were 6 or higher). 
PROPDEM10 for Sierra Leone Defense of Democracy: Rivero Celestina and Gleditsch 
(2013) do not include Sierra Leone after 2007.  PROMDEM10 (0.5) is author’s 
calculation based on Polity IV scores of two neighboring countries in 2008 in which 1 
was 6 or higher. 
POLITYCHANGE5 and POLITYCHANGE10 for Active Voices: I base these values on 
the 1990 Polity score since this is the last one consistent with the Ratsiraka regime and 
not contaminated by the success of the civil resistance campaign at the end of 1991. 
All dependent variables for Velvet Revolution:  Since the Velvet Revolution took place 
in Czechoslovakia, a country which ceased to exist shortly after the revolution, I use the 
mean of the scores of both the Czech Republic and Slovakia to inform these variables. 
All independent variables related to country-year data prior to the transition (PREWAR, 
PREDEMOC, POLITYCHANGE) in USSR countries is coded with the relevant values 





Section 4: Transition Narratives and Sources 
 In many cases the coding of the transition mechanism is fairly straightforward.  
However, in some cases coding required significant research and the coding transition 
mechanism is open to interpretation.  In all of these cases I have included a 
“methodological note” (signified: MN) to explain my coding decision in more detail. 
 
Name: The Ruhrkampf  
Country: Germany 
End Year: 1923 
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention  
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional. 
Summary: The Ruhr region was annexed by France in an attempt to force Germany to 
pay exorbitant reparation rates.  The German government denounced the occupation as 
illegal and attempted to organize “passive resistance” against it to prevent the French 
both from gaining economic benefit from the occupation and to prevent them from 
annexing the region.  While “passive resistance” was initially unsuccessful, the English 
and Americans intervened, pressuring the French to agree to an international commission 
to re-negotiate Germany’s post-war reparations and withdraw from the Ruhr. 
 
Sources 




Name: Anti-Ibanez Revolution 
Country: Chile 
End Year: 1931 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: After a student-initiated uprising which was styled a “civil revolution,” 
President of Chile Carlos Ibanez resigned.  He was succeeded initially by Pedro Opazo, 
the president of the Chilean Senate, a succession mandated by the Chilean constitution.  
Opazo almost immediately resigned after continued demonstrations against his rule 
convinced the Chilean senate that he could not restore order, and was succeeded by the 
premier of the cabinet, Esteban Montero – another succession following guidelines in the 
Chilean constitution.  While the military and civilian political leadership did support the 
new regime there is no evidence that Ibanez’s resignation was the result of a military or 
civilian elite coup.   
 
Sources 
 Rector, John Lawrence. 2003. The History of Chile. Westport, CT: Greenwood 
Press. 148-150. 
 Special to The New York Times. “Revolt Wins in Chile as President Quits; Many 




Name: Guatemalan October Revolutionaries against Ubico dictatorship 
End year: 1944 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat (Military) 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: A civil resistance campaign, led by students, rejected attempts by the Ubico 
government to negotiate transition.  Instead, Ubico abruptly resigned, a move which 
created a constitutional crisis.  Ubico’s resignation, however, was not the critical moment 
of success as the military infrastructure which had run the country during Ubico’s tenure 
remained in place, and a junta of close Ubico supporters was left in charge of the country.  
The real transition was initiated in October when junior officers, appealed to by the civil 
resistance campaign, staged a coup d’etat which overthrew the junta and established a 
brief interim administration which organized the election of campaign leader Juan Jose 
Arevalo as the next president.  
 
Sources  
 Cable to The New York Times. “Guatemala Under Military Junta as Unrest 
Forces President Out.” The New York Times (1944, July 2). 
 Cable to The New York Times. “Ubico’s Men Kept Control.” The New York 
Times (1944, October 21). 
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 Grieb, Kenneth J 1976. “The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of1944.” 
The Americas 32, 524-543. 
 
Name: Strike of Fallen Arms  
End Year: 1944 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: The general strike initiated by students and later coordinated by the “National 
Reconstruction Committee” achieved success through the resignation of President 
Maximiliano Martinez.  The NRC had attempted to negotiate a transition path with 
Martinez, but while the negotiations had an effect on the later transition they ultimately 
failed to reach agreement on the terms of Martinez’s departure – Martinez wanted to 
remain in power for another month to oversee the transition, while the NRC demanded 
his immediate departure.  As the prospects for a violent clash between the campaign and 
the military increased, Martinez finally agreed to resign after being urged to do so by 
members of his cabinet to avoid bloodshed. 
 
Sources 
 Ackerman, Peter and Jack DuVall. A Force More Powerful 
 Parkman, Patricia. 1988. Nonviolent Insurrection in El Salvador: The Fall of 




Name: Anti-Lescot Revolution 
Country: Haiti 
End Year: 1946 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional. 
Summary: A student-initiated five-day general strike in Haiti was aimed at overthrowing 
authoritarian president Elie Lescot.  When Lescot ordered military leaders to use 
whatever force necessary to repress the strike they refused and instead, in consultation 
with the American ambassador, staged a coup d’etat, ordering Lescot to resign through 
threats to his life.  Lescot fled the country and the coup leaders assumed control of the 
state, promising to hold free elections.   
 
Sources 
 Smith, Matthew J. 2004. “VIVE 1804!: The Haitian revolution and the 
revolutionary generation of 1946.” Caribbean Quarterly 50 (4): 25-41. 
 Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2009. “Haitians Overthrow a Dictator.” 
Accessed 10/18/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/haitians-
overthrow-dictator-1946 
 




End Year: 1956 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: After several months of student protests a nonviolent campaign against 
Haitian dictator Paul Magloire expanded to include a general strike by business leaders.  
When Magloire was unable to break the strike through intimidation, and fearing the 
consequences if he attempted a broader violent crackdown, he resigned and fled the 
country. 
 
MN: Sources indicate that the resignation was Magloire’s decision, and not one initiated 
by the army, hence this is coded a resignation rather than a coup.  However, there are 
some indications that the army at least pressured Magloire or perhaps “requested” his 
resignation.  Further research might indicate that a “coup” coding is more appropriate.  
 
Sources 
 Parkman, Patricia. 1990. Insurrectionary Civic Strikes in Latin America: 1931-





 Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2009. “Haitians Strike and Overthrow a 





Name: Anti-Rojas Revolution 
Country: Colombia 
End Year: 1957 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional. 
Summary: Initial protests by students over the arrest of an opposition presidential 
candidate quickly escalated to include workers’ strikes and a number of other nonviolent 
tactics.  Transition occurred when a three-member military junta withdrew support from 
Rojas and demanded that he step down.  While Rojas resigned, this transition is a coup 
d’etat rather than a resignation because of the initiatory influence of the junta which took 





Global Nonviolent Action Database. 2009. “Colombians Overthrow Dictator, 1957.” 




Name: Convention People’s Party Movement 
Country: Ghana 
End Year: 1957 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional. 
Summary: The Convention People’s Party of Kwame Nkrumah organized opposition to 
British colonialism through a campaign of “positive action” which successfully pressured 
the British first to allow elections which brought CPP figures into power and eventually, 




 de Smith, S. A. 1957. “The independence of Ghana.” The Modern Law Review 20 
(4): 347-63. 
 Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Ghanaians campaign for independence 






Name: Anti-Jimenez Revolution 
Country: Venezuela 
End Year: 1958 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional. 
Summary: After an abortive coup in early January shook confidence in the government, a 
coalition of underground political parties organized a general strike and mass 
demonstrations in Caracas with the aim of ousting dictator Marcos Perez Jimenez.  The 
coalition directly appealed to the military to intervene on behalf of the people.  The 
military did so, ousting Jimenez in a coup d’etat and guaranteeing free elections.   
 
Sources 
 Szulc, Tad. 1958. “Venezuela is Set for Strike Today.” The New York Times 
(1958, January 21). 
 Szulc, Tad. 1958. “Caracas Revolt Ousts Dictator: Dead Exceed 100.” The New 
York Times (1958, January 23). 
 




End Year: 1960 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Political parties in the Belgian Congo, primarily ABAKO and the Parti 
Solidaire Africain organized demonstrations against Belgian rule and a massive boycott 
of elections for local Congolese authorities (which would remain under Belgian control).  
The political disturbance, along with a number of other factors, convinced the Belgians to 
hold a roundtable negotiation where they agreed to grant the Congo independence. 
 
MN:  While this transition mechanism is certainly clear, this case is somewhat suspect 
because it is doubtful to what extent the mobilization by ABAKO and PSA genuinely 
represents a civil resistance movement.  Civil resistance activities seem to be limited, 
possibly only including encouraging Congolese to boycott the Belgian-organized 
elections.  It may be more appropriate to simply code this transition as an elite-led pacted 
transition.     
 
Sources 
 Lemarchand, Rene. 1964. Political Awakening in the Belgian Congo. Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press. 
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 Weiss, Herbert F. 1967. Political Protest in the Congo: The Parti Solidaire 
Africain During the Independence Struggle.” Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Name: Anti-Rhee Student Movement 
Country: Ghana 
End Year: 1960 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional. 
Summary: After a rigged election sparked popular discontent against the authoritarian 
regime of South Korean president Syngman Rhee students in Seoul initiated a massive 
campaign of protests against Rhee’s rule.  The protests continued to grow in scope 
despite government repression, eventually leading to Rhee’s resignation. 
 
Sources 
 Kim, Quee-Young. “From Protest to Change of Regime: The 4-19 Revolt and the 
Fall of the Rhee Regime in South Korea.” Social Forces 74 (1996); 1179-1208. 
 Pyo, Yein. “South Korean Students Force Dictator to Resign, New Elections, 






Name: Nyasaland African Congress 
Country: Ghana 
End Year: 1960 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional. 
Summary: The Nyasaland African Congress, led by Dr. Hastings Banda, led agitation for 
independence for several years against the British, peaking in 1959 with a widespread 
organized civil disobedience campaign, during which time Hastings Banda was placed 
under arrest.  In 1960, under pressure from the continued disturbances by the NAC, the 
British released Banda and held a series of constitutional negotiations with the NAC 
which gave Africans rule in Malawi and led to Malawi’s eventual independence. 
 
MN: While Malawi did not become formally independent until several years later, the 
constitutional negotiations of 1960 marked the critical turning point in which the balance 
of power shifted to Banda and the Congress. Thus I consider the negotiations of 1960 to 
be the critical transition mechanism. 
 
Sources 




 Power, Joey. Political Culture and Nationalism in Malawi: Building Kwacha. 
Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press. 
 
Name: Zambia Anti-Colonial Struggle 
Country: Zambia 
End Year: 1962 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional. 
Summary: In 1961, as the British government was attempting to disengage from its 
African colonies, the white minority in Zambia attempted to impose a constitution which 
would ensure white minority rule.  A widespread civil resistance campaign led by Dr. 
Kenneth Kaunda and the United National Independence Party pressured the British to re-
open the constitution and change the rules to allow Africa-majority governments.  The 
constitutional changes, civil resistance, and tireless electioneering by Kaunda, led to the 
election of the first African-majority government in Zambia. 
 
MN: While Zambia did not become formally independent until 1964, the election of 
1962 was the critical turning point where the British and European settlers in Zambia 
capitulated to African demands for political self-determination and African parties moved 
from semi-legal opposition to a major role in government.  The remaining two years of 





 Hall, Richard. Zambia 1890-1964: The Colonial Period. London, England: 
Longman Group, Ltd. 
 
 
Name: Anti-Balaguer Revolution 
Country: Dominican Republic 
End Year: 1962 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional. 
Summary: President Joaquim Balaguer of the Dominican Republic was a holdover from 
the brutally authoritarian regime of Dictator Rafael Trujillo.  Civil society groups 
mobilized strikes and demonstrations against Balaguer because of this, demanding he 
step down and allow for free elections.  After several months of protests Balaguer 
negotiated a transitional process with the opposition, but before this process could truly 
begin Balaguer was removed from office in a military coup orchestrated by the head of 
the air force.  The coup was vigorously and vocally opposed by the United States, and a 
group of junior officers, supported by the United States, staged a counter-coup a few days 





 “Dominican Junta Ousted; Chief and 4 Aides Seized; Council Again in 
Control.” The New York Times (1962, January 19). 
 Global Nonviolent Action Database. “Dominican citizens general strike for free 




Name: Anti-Karamanlis “Unrelenting Struggle.” 
Country: Greece 
End Year: 1963 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, Institutional 
Summary: in 1961, a group of right-wing politicians and military figures engaged in 
widespread electoral fraud in Greece to ensure the victory of Conservative leader 
Constantine Karamanlis.  The fraud led to an outcry across the country and the initiation 
of an “unrelenting struggle” by opposition parties, student groups, and labor unions to 
oust the Conservatives, a civil resistance campaign of strikes, demonstrations, and 
nonviolent occupations.  This struggle was a major factor first in Karamanlis resignation 





MN: While Karamanlis did resign in June, his resignation did not spark a real transition 
of power, as the transitional government which ruled until the election in November 
remained completely controlled by the Conservatives.  The real transition did not occur 
until George Papandreou and liberal Center Union party won the election in November.  
 
Sources 
 Close, David H. Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London, 
England: Pearson Education Limited (2002) . 
 Koliopoulos, Giann s, and Thanos M. Veremis. Modern Greece: A History since 
1821. Chichester, England: John Wiley & Sons, Ltd, (2009). 
 
 
Name: Anti-Huong Campaign 
Country: South Vietnam 
End Year: 1965 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional. 
Summary: Buddhist monks demanded that Prime Minister Tran Van Huong step down 
after several members of his cabinet were chosen from loyalists to former dictator Ngo 
Dinh Diem. Campaign tactics included demonstrations, symbolic hunger strikes, and 
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general strikes across several areas of Vietnam.  On January 27th, the Vietnamese 
military deposed Huong in a bloodless coup and the Buddhists ended their campaign. 
 
Sources 
 Grose, Peter. “Buddhists spurn Vietnam regime and urge ouster.” (1964, 24 
November). The New York Times. 
 Grose, Peter. “Buddhist leaders open fast in fight on Saigon regime.” (1964, 12 
December) The New York Times. 
 Topping, Seymour. “Khanh names civilian premier; Buddhists halt 
demonstrations.” (1965, 28 January) The New York Times. 
 
Bangladesh Independence Movement  
Location: East Pakistan/Bangladesh 
End Year: 1971 
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: Beginning in March, 1971, hundreds of thousands of East Pakistani protesters, 
led by Awami League leader Mujibur Rahman, marched in Dhaka demanding 
independence for East Pakistan.  Local government officials refused to follow orders 
from West Pakistani authorities and instead followed a series of directives from the 
Awami League leadership, almost immediately making the Awami League the de facto 
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government of East Pakistan.  After the West Pakistani military attempted to brutally re-
assert control of East Pakistan through mass slaughter of civilians, with tens of thousands 
massacred in the first 48 hours of the attack, Bengali military units defected to the Awami 
League and the nonviolent campaign shifted to a military conflict.  After a military 
intervention by India, East Pakistan became the independent nation of Bangladesh. 
 
Sources: 
 “Rally Urges PM to Step Down.” The Times of India (1975, June 24). 
 Borders, William. “India Returns to Democracy.” The New York Times (1977, 
March 22). 
 Hossain, Ishtiaq. “Bangladesh: Civil Resistance in the Struggle for Independence: 
1948-1971.” in ed. Maciej J. Bartkowski. Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil 
Resistance in Liberation Struggles. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 
(2013). 
 United Press International. “Leader in Dacca acts to take over: East Pakistani 
proclaims 35 directives aimed at section’s ‘emancipation.’” (1971, 15 March) The 




End Year: 1972 
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Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Summary: Student protests against the Tsiranana government in Madagascar emerged as 
early as January 1972, when youths around the country began denouncing deteriorating 
economic conditions.  On May 12, 1972, protestors organized a strike involving as many 
as 100,000 secondary-level students, and many were arrested as the protests spread 
beyond the capital of Antananarivo into the provinces and other cities.  By May 19, 
students were calling for the immediate resignation of President Tsiranana.  Though he 
did not formally resign for several months, he ceded power to the military the following 
day. 
Sources: 
 1972. “Madagascar Leader is Urged to Resign,” The New York Times, May 20. 
 Hoagland, Jim. 1972. “Malagasy Demonstrators Quietened After Power is 
Transferred to Army,” The Washington Post, Times Herald, May 22. 
 
Thai Student Protests 
Location: Thailand 
End Year: 1973 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional 
Summary: In October of 1973, students in Thailand less mass protests, initially 
demanding the release of imprisoned student union leaders but later increasing their 
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demands to include constitutional reform and the expulsion of Thailand’s military 
dictators.  After the military began violently repressing the protests, Thailand’s king 
Bhumibol Adulyadej, working through Deputy Army Commander Krit Sivara, 
orchestrated the ouster of the military dictators. 
 
Sources: 
 Handley, Paul. The King Never Smiles: A Biography of Thailand’s Bhumibol 
Adulyadej New Haven, CT: Yale University Press (2006). 
 Heinze, Ruth-Inge. “Ten Days in October – Students vs. the Military: An Account 




End Year: 1974 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional 
Summary: In April of 1974, a small group of younger leftist military officers, aided by 
mass mobilization of civilians, overthrew Portugal’s authoritarian regime in a coup 





 Fortuna, Thomas. “Portugese Workers Campaign for Societal Change (Ongoing 
Revolutionary Process) 1974-1976.” Global Nonviolent Action Database 
(11/30/11).  Accessed 11/20/13 at 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/portuguese-workers-campaign-societal-
change-ongoing-revolutionary-process-1974-1976. 
 Graham, Lawrence S. “Is the Portugese Revolution Dead?” Luso-Brazilian 
Review 16 (1979): 147-159.  
 
Greek Protests Against Military Rule 
Location: Portugal 
End Year: 1974 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: Uprisings by students, workers and others in 1973-74 along with a disastrous 
military adventure in Cyprus and threat of war with Turkey, led insiders in the Greek 
military to oust junta leader Ioannidis and return Greece to civilian rule, bringing former 
Prime Minister Constantine Karamanlis back into power. 
 
Sources: 
 Close, David H. Greece Since 1945: Politics, Economy and Society. London, UK: 
Pearson Education Limited (2002). 
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 Danopoulos, Constantine P. “Military Professionalism and Regime Legitimacy in 
Greece, 1967-1974.” Political Science Quarterly 98 (1983): 483-506. 
 
 
Name: Anti-Bhutto Campaign 
Location: Pakistan 
End Year: 1977 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, non-institutional 
Summary: After elections in March of 1977, a wide variety of civil society and 
opposition groups began a campaign to depose the government of Prime Minister 
Zulfikar Ali Bhutto.  The campaign was sparked by accusations that Bhutto had rigged 
the election to favor his Pakistan People’s Party.  Demonstrations, nonviolent 
interventions, and day-long general strikes were widespread across Pakistan, with 
broadbased diverse support.  Demonstrations were violently repressed, with scattered 
incidents of protesters being shot and tens of thousands of opposition leaders 
arrested.  Bhutto also attempted to appease the opposition by offering new elections or a 
referendum on his rule but his opponents refused, insisting instead that he leave office 
immediately.  When final negotiations between Bhutto and the opposition in July broke 





 “Opposition strike disrupts main cities of Pakistan.” (1977, 11 March) The New 
York Times. 
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(1977, 14 April). The New York Times. 
 Borders, William. “Bhutto steps up peace efforts but foes won’t yield.” (1977, 16 
April). The New York Times. 
 Kamm, Henry. “Opposition demonstrations in Pakistani cities heighten crisis 




End Year: 1977 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Anti-corruption activists led a campaign to oust Prime Minister Indira Gandhi 
after she was found guilty of election fraud and ordered by a court to step down.  Prime 
Minister Gandhi responded by declaring a year and a half long emergency in which civil 
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liberties were suspended and tens of thousands of opponents arrested.  When the 
emergency was unexpectedly lifted in January 1977 and Indira Gandhi called for an 
election to validate her rule the activists which had opposed her joined together in the 
Janata party and successfully ousted her from power.   
 
Sources: 
 “Rally Urges PM to Step Down.” The Times of India (1975, June 24). 
 Borders, William. “India Returns to Democracy.” The New York Times (1977, 
March 22). 
 Pace, Eric. “India Reports 676 Arrests in Drive on those Opposed to Regime of 
Mrs. Gandhi.” The New York Times (1975, June 27).  
 
Name: Iranian Revolution 
Country: Iran 
End Year: 1979 
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: A year and a half-long campaign of protests, strikes, and demonstrations 
against the dictatorship of the Shah of Iran peaked in February 1979 when the Shah’s 
appointed Prime Minister, Shapour Bakhtiyar, allowed religious and dissident leader 
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to return from exile in France.  Millions welcomed 
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Khomeini and supported his desire to establish an Islamic government.  While Bakhtiyar 
maintained his government’s legitimacy, two years of revolution had so shifted the 
balance of public support that Bakhtiyar’s regime ceased to function and Khomeini’s new 
Islamic government assumed rule over Iran. 
 
Sources 
 Daneshvar, Parviz. Revolution in Iran. New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, Inc. 
(1996). 
 Dolan, Lindsay. “Iranians Overthrow the Shah,1977-79.” Global Nonviolent 




Name: Anti-Junta Struggle 
Country: Bolivia 
End Year: 1982 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Popular opposition to the series of military juntas which had ruled Bolivia for 
several years peaked in 1982, when various civil society groups including unions, 
employers’ groups, and the Catholic Church all came together in a unified civil resistance 
 
168 
campaign.  The military, which had tired of rule and was looking for “una salida” to leave 
power, accepted a negotiated transition process whereby an opposition government voted 
into power in an annulled election in 1980 assumed power. 
 
Sources 
 Kim, Rosanna. “Bolivians Successfully Oust Military Regime, 1982.” Global 




Name: Pro-Democracy Movement 
Country: Argentina 
End Year: 1983 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Popular resistance to the Argentine military dictatorship and its brutal “dirty 
war” against its own people, spearheaded by the “Mothers of the Disappeared” protest 
group, blossomed into a full-scale civil resistance campaign after the Argentine 
government’s defeat by Great Britain in the Falklands war.  The military, seeking to 
extricate itself from rule, agreed to hold free and fair elections.  The elections 
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successfully ousted the military and gave power to the strongest opponents of military 
rule, the Radicals. 
 
Sources 
 Lewis, Daniel K. The History of Argentina. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
 Tedla, Aden. “Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo Campaign for Democracy and the 
Return of Their Family Members.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2012, 




Name: Diretas Ja 
Country: Brazil 
End Year: 1985 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: A campaign of protests and demonstrations for direct presidential elections in 
Brazil unified opposition parties, unions, and civil society groups to launch a united 
challenge against Brazil’s retreating military dictatorship.  This challenge, bringing on 
board many moderate defectors from the military regime, successfully ousted the regime 





 Mainwaring, Scott. “The Transition to Democracy in Brazil.” Journal of 
Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 28 (1986): 149-179. 
 
Name: Uruguay Anti-Military 
Country: Uruguay 
End Year: 1984 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Protests and strikes by labor unions and opposition parties successfully 
pressured the Uruguayan military dictatorship to abide by an earlier agreement to hold 
elections in November of 1984.  The opposition successfully won the election, bringing 
an end to military rule and restoring democracy. 
 
MN: A process of negotiation between the regime and opposition did lead to the 
elections, thus the transition mechanism may be classified as negotiation.  However, 
since the fundamental breakthrough in power dynamics occurred through the election I 





 Finch, Henry. “Democratization in Uruguay.” Third World Quarterly 7 (1985): 
594-609. 
 
Name: Anti-Nimeiry Protests 
Country: Sudan 
End Year: 1985 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional 
Summary: A massive wave of strikes and demonstrations organized by students, 
professional organizations, and other opposition political parties against the regime of 
President Jaafar Nimeiry took place while Nimeiry was on a trip to the United States.  
Protest leaders convinced the military leadership not to repress the protests and instead 
stage a coup when Nimeiry returned to Sudan.  The coup succeeded, ousting Nimeiry. 
 
Sources 
 Abbass, Samia. “Sudanese General Strike Against Numeiri Dictatorship, 1985.” 








End Year: 1986 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional 
Summary: Beginning in October 1985, widespread protests against the government of 
Jean-Claude “Baby Doc” Duvalier called for his ouster and asked the army to assume 
power in Haiti.  The protests were largely leaderless and spontaneous, though the bishops 
of the Catholic Church played a key role.  Duvalier attempted to violently repress them 
by the army largely refused to attack protesters, and the US government, one of 
Duvalier’s primary benefactors, threatened to withhold aid.  Finally, in February 1986, 
with the army refusing to follow orders and preparing to assume control of the country, 
the US explicitly calling for Duvalier’s exit, and little or no government control in most 
of the country, Duvalier fled the country.  A military junta assumed power. 
 
MN: This transition mechanism is difficult to code because of the secretive nature of the 
relationship between the Duvalier, the Haitian army, and the United States.  Pressure 
from both of these parties means that the mechanism could conceivably be coded as a 
coup or international intervention.  The wide breakdown of government control also 
indicates at least partially towards an overwhelming.  The key factor in my decision to 
code “resignation” is the indication that Duvalier departed when he did largely under his 
own choosing, and that he also named the military junta members who succeeded him.  
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This level of initiative and ability to shape the post-transition order makes “resignation” 
the most accurate coding of this transition. 
 
Sources 
 Dupuy, Alex. Haiti in the New World Order: The Limits of Democratic 
Revolution. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
 Ferguson, James. Papa Doc, Baby Doc: Haiti and the Duvaliers. New York, NY: 
Basil Blackwell, Inc. 
Name: “People Power.” 
Country: Philippines 
End Year: 1986 
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional 
Summary: In 1986 Ferdinand Marcos blatantly rigged a presidential election, sparking 
the beginning of a civil resistance campaign against him by the opposition, led by 
Corazon Aquino.  However, just as the campaign was beginning a group of Marcos 
insiders staged an abortive coup.  When the coup failed, the coup plotters declared their 
support for Aquino and asked for her protection.  Millions of Filipinos then gathered 
around the camps where the coup plotters were stationed.  With monks and nuns in the 
front lines, Marcos’ troops refused to attack the nonviolent protesters.  As the coup 
plotters engineered high-level defections from within Marcos’ ranks, rank-and-file 
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soldiers and security forces defected en masse.  Marcos, his regime collapsing around 
him, fled the country in an American helicopter. 
 
Sources 
 McCoy, Alfred W. Closer Than Brothers: Manhood at the Philippine Military 
Academy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999. 
 Zunes, Stephen. "The Origins of People Power in the Philippines." In Nonviolent 
Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective, edited by Stephen Zunes, Lester 
R. Kurtz and Sarah Beth Asher, 129-157. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, 
1999. 
Name: South Korea Anti-Junta 
Country: South Korea 
End Year: 1988 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: A burgeoning pro-democracy movement against military dictator Chun Doo-
Hwan organized protests to push Chun to allow direct presidential elections.  After rallies 
grew increasingly powerful, Chun eventually agreed to hold direct elections.  While a 
split in the opposition meant that Chun’s successor, Roh Tae-Woo, was elected to the 
presidency, the election marked a critical turning point for South Korea and 





 Lakey, George. “South Koreans Win Mass Campaign For Democracy, 1986-87.” 




Name: Anti-Pinochet Campaign  
End Year: 1988 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: A unified opposition campaign successfully defeated authoritarian president 
Augusto Pinochet in a national plebiscite on the continuation of his rule.  After Pinochet 
lost the plebiscite the military refused to support him any longer and Pinochet was 




 Bernath-Plaistad, Shandra and Rennebohm, Max. “Chileans Overthrow Pinochet 
Regime, 1983-1988.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2008, October 31).  
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End Year: 1989 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: The Solidarity trade union movement waged a nearly ten-year nonviolent 
struggle against the Communist government of Poland, first pushing for independent 
trade union rights and later pushing for democratization.  A wave of strikes in 1988 
pressured the Polish government to agree to engage in “Round Table” negotiations with 
Solidarity.  These negotiations successfully initiated a political transition in which 
Solidarity first entered parliament and eventually elected its leader, Lech Walesa, to the 




 Garton Ash, Timothy. The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague. New York, NY: Random House (1990). 
 Kurtz, Lester R. and Lee Smithey. “ ‘We Have Bare Hands:’ Nonviolent Social 
Movements in the Soviet Bloc.” in Stephen Zunes, Lester R. Kurtz, and Sarah 
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Beth Asher (eds.) Nonviolent Social Movements: A Geographical Perspective. 
Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. (1999). 
 
Name: Pro-Democracy Movement, East Germany  
End Year: 1989 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: The East German transition involved three major mechanisms: an intra-party 
elite coup which ousted party leader Erich Honecker, the mass resignations of the 
remaining SED government which followed Honecker’s ouster, and the eventual election 
which followed the SED’s resignations.  However, the elite coup only provided the initial 
major opening for the pro-democracy movement while keeping SED rule intact, and the 
election followed several months after the regime had effectively ceased to function.  
Thus, the critical transition mechanism in the East German case were the final wave of 




 Nepstad, Sharon Erickson. 2011. Nonviolent Revolutions: Civil Resistance in the 
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th




Name: Pro-Democracy Movement, Hungary  
End Year: 1989 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Liberalization by moderates within the Hungarian Communist party sparked 
mass civil resistance mobilization recalling past Hungarian nonviolent uprisings and 
calling for democracy.  These changes led the Communists to hold a series of 
negotiations with the united Opposition Round Table which fundamentally restructured 
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Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers, Inc. (1999). 
 
Name: Velvet Revolution 
End Year: 1989 
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Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Inspired by the successful nonviolent revolutions in Poland, Hungary, and 
East Germany, students and dissidents in Czechoslovakia sought to oust their Communist 
rulers “in ten days.”  While the revolution did take slightly longer, after three weeks of 
continuous mass demonstrations and general strikes the Civic Forum, an alliance of 
opposition groups, held negotiations with the Communist party which led to a new 




 Garton Ash, Timothy. The Magic Lantern: The Revolution of ’89 Witnessed in 
Warsaw, Budapest, Berlin, and Prague. New York, NY: Random House (1990). 
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Name: Bulgaria Anti-Communist Campaign  
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
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Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Civil resistance in Bulgaria was largely initiated after an intra-Communist 
party coup, where long-time leader Todor Zhivkov was ousted from power by Foreign 
Minister Petar Mladenov.  While Mladenov began instituting reforms, opposition groups 
joined together to push the pace of reform and held protests and demonstrations 
demanding an end to Communist single-party rule and the institution of multi-party 
democracy.  After months of increasingly powerful protests and strikes the Communists 
agreed to hold roundtable negotiations with the opposition.  As a result of the 
negotiations (backed by continuing external protests) the Communist party relinquished 
its constitutional sole hold on power and control over the military, and agreed to allow for 
multi-party elections. 
 
MN: Some sources (Roberts 1991) consider the “palace coup” against Zhivkov to be the 
breakthrough point in this campaign.  However, Mladenov’s coup was prior to the central 
stages of the campaign, and did not grant protesters essential demands.  These demands 
were instead granted as a result of the negotiations sparked by protests after Mladenov’s 
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Name: Latvia Anti-Communist Campaign  
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Several pro-independence organizations in Latvia organized protests, strikes, 
and various forms of creative nonviolent resistance to push for democratic rule and 
independence.  Their agitation led to the first free election to the Latvian Supreme Soviet 
in 1990, in which pro-independence candidates assumed control of the government.  
While Latvia did not finalize its independence from the Soviet Union until after the 
Soviet coup the following year, this election represented the critical breakthrough point 
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Name: Singing Revolution 
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Estonian civil society organizers led a nonviolent civil resistance campaign for 
democracy and independence in the Soviet republic of Estonia.  Their efforts, along with 
liberalizations by Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev, led to the election of the Congress 
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of Estonia in 1990, an alternate governing body that orchestrated Estonia’s independence 
from the USSR by August of 1991. 
 
MN: As with Latvia and Lithuania, Estonia did not achieve formal independence from 
the USSR until 1991 and civil resistance continued against attempts by the USSR to 
reassert its control over Estonia.  However, the election in 1990 was the critical 
breakthrough point where political authority and de facto independence largely passed to 
the civil resistance campaign. 
 
Sources 
 Tedla, Aden. “Estonians Campaign for Independence (The Singing Revolution), 





End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Lithuanian civil society groups, led by the Sajudis group, led protests 
declaring the illegality of Soviet rule in Lithuania and demanding democracy and 
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independence, as well as a number of other creative nonviolent resistance tactics.  Their 
efforts led to a number of organizations, including the Lithuanian Communist Party, 
ending their relationships with the USSR and the election of Sajudis to a massive 
majority in the Lithuanian Supreme Council in February 1990.  Sajudis declared 
independence a few months later and successfully nonviolently repelled attempts by the 
USSR to re-assert its authority.   
 
MN: As with Latvia and Estonia, Lithuania did not achieve formal independence from 
the USSR until 1991 and civil resistance continued against attempts by the USSR to 
reassert its control.  However, the election in 1990 was the critical breakthrough point 
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Name: Kyrgyzstan Democratic Movement  
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: Violent ethnic clashes between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz in early 1990 sparked a 
nationalist movement in the Kyrgyz oblast of the USSR demanding greater democracy 
and independence.  After protests peaked with a mass hunger strike in Bishkek, the 
Supreme Soviet in Moscow allowed the Kyrgyz Supreme Soviet to create the post of 
President and hold elections for it.  The elections were won by reformer Askar Akaev, 
who began a rapid process of democratization and declared full independence from the 
USSR after the Communist hardliner coup in August of 1991. 
 
MN: This case only weakly meets inclusion criteria since it is not clear whether the 
protests were directly calling for democracy/independence (and were thus maximalist) or 
were simply in response to unemployment and mistreatment of ethnic Kyrgyz.  Thus it is 
possible that this case may be better considered an elite-led transition rather than a 
transition initiated by a successful civil resistance campaign.  Statistical tests were run 
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Name: Slovenia Anti-Communist Movement 
Country: Nepal 
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: A wide range of alternative groups arose in the 1980s in Slovenia, pursuing a 
wide range of liberalizing agendas.  In response to repression by Yugoslavian authorities, 
Slovenian alternative groups came together through protests and demonstrations to push 
the sympathetic Slovenian Communist government to liberalize and move away from 
Yugoslavia.  These protests led to Slovenia’s first democratic elections in 1990, in which 
a coalition of opposition parties was brought into power with a mandate to get Slovenia 




MN: This case only weakly meets inclusion criteria – the evidence for an organized civil 
resistance campaign, while it might show itself to be more extensive after further 
research, is quite limited.  However, the existence of the semi-organized “alternative” and 
their activities pushing for democratization and independence are certainly strong 
indications of organized civil resistance. As with similar post-Communist cases I 
consider the transition mechanism to be the election whereby liberal oppositions first 
came into power, rather than the formal declaration of independence a year later.  As with 
other cases whose inclusion in the dataset is weak, statistical tests were run which both 
included and excluded this case. 
 
Sources 
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Benderly and Evan Kraft (eds) Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, 
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Brookfield, VT: Dartmouth Publishing Company (1997). 
 Silber, Laura and Allan Little Yugoslavia: Death of a Nation. New York, NY: 
Penguin Books (1997). 
 
Name: Benin Anti-Communist Campaign  
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End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: A year of civil resistance, primarily strikes by students and labor unions, with 
support from the church and civil society institutions, forced long-time Communist leader 
Mathieu Kerekou to agree to hold a national dialogue.  The national dialogue concluded 
by declaring its own sovereignty, stripping Kerekou of his powers, and creating a multi-
party democracy in Benin. 
 
Sources 
 Bierschenk, Thomas “Democratization Without Development: Benin 1989-2009.” 
The International Journal of Politics, Culture, and Society 22.3 (2009) 337-57. 
  
 
Name: Mongolia Anti-Communist Campaign  
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: The politburo of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party (MPRP), the 
Communist party which had ruled Mongolia for almost 70 years, resigned after the 
Mongolian Democratic Union organized larger and larger street demonstrations 
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demanding an opening of the Mongolian political system.  While the resignation was 
followed by a process of negotiations and eventually multiparty elections, the transition 
mechanism itself is best identified as the resignation, while what followed was essentially 
part of the later political transition. 
 
Sources 
 Rossabi, Morris. 2005. Modern Mongolia: From Khans to Commissars to 
Capitalists. Berkeley: University of California Press. 21-28. 
 
Name: Anti-Ershad Campaign  
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional  
Summary: An alliance of major political parties, along with student groups, organized a 
series of paralyzing strikes to demand that dictator Hussein Muhammad Ershad step 
down and hand over power to a Vice President selected by the opposition.  Ershad 
attempted to suppress the uprising through force, but his violent tactics sparked broader 
mobilization against his regime.  The leadership of the military, believing that Ershad’s 
actions were tarnishing the military as an institution, decided that they could no longer 
support Ershad as president.  Upon receiving news of the military’s defection,  Ershad 
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acceded to the opposition’s demand, resigned, and handed power over to the candidate 
selected by the opposition. 
 
Methodological note: The central role of the military defection in Ershad’s resignation 
might lead some to code this transition as a coup.  The key distinction is that, while the 
military did defect, they did not attempt to independently seize power, nor did they 
themselves initiate the transition.  Ershad, rather, chose to resign and himself took the 
iniating step.  Power was also handed over to the candidate selected by the united 
opposition, not taken up by the military.  Thus it is more appropriate to code this 
transition mechanism as a resignation.  
 
Sources 
 Maniruzzaman, T. 1992. "The Fall of the Military Dictator: 1991 Elections and 
the Prospect of Civilian Rule in Bangladesh." Pacific Affairs 65(2): 203-224. 
 
Name: Movement for the Restoration of Democracy 
Country: Nepal 
End Year: 1990 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
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Summary: In 1990 the Nepali Congress, along with a constellation of other political 
groups, students, and others led strikes and demonstrations demanding an end to 
monarchical rule and a move towards a constitutional monarchy.  When neither co-
optation nor violent repression succeeded in suppressing the movement the king issued a 
proclamation allowing for the drafting of a new constitution.  Through a process of 
intensive negotiation between the king and the opposition an new constitution was 
promulgated making Nepal a constitutional monarchy. 
 
Sources 
 Schock, Kurt. 2005. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Non-
Democracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 120-125.  
 
Name: Niger Anti-Military Campaign 
Country: Nepal 
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: In 1991, protests by students and independent labor unions successfully 
pressured Col. Ali Saibou, military ruler of Niger, to begin a transition to democracy.  
The campaign demanded that Saibou allow a “national dialogue” group of government 
and civil society leaders to determine how to transition the country to democracy.  Saibou 
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agreed, and the national dialogue was put in place.  After three months of negotiations the 
national dialogue dissolved the government and put in place a transitional administration.  
 
MN: The establishment of the National Conference and its process of putting in place a 
transitional government does fit the general profile of a mechanism of success.  However, 
it would also not be unreasonable to code the transition as occurring when Niger 
officially voted on a democratic constitution in 1992 or when the first democratically-
elected government assumed office in 1993.  These different codings effect how Niger’s 
future outcomes are coded because Niger suffered a brief return to authoritarianism from 
1996-98.  According to PolityIV, Niger was a robust democracy for three years after the 
negotiated transition, and returned to at least weak democracy after the coup of 1996 led 
to that brief period of authoritarianism.  Thus the particular timing of Niger’s transition 
process may have outsized effects on how it appears in the data. 
 
Sources 
 “Niger’s Pro-Democracy Conference to Start on Monday.” Reuters News (1991, 
July 27). 
 “Niger Conference Dissolves Government, Dismisses Army Chief.” Reuters News 
(1991, September 10). 






Name: Albania Anti-Communist Campaign 
Country: Albania 
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Civil resistance to the Albanian Communist regime, which had begun in 1989, 
peaked in May-June of 1991, when a general strike organized by students and labor 
groups along with the recently-formed Democratic Party paralyzed the country for four 
weeks.  Along with economic demands the strikers called for an end to Communist rule.  
Unable to end the strike, the Communist government resigned.  I consider the resignation 
to be the key transition mechanism for two reasons: although Albania did have a previous 
democratic election, the election failed to unseat the Communists, and the leadership of 
the country remained largely unchanged.  After the strike while the Communists did not 
fully depart from power they only remained in power in a coalition transitional 
government along with the Democratic Party until new elections were held.  The 
Communists who remained also purged much of their former leadership and completely 
changed their platform to move from being a Communist party to a Democratic Socialist 
party.  Thus the period of interim government is more appropriately considered as part of 





 Vickers, Miranda and James Pettifer. 2000. Albania: From Anarchy to a Balkan 
Identity. New York, NY: New York University Press.  
 
Name: Zambia Pro-Democracy 
Country: Zambia 
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Non-coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Powerful Zambian labor unions spearheaded a civil resistance campaign 
beginning in 1989 against the one-party rule of long-time authoritarian President of 
Zambia Kenneth Kaunda, demanding a change in Zambia’s constitution to allow multi-
party rule and oust Kaunda from power.  The campaign gained momentum in June when 
the government raised the price of Maize, sparking riots, and when massive celebrations 
when reports were issued that Kaunda had been ousted in a coup publicly revealed the 
extent of popular opposition to President Kaunda.  As protests grew larger President 
Kaunda agreed to allow multi-party elections and created a commission to draft a new 
constitution.  Multi-party elections in 1991 successfully ousted Kaunda and brought the 





 Bratton, Michael. “Zambia Starts Over.” Journal of Democracy 3.2 (April 1992), 
81-94. 
 
Name: Russian Anti-Coup Protests 
Country: Russia/USSR 
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional. 
Summary: In August of 1991 a group of Soviet “hardliners” attempted to stage a coup 
against the leadership of reformist Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.  However, mass 
popular uprisings against the coup, initiated but only partially led by Russian President 
Boris Yeltsin, led to mass military defections and the disintegration of the coup leaders 
incipient regime.   
 
MN: I code this transition mechanism as “overwhelming” because of the disintegrative 
nature of the campaign’s success against the coup leaders.  The coup’s organizational 
structure quite literally fell apart as the campaign sparked widespread military defections.  
Thus while physical overwhelming may not have occurred, the disintegrative mechanism 





 Nakhoda, Zein. “Defense of Soviet State Against Coup, 1991.” Global Nonviolent 
Action Database (2011, May 14).  Accessed 12/9/13 at 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/defense-soviet-state-against-coup-1991. 
 Sharp, Gene and Bruce Jenkins. The Anti-Coup. Boston, MA: The Albert Einstein 




Name: Belarus Pro-Democracy Movement 
Country: Belarus 
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Democratic and nationalistic opposition had been building in Belarus for 
several years, with protests and demonstrations supporting demands for a break from the 
Soviet Union and a more open political system.  In 1990, despite election rules which 
heavily weighted allocation of seats towards the Communist Party members of the 
opposition were elected to the Belarussian Supreme Soviet.  In the following year the 
Belorussian Communist party quickly lost members, so that, when the August 1991 
attempted coup occurred in Russia, the Belorussian Communists were severely 
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weakened.  With demonstrators gathering outside the parliament demanding 
independence and an end to Communist rule, the Supreme Soviet held a two-day 
extraordinary meeting.  In this meeting more liberal members of the Communist party 
allied with the opposition, forced the resignation of the President of the Supreme Soviet 
and declared Belarus independent.  A few days later the entire cabinet declared that they 
had “suspended” their membership in the Communist party, officially ending Communist 
rule. 
 
MN: Belarus is a difficult case to code because the transition lacks very clear, distinctive 
transition points.  However, when understood from the POV of the goals of the campaign 
(independence and an end to Communist rule) the August declaration seems to be the 
clearest transition moment.  The mechanism I consider to be an elite coup because it was 
essentially a rebellion and assumption of power within the ranks of the Belorussian 
Communist party.  However, a plausible argument could be made for coding the 
transition as either a resignation or a negotiation.  Resignation I find less plausible 
because of the aspect of pressure from other members of the Communist party on the top 
leadership.  Negotiation is more plausible but also problematic because sources indicate 
that the primary actors were intra-Communist, with the opposition merely playing a 
pressuring role. However, additional research might lend greater credence to coding this 
transition as a negotiation.  In my statistical tests I run separate regressions coding 





 Zaprudnik, Jan. Belarus: At a Crossroads in History. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press (1993). 
 
Name: Thailand Pro-Democracy Movement 
Country: Thailand 
End Year: 1992 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: The Campaign for Popular Democracy, an umbrella group of opposition 
parties, students, and other civil society groups organized mass demonstrations in 
Bangkok and other cities around Thailand to demand an end to military rule and promote 
a more democratic constitution.  The protesters also called specifically for the resignation 
of Prime Minister Suchinda, who was from the military.  Suchinda resigned in May of 
1992 after several days of bloody protest suppression by the military, but protests and 
other political activism continued until an election in September, when a coalition of pro-
democracy parties was voted into office, thus the election, not the resignation of 





 Schock, Kurt. 2005. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Non-
Democracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 120-125. 
 
Name: Active Voices Campaign  
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional Transition 
Summary: The unified “Active Voices” opposition staged a six-month general strike in 
1991 that forced authoritarian president Didier Ratsiraka to agree to a negotiated power-
sharing arrangement that put opposition figures in most major positions of power and led 
to a new constitution and Ratsiraka’s eventual final ouster from power in a presidential 
election in 1993. 
 
MN: I consider the breakthrough to be the negotiations of late 1991 because these 
resulted in the fundamental shift of the opposition from civil resistance to a position of 
power shaping the transition process.  While Ratsiraka retained some power throughout 
the following two-year transition his power was largely subordinated to the opposition.  






 “Madagascar Opposition Wins Key Posts in Transitional Rule.” Reuters News 
(1991, November 1). 
 “National Unity Government Takes Office in Madagascar.” Reuters News (1991, 
December 19). 
 Randrianja, Solofo. “’Be not Afraid, Only Believe;: Madagascar 2002.” African 
Affairs 102 (2003) 309-329. 
 Ruyter, Elena. “Madagascar Citizens Force Free Elections, 1990-1992.” Global 





Name: Anti-Hoyte Protests 
Country: Guyana 
End Year: 1992 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Protests in the early 1990s successfully pressured authoritarian Socialist leader 





MN: The role of civil resistance in this case was unclear based on the research 
performed.  This case may be better considered an elite-led transition.  Statistical tests 
were run both including and excluding this case. 
 
Sources 
 French, Howard W. “Guyana Marxist, Mellowed, Makes a Comeback.” The New 
York Times (1991, July 5). 
 Wilkinson, Bert. “Jagan Defeats President Hoyte in Violence-Wracked Election.” 
The Associated Press (1992, October 7). 
 
Name: People Against Violence 
Country: Slovakia 
End Year: 1992 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: People Against Violence, a Slovak dissident group, was a critical force in the 
1989 “Velvet Revolution” which ousted the Communist government of Czechoslovakia.  
Over the following three years Slovak activists continued to push for an independent 
Slovakia.  A series of negotiations between Czech and Slovak leaders, backed by 
continuing pressure from the streets in Slovakia, led to Slovakia’s peaceful secession in 





 Innes, Abby. Czechoslovakia: The Short Goodbye. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press (2001). 
 Kirschbaum, Stanislav J. A History of Slovakia: The Struggle for Survival. New 
York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Name: Mali Pro-Democracy Movement 
Country: Mali 
End Year: 1991 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’Etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: Students, opposition groups, and labor unions led a massive civil resistance 
campaign against Mali’s military dictator: General Moussa Traore.  When violent 
repression backfired and the campaign continued to grow the military defected en masse 
and joined protests.  A group of officers, led by Lieutenant Colonel Amadou Toumani 






 Passanante, Aly. “Malians Defeat Dictator, Gain Free Election (March 
Revolution), 1991. Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, February 20). 
 
Name: Malawi Multi-Party Democracy Movement 
Country: Malawi 
End Year: 1993 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Strikes and demonstrations by students, labor unions, and the Catholic Church 
successfully pressured long-time authoritarian President Hastings Banda to hold a 
referendum on moving Malawi from a one-party state to a multi-party democracy.  The 
civil resistance campaign, with help from UN observers, successfully won the 
referendum, initiating a process of constitutional reform which ended with a free and fair 
election in 1994 which finally ousted President Hastings Banda from power. 
 
MN: An argument could be made that either the election or the referendum are the 
critical mechanism of transition in this case.  This does not affect how the transition 
mechanism is coded, since both would fall under my category of “elections,” but does 
change whether the end year of the campaign is considered to be 1993 or 1994, and thus 
has effects on the values of the control variables.  I consider the referendum to be the 
transition point because it placed multi-party election advocates in significant authority 
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and initiated the constitutional reform process.  Changing the end-year does not cause 
significant changes in the values of Malawi’s post-campaign variables.  
 
Sources 
 Carpenter, Lindsay. “Malawians Bring Down 30-Year Dictator, 1992-1993.”  




Name: South African Defiance Campaign 
Country: South Africa 
End Year: 1992 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: A series of nonviolent mass uprisings, including boycotts of white businesses, 
creation of alternative institutions, and labor strikes, as well as an international 
divestment and sanctions campaign, led the government of apartheid South Africa to 
engage in a negotiated transition process, under the auspices of the Convention for a 
Democratic South Africa (CODESA).  While it faced significant challenges, CODESA 
eventually led to an agreement in late 1992 to hold national elections and a five-year 
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national unity government.  The election, held in 1994, led to the election of freedom 
fighter Nelson Mandela as South Africa’s first black president.   
 
MN: South Africa’s transition presents a significant coding challenge.  There are three 
significant points which can be argued as the mechanism of success: de Klerk’s decision 
to legalize the ANC and free Nelson Mandela in 1990, the CODESA negotiations which 
concluded in 1992, and the election in 1994.  CODESA is the best choice for the 
following reasons:   
 The 1990 decisions by de Klerk, while they significantly opened the ability of the 
ANC to shape the future of South Africa, did not lead to a real shift in power, thus 
they are not significant enough to be considered the mechanism of transition. 
 The 1994 election, while groundbreaking, took place under an already agreed-
upon negotiated framework.  When the election took place, the ANC was already 
in the position of strenuously pushing its agenda through its own political 
influence and was guaranteed at least some role in the post-election government 
(because of the agreements on forming a government of national unity made at 
CODESA).  The election thus determined primarily how big the ANC’s power in 
the government would be, not whether they would have a role. 
 The negotiated agreement from CODESA thus represents the best coding of the 
transition mechanism.  It gave the ANC and other African groups significant 
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 Davenport, T.R.H. The Birth of a New South Africa. Toronto, Canada: University 
of Toronto Press (1998). 
 Jackson, John.  “The 1994 Election: An Analysis.” In F.H. Toase and E.J. Yorke 
(eds) The New South Africa: Prospects for Domestic and International Security. 
New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press (1998). 
 Schock, Kurt. Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in 
Nondemocracies. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press (2005). 
 
 
Name: Anti-Suharto Protests 
Country: Indonesia 
End Year: 1998 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: A massive civil resistance campaign, primarily led by students and fueled by a 
major economic crisis, led to mass defections from the regime of Indonesian dictator 
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Suharto.  As his regime increasingly lost cohesion Suharto resigned, handing over power 
to his vice-president, B.J. Habibie, who initiated a democratic transition. 
 
Sources 
 Boudreau, Vincent. Resisting Dictatorship: Repression and Protest in Southeast 
Asia. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press (2004). 
 Noble, Sarah. “Sierra Leone Citizens Defend Democracy, 1997-1998.”  Global 






Name: Sierra Leone Defense of Democracy 
Country: Sierra Leone 
End Year: 1998 
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: After a military coup ousted Sierra Leone’s first multi-party democracy labor 
unions, teachers unions, and student groups organized protests and strikes against the new 
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military government.  The campaign ended successfully when an African peacekeeping 
force invaded the country and ousted the coup leaders, restoring democratic governance. 
 
Sources 
 Lakey, George. “Sierra Leone Citizens Defend Democracy, 1997-1998.”  Global 




Nigerian Anti-Military Rule 
Location: Nigeria 
End Year: 1999 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Civil society organizations in Nigeria launched civil resistance throughout the 
rule of military dictator Sani Abacha to demand an end to military rule and a return to 
multi-party democracy.  Domestic resistance, tied with a declining economy and the 
death of Abacha in 1998 led to a rapid liberalization under General Abubakar and finally 




MN: Initial research puts only limited links between the civil resistance which took place 
in Nigeria and the transition away from military rule.  A better understanding may be to 
look at this case as an elite-led transition from a reluctant ruling military following 
Abacha's death.  Thus this case is considered to only weakly meet inclusion 
criteria.  Statistical tests were run which both included and excluded this case. 
 
Sources 
 Edozie, Rita Kiki. People Power and Democracy: The Popular Movement 
Against Military Despotism in Nigeria, 1989-1999. Trenton, NJ: Africa World 
Press, Inc. 
 Falola, Toyin and Matthew M Heaton. A History of Nigeria. Cambridge, England: 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
 
Name: Timorese Resistance 
Country: Indonesia/East Timor 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: International Intervention 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-institutional. 
Summary: After a long struggle against Indonesian occupation involving both guerrilla 
warfare and nonviolent resistance the citizens of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for 
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independence from Indonesia in a 1999 referendum.  However, immediately after the 
referendum Indonesian-backed militias invaded East Timor to reassert Indonesian rule.  
Independence was only achieved the following year when an Australian-led UN force 
invaded East Timor and established East Timor as an independent state. 
 
MN: I do not consider the referendum to be the mechanism of success in this case 
because it was followed by a de facto invasion to reassert Indonesian authority.  Thus, 
while the referendum was no doubt central to how future events played out the key 
mechanism of success was the international military intervention. 
 
Sources 
 Jones, Hannah. “East Timorese Activists Campaign for Independence from 
Indonesia, 1987-2002.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, February 16).  
Accessed 12/12/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/east-timorese-
activists-campaign-independence-indonesia-1987-2002. 
 Stephan, Maria J. “Fighting for Statehood: The Role of Civilian-Based Resistance 
in the East Timorese, Palestinian, and Kosovo Albanian Self-Determination 






End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Discovery of evidence implicating a top advisor of Peruvian President Alberto 
Fujimori of corruption sparked mass protests demanding Fujimori’s resignation.  The 
protests, tied with continuing investigations into corruption in Fujimori’s administration 
led to his resignation. 
 
Sources 
 Munoz, Aurora. “Surinamese Protest Against President, 1999.” Global Nonviolent 




Name: Anti-PRI Campaign 
Country: Mexico 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
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Summary: Several waves of protest, as well as economic challenges and elite-led 
liberalization, led to the successful ouster of the long-time authoritarian PRI party in 
Mexico in the 2000 Mexican presidential election. 
 
MN: Initial research revealed a minimal civil resistance role, thus the case is considered a 
weak example.  Statistical tests were run both including and excluding this case. 
 
Sources 
 Kirkwood, Burton. The History of Mexico. Santa Barbara, CA: Greenwood Press. 
 
Name: Croatia Democratic Opposition 
Country: Croatia 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: An alliance of opposition parties and civil society activists came together to 
challenge the rule of Croatia’s semi-authoritarian nationalist government.  Protests, 
innovative campaigning, and the unexpected death of Croatian President Franjo Tudman, 
all came together for the opposition to win a majority in parliament and the presidency 





 Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in 
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 Fisher, Sharon. Political Change in post-Communist Slovakia and Croatia: From 
Nationalist to Europeanist. New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillan (2006). 
 
 
Name: Bulldozer Revolution/Otpor 
Country: Yugoslavia 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: The Serbian student movement Otpor spearheaded a campaign of civil 
resistance against Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic, engaging in creative protests to 
undermine the narrative of Milosevic’s inevitable rule and successfully unifying the 
fragmented Serbian opposition into the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS).  Due in 
large part to Otpor’s efforts, DOS’s presidential candidate, Vosislav Kostunica, defeated 
Milosevic in the 2000 Yugoslavian presidential election.  When Milosevic falsely 
claimed that Kostunica had received less than 50% of the vote and thus a second round of 
elections was called for Otpor and opposition activists engaged in a wave of massive 
demonstrations, occupying central Belgrade, while outside of Belgrade workers at the 
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Kolubara coal mines (which supplied half of the country’s electricity) went on strike.  
Faced with increasing resistance and with police largely refusing to obey orders to 
disperse protesters the constitutional court reversed its ruling claiming a second round 
was required, Milosevic renounced his claim to the presidency, and Kostunica was made 
President of Yugoslavia.   
 
MN: Coding the transition mechanism in this case is challenging because of different 
possible interpretations of the importance of the election.  An argument could be made 
for this case being an example of negotiation (because the court reversed its decision and 
Milosevic stepped down after meetings with Kostunica), or of overwhelming (since after 
the election the massive protests, strikes, and defections by police and local government 
officials were crucial in ending Milosevic’s rule).  However, while the largest 
mobilization took place after the election itself, I consider the election to be the crucial 
transition mechanism for X reasons 
 Winning the election was clearly a necessary component for the mobilization 
which took place afterwards. 
 The protests were explicitly focused on ensuring the government honored the 
terms of the election rather than seeking a different route to power, e.g. through 
negotiation or extra-institutional seizure of power. 
 The final victory took the form of the constitutional court reversing its stand on 





 Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in 
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 Rennebohm, Max. “Serbians Overthrow Milosevic (Bulldozer Revolution), 
2000.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, September 8). Accessed 
12/12/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/serbians-overthrow-
milosevic-bulldozer-revolution-2000. 
 Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, 





Name: Anti-Rawlings Campaign 
Country: Ghana 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: After almost 20 years of continuous rule by authoritarian leader Jerry 
Rawlings (first as an un-elected coup leader and later as Ghana’s President), Ghana’s 
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democratic opposition launched a successful campaign to prevent Rawlings’ successor, 
Vice President John Atta Mills, from succeeding him.  The political campaign, backed by 
pro-democracy protests, successfully defeated Mills and consolidated Ghana’s 
democratic transition. 
 
MN: Initial research only revealed a tenuous role for civil resistance, and the case may be 
better considered as an elite-led transition followed by a traditional election rather than a 
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End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Labor unions in Surinam organized protests and demonstrations against 
President Jules Wijdenbosch.  The unions, along with opposition parties, unsuccessfully 
attempted to oust Wijdenbosch through parliamentary procedures.  However, as protests 
continued, Wijdenbosch agreed to hold early elections if the unions would temporarily 
call off their disturbances.  The campaign shifted tactics to ousting Wijdenbosch 
electorally and successfully defeated him in the early election. 
 
Sources 
 Becker, Meghan Auker. “Surinamese Protest Against President, 1999.” Global 




Name: Anti-Diouf Movement 
Country: Senegal 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Election  
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Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: An alliance of opposition parties and defecting figures from the long-time 
ruling Socialist Party organized a concerted challenge to long-time ruled Abdou Diouf.  
The opposition organized successful protests against plans by the Socialist Party to rig 
the vote, and successfully defeated Diouf in the second round of the presidential election. 
 
Method Note: While the mechanism of success is very clear, whether this case should be 
considered civil resistance or simply regular election politics is unclear.  I consider it civil 
resistance for two reasons: first, the one-party authoritarian nature of the regime which 
preceded the election and second, the real and effective use of demonstrations and the 
threat of mass civil disobedience by the opposition to pressure the regime into holding a 
free and fair election.  
 
Sources 
 “New Senegalese President Sworn In, Ending 40 Years of One-Party Rule.” 
Agence France Presse (2000, April 1). 
 Galvan, Dennis Charles. “Political Turnover and Social Change in 
Senegal.”Journal of Democracy 12(3) (July 2001), 51-62. 
 McKenzie, Glenn. “Senegal Elections: Peaceful Change or Violent Renewal?” 





Name: Anti-Chaudhry Campaign 
Country: Fiji 
End Year: 2000 
Transition Mechanism: Coup d’etat 
Secondary codes: Coercive, non-institutional 
Summary: Fiji’s first Indo-Fijian prime minister, Mahendra Chaudhry, was elected in 
May of 1999.  The election was widely resented by ethnic Fijian nationalists, particularly 
activists in the Takuei Movement, a Fijian nationalist group which had participated in 
agitation prior to the Fijian coups of 1987 (See Anti-Coalition Government Protests).  On 
April 28, 2000, the Takuei movement and other Fijian groups organized a protest march 
to demand the resignation of Chaudhry’s government.  In response to the march the 
government banned any additional protest marches.  The nationalists ignored the ban and 
planned a march on May 19th, the one-year anniversary of Chaudhry’s installation.  As 
the protest march was underway Fijian nationalists led by failed businessman George 
Speight staged a coup, taking captive Prime Minister Chaudhry and announcing the 
overthrow of the government.  The police and military initially declared the coup 
illegitimate but wavered in cracking down on the plotters.  The Takuei Movement 
declared its support for Speight’s coup and thousands of supporters descended on the 
parliament building to show their support for Speight.  After a ten-day standoff and riots 
around the Fijian capital by Speight supporters on May 29th the army announced that 
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they had assumed executive authority to resolve the crisis, permanently overthrowing the 
Chaudhry government.   
 
Sources: 
 “Fiji Government Bans Protest Marches.” Agence France Presse (2000, May 5). 
 Keith-Reid, Robert. “Thousands Take to Streets to Protest Fiji’s Government.” 
The Associated Press (2000, April 28). 
 “Fiji PM Overthrown, Held by Armed Men in Parliament.” Agence France Presse 
(2000, May 19). 
 Field, Michael. “Army Takes Power in Fiji, Declares Martial Law.” Agence 
France Presse (2000, May 29). 
 
Name: Second People Power Movement 
Country: Philippines 
End Year: 2001 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: In 2001, outrage over political maneuvering to save Philippine President 
Joseph Estrada from conviction in a corruption investigation resulted in a call for mass 
demonstrations to oust Estrada from office.  Over four days, millions of protesters 
gathered in Manila in echoes of the 1986 “people power” revolution against Philippine 
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dictator Ferdinand Marcos.  The mass uprising sparked quick defections from the head of 
the military and the supreme court, which issued a declaration denying Estrada 
legitimacy and installing his vice-president, Gloria Arroyo, as president. 
 
Sources 
 Mydans, Seth. “’People Power II’ Doesn’t Give Filipinos the Same Glow.” The 
New York Times (2001, February 5). 
 Seigel, Jessica. “Philippine Citizens Overthrow President Joseph Estrada (People 
Power II), 2001.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2013, March 3).  Accessed 
12/1/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/philippine-citizens-
overthrow-president-joseph-estrada-people-power-ii-2001. 
Name: Anti-Chiluba Protests 
Country: Zambia 
End Year: 2001 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: In 2001, Zambian President Frederick Chiluba was set to step down due to a 
two-term limit in the Zambian constitution.  However, early in the year Chiluba 
expressed his unwillingness to step down and instead began putting in place mechanisms 
to remain in power for a third time.  In response students, civil society groups, and 
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churches launched mass protests to demand that Chiluba give up power.  In response to 
the protests, Chiluba agreed to not run for a third term.   
 
MN: Confidence in including this case in the data is limited – while civil resistance did 
play a role in motivating Chiluba to not seek a third term, whether this qualifies as 
seeking “regime change” and thus being maximalist is questionable.  Statistical tests were 




 Phiri, Isabel Apawo. “President Frederick J.T. Chiluba of Zambia: The Christian 




Name: Madagascar Pro-Democracy Movement 
Country: Madagascar 
End Year: 2003 
Transition Mechanism: Negotiation 
Secondary Codes: Non-Coercive, institutional. 
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Summary: After an election filled with widespread fraud, supporters of opposition 
candidate Marc Ravalomanana held daily protests to demand the annulling of the election 
and the ouster of long-time president Didier Ratsiraka.  When the Madagascar High 
Constitutional Court (under pressure from Ratsiraka) refused to acknowledge the fraud 
and claimed that neither candidate had received more than 50% of the vote, thus 
requiring a second round, Ravalomanana’s supporters nonviolently occupied government 
buildings in the capital, Antananarivo, while Ratsiraka retreated to his demographic base 
on the coasts.  After several months of standoff, the two parties were brought to Senegal, 
where, under the auspices of the OAU, they reached a negotiated settlement which put an 
interim government in place and recounted the votes from the election.  The recount gave 
Ravalomanana an absolute majority, and thus the victory. 
 
MN: The election itself was clearly an important mechanism of success for the 
Ravalomanana campaign, however, as the narrative above shows, victory in the election 
was only a preliminary for true victory.  The major phase of the campaign took place 
after the election.  Victory was only achieved after the process of negotiation put the 
interim government in place which recounted the vote and issued the new High 
Constitutional Court verdict.  Thus I consider the negotiation to be the most accurate 





 Randrianja, Solofo. “’Be not Afraid, Only Believe; Madagascar 2002.” African 
Affairs 102 (2003) 309-329. 
 
Name: Rose Revolution 
Country: Georgia 
End Year: 2003 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: Opposition and civil society groups in Georgia, led by Mikhail Saakashvili, 
joined together to contest parliamentary elections against Georgian President and former 
Soviet official Eduard Shevardnadze.  When widespread electoral fraud gave 
Shevardnadze’s supporters the victory, Saakashvili and his supporters organized civil 
resistance in Tbilisi.  The campaign peaked with Saakashvili and thousands of protesters 
storming the opening session of the new Georgian parliament and demanding 
Shevardnadze’s resignation.  Shevardnadze resigned from office within weeks.  
 
Sources 
 Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in 
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 Radnitz, Scott. “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and 
the Post-Soviet ‘Revolutions.’” Comparative Politics 42, no. 1 (2010): 127-146. 
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 Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, 
and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 
(2007): 535-551. 
Name: Orange Revolution 
Country: Ukraine 
End Year: 2004 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional. 
Summary: The 2004 presidential election in Ukraine pitted opposition candidate Victor 
Yushchenko against the handpicked successor of authoritarian President Leonid Kuchma, 
Victor Yanukovich.  After Yanukovich attempted to steal the election through 
widespread public fraud, Yushchenko’s supporters began protests which eventually 
pressured the country’s constitutional court to acknowledge the widespread fraud and 
demand a new run-off election.  In the second election, monitored closely by domestic 
and international observers, Yushchenko defeated Yanukovich.  
 
Sources 
 Kuntz, Philipp and Mark R. Thompson. “More Than Just the Final Straw: Stolen 




 Radnitz, Scott. “The Color of Money: Privatization, Economic Dispersion, and 
the Post-Soviet ‘Revolutions.’” Comparative Politics 42, no. 1 (2010): 127-146. 
 Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, 
and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 
(2007): 535-551. 
Name: Forajido Rebellion 
Country: Ecuador 
End Year: 2005 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional 
Summary: A widespread popular civil resistance campaign organized protests in Quito 
against the regime of President Lucio Gutierrez.  The campaign was based around a 
number of grievances, most particularly Gutierrez’ replacement of supreme court justices 
with his own followers.  As the movement grew, the military became unwilling to 
continue repressing nonviolent protesters and announced they would no longer support 
President Gutierrez.  As soon as the military withdrew its support the Ecuadorian 
congress voted 60-2 to remove Gutierrez from office on the grounds that he had 
“abandoned his post.” 
 
MN: The coding of this transition is problematic because it contains both 
institutionalized elements and non-institutionalized elements.  I code it as a coup for two 
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reasons: first, the action by the Ecuadorian congress voting Gutierrez out was clearly in 
response to the military defection.  Second, the vote, rather than being a carefully 
legislated process, was rather more of an institutional front to a rapid independent seizure 
of power by elites.  Thus the transition is best-coded as a coup.    
 
Sources 
 Palazzolo, Nick. “Ecuadorians Oust President Gutierrez (Rebellion of the 
Forajidos), 2005.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2013, February 17). 
Accessed 11/14/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/ecuadorians-oust-
president-guti-rrez-rebellion-forajidos-2005. 
 
Name: The Gas Wars 
Country: Bolivia 
End Year: 2005 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, institutional 
Summary: A protest campaign in favor of nationalizing Bolivia’s natural gas reserves 
from 2003-2005 led by Socialist leader Evo Morales among others led to the ouster of 
President Sanchez de Lozada in 2003 and later to the ouster of Sanchez de Lozada’s 
successor, Carlos Mesa.  As protests continued to grow and reformist measures failed to 




MN: I code this as a single successful campaign rather than two successful campaigns 
(one against President Sanchez de Lozada and one against President Mesa) for two 
reasons.  On the data side, including a unit of analysis for both campaigns would skew 
the data as the outcome years are close to the same.   Thus, even if both were included in 
the dataset any analysis would have to exclude one.  Since protests continued after 
Sanchez de Lozada’s resignation it therefore made sense to me to analyze this as a single 
campaign ending with Mesa’s resignation in 2005, which was followed by a brief 
transitional period and the election of Evo Morales as president soon afterwards. 
 
Sources 
 Hirschel-Burns, Danny. “Bolivians Win Democratic Control of the Country’s Gas 
Reserves, 2003-2005.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2011, April 24). 
Accessed 11/12/13 at http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/bolivians-win-
democratic-control-countrys-gas-reserves-2003-2005. 
 Painter, James. “Why is Bolivia in Turmoil?” BBC News (2005, June 3). 
Accessed 11/12/13 at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4604173.stm. 
 
Name: Tulip Revolution 
Country: East Timor 
End Year: 2005 
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Transition Mechanism: Overwhelming 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: After local opposition leaders were defeated in parliamentary elections in 
Kyrgyzstan, widespread protests erupted almost spontaneously across the south of the 
country against the rule of long-time authoritarian President Askar Akaev.  As protests 
(some but not all under the control of the opposition) grew, various government 
ministries stopped obeying Akaev’s orders.  As protesters massed in Bishkek, scattered 
attempts to repress them failed as police defection grew.  As protesters occupied the 
Kyrgyz “white house” Akaev fled the country. 
 
Sources: 
 Bunce, Valerie J. and Sharon L. Wolchik. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in 
Postcommunist Countries. Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press. 
 Tucker, Joshua A. 2007. “Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, 
and Postcommunist Colored Revolutions.” Perspectives on Politics 5, no. 3 
(2007): 535-551 
 
Name: Cedar Revolution/Independence Intifada 
Country: Lebanon 
End Year: 2005 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
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Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional 
Summary: In early 2005, after popular Lebanese politician Rafiq Hariri died in a car 
bombing widely attributed to Syrian intelligence services opposition parties in Syria 
organized mass demonstrations demanding an end to the occupation of Lebanon by 
Syrian troops.  At the peak of the campaign over 1.2 million people (more than 25% of 
Lebanon’s population) protested against Syrian occupation.  As a result of the protests, 
all Syrian troops were withdrawn from Lebanon by April of 2005. 
 
MN: I code the transition mechanism in this case as “resignation” because Syrian 
President Bashar Assad unilaterally decided to withdraw Syrian troops.  This initiative 
aspect makes resignation the best coding, though of course no formal political resignation 
on the part of the Syrians took place. 
 
Sources: 
 Schlotterbeck, Markus. “Lebanese Campaign for Democracy (Independence 
Intifada or Cedar Revolution), 2005.” Global Nonviolent Action Database (2009, 




Name: Anti-Alkatiri Campaign 
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Country: East Timor 
End Year: 2006 
Transition Mechanism: Resignation 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: After Prime Minister Alkatiri’s dismissal of 600 soldiers who claimed they 
had been discriminated against sparked violent unrest thousands of protesters began 
holding demonstrations in Dili demanding that Alkatiri take responsibility for the unrest 
and step down.  They asked President Gusmao to dissolve the government.  As protests 
continued, on June 20
th
 President Gusmao threatened to resign if Alkatiri did not step 
down.  On June 26
th
 Alkatiri resigned, allowing Gusmao to form an interim government. 
 
Sources: 
 “Pressure mounts on ETimor PM to resign after protest rally.” Agence France 
Presse  (2006, Jun 6).  
 Smith, Tanalee. “East Timor’s embattled prime minister quits, raising hopes for 
end to violence.” Associated Press Newswires (2006, Jun 26).  
 
Name: Nepalese Anti-Government 
Country: Nepal 
End Year: 2006 
Transition Mechanism: Election 
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Secondary Codes: Coercive, Institutional 
Summary: Years of agitation by pro-democracy forces in Nepal culminated in a massive 
general strike in April of 2006 demanding an end to emergency rule, the return of the 
elected parliament, and the ouster of King Gyanendra, who had essentially ruled by 
decree since 2002.  In late April Gyanendra agreed to allow parliament to reconvene, and 
on May 18
th
 parliament voted to officially strip him of his monarchical powers.  While 
the political transition in Nepal continued in an uncertain fashion after this moment (and 
in still in a great deal of flux today) this vote represents the critical transition mechanism 
when the king lost his power as an absolute monarch and the balance of power shifted to 
the elected parliament.   
 
MN: I code this transition mechanism as an “election” because of its democratic process 
nature -  an institutional process by an elected parliament. 
 
Sources: 
 “Nepal’s King May Lose Power – Lawmakers Adopt Plan to Make Him a 
Figurehead Leader.” The Wall Street Journal (2006, May 19). 
 Abbass, Samia. “Nepalese General Strike to Protest Monarchic Rule, 2006.” 





 Sengupta, Somini. “Nepal Legislators Move to Curb the King’s Power.” The New 
York Times  (2006, May 19).  
 
Name: Anti-Thaksin Campaign  
End-Year: 2006 
Transition Mechanism: Coup D’etat 
Secondary Codes: Coercive, Non-Institutional  
Summary: In 2005 and early 2006 the People’s Alliance for Democracy, a “royalist” 
protest movement led by middle and upper class residents of Bangkok began a protest 
campaign against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who was popular in rural areas of 
Thailand but widely despised in Bangkok.  The protesters repeatedly appealed to the king 
to remove Thaksin, but he refused to do so.  In 2006, the military ousted Thaksin in a 
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